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The I.R.B. and the 1916 Rising

Edmund Lynch

Chief Commandant O'Donoghue

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

Diarmuid Lynch

THE I.R.B. AND THE 1916 INSURRECTION

A record of the preparations for the Rising, with comments on published works relating thereto, and a Report on Operations in the G.P.O. garrison area during Easter Week, 1916.

by

DIARMUID LYNCH

Member of the Pre-1916 Supreme Council

Edited, with a foreword and two chapters on the American phase of Diarmuid Lynch's activities in the Clan-na-Gael and Friends of Irish Freedom,

by

FLORENCE O'DONOGHUE



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FOREWORD

The autobiographical record which Diarmuid Lynch had commenced to write but never completed, and which forms the first chapter of this book, covers the period of his first sojourn of eleven years in the United States of America. It ends with his initiation into the Irish Republican Brotherhood by Sean T. O'Kelly in 1908, when, after his return to Ireland, he became a member of the Bartholomew Teeling Circle.

Although his national activities continued in one form or another up to the date of his death in November 1950, and although some of these activities are modestly referred to in the course of comment on published works relating to the Rising and to the I.R.B. wherever it was necessary to indicate his personal knowledge of events, nevertheless it seems desirable to supplement his unfinished record by setting down briefly the main events of his life. His work in the United States, as National Secretary of the Friends of Irish Freedom from 1918 to 1932, is a separate phase, an outline of which is given in the two last chapters in this book. The material for a full record of that phase, including the controversies in which the organisation was involved, is available in America and will, no doubt, be published.

From 1908 to 1917 the I.R.B. was the organisation through which Diarmuid contributed most of his service to the cause of the Irish Republic, and his participation in the Rising was its principal event. From his return to Ireland in 1932 until almost the day of his death he had been engaged, quietly and with almost incredible persistence, in collecting and recording accurate records of the historic events of the Rising and the pre-Rising activities of the I.R.B. Beginning this work at a time when little or nothing had been done to assemble the material for a factual record, or to separate the truth from the fables which gather inevitably around the activities of a secret organisation, he pursued it with astonishing industry and acumen. To say that he checked and re-checked everything he put on record as fact would be a considerable understatement. No possible source of accurate information was disregarded, no slightest lead towards the truth in which alone he was interested was neglected. In the light of his personal knowledge of the leaders and events of the period he was in a unique position to separate what was true and significant historically from the sentimental accretions of patriotic imagination. His personal integrity and ability, and the fact that he was one of the last surviving members of the pre-1916 Supreme Council of the I.R.B. combine to give his record of events an authoritative quality.

When he came to Cork in 1910 he was transferred from the Bartholomew Teeling Circle to the Cork City Circle whose centre was Sean O'Hegarty. His sterling worth and organisational ability were at once recognised, and in the following year he was elected by secret ballot to the post of Divisional Centre for South Munster and representative on the Supreme Council. This position he held until the Rising. It is an indication of the confidence reposed on him by the leaders that in 1914 he was the Council's delegate to the biennial Convention of the Clan-na-Gael in America, where he reported to the Revolutionary Directory on the state of the home organisation, and that during the period of Sean MacDiarmada's imprisonment in 1915 it was Diarmuid who was selected to act for him as Secretary of the Supreme Council, at a time when the final plans for the Rising were being completed.

His mission to the United States in 1914 with Thomas Ashe* was ostensibly to collect money for the Gaelic League, of which he was a member of the Coiste Gnotha. He remained in America after Ashe's return to carry out his actual mission, and when he returned to Ireland he brought a draft for £2,000 to purchase arms for the newly founded Irish Volunteers.

His activities in organising the I.R.B. in various parts of the country, in the distribution of Casement's pamphlet, "Ireland, Germany and the Freedom of the Seas," in the preparations for the Rising and in the selection of a landing place for the expected German arms are all recorded in the pages that follow, and it is not necessary to refer to them here. In these years he was the soldier in preparation; in Easter Week he became the soldier in action as a Staff Captain in the G.P.O. That phase of his work also is sufficiently evident from the records he has compiled.

In the courtsmartial following the Rising he was sentenced to death. Probably the fact that he had retained his American citizenship saved him from execution. At the request of Senator O'Gorman, President Wilson intervened on his behalf. His sentence was commuted to ten years' penal servitude. He was in Dartmoor and Lewis prisons until released with the other sentenced prisoners in June 1917.

Immediately on release he took up his work again, becoming a member of the Sinn Fein Executive Council, a member of the Irish Volunteer Executive and Director of Communications on the Headquarters Staff, and Treasurer of the reorganised Supreme Council of the I.R.B. Its President was then Sean McGarry and its Secretary Michael Collins. With Diarmuid, they constituted the Executive of the organisation. Diarmuid Lynch, Tom Ashe and Con Collins were entrusted by the Supreme Council in 1917 with the task of revising the I.R.B. Constitution, to bring it into conformity with the new position which had arisen from the proclamation of the Republic.

The reconstituted Sinn Fein Executive, reinforced by representatives of

* died on hunger strike - 1917.

the Volunteer and I.R.B. organisations, became in effect a national Government, exercising such legislative and executive functions as the strength of the national position permitted. Shadow ministers were appointed, but named Directors. Diarmuid was appointed Food Director—a very necessary Ministry at a time when Britain's food position had become so precarious as a result of German submarine warfare that there was real danger that this country would be denuded of essential supplies.

On February 21st, 1918, acting in his capacity as Food Controller, Diarmuid had seized in Dublin a consignment of pigs intended for export to England. He was subsequently arrested and brought before a Court. At his trial on March 3rd he made the following statement:

> "As an American citizen I stand by the principle laid down in the Declaration of American Independence and restated by President Wilson, that government of a people without the consent of the governed is unjust and contrary to the God-given rights of all nations.
>
> I stand by the inalienable rights of the Irish Republic enunciated by the gallant men murdered by England in 1916. I deny the right of any Court constituted by British Law to deprive me of my liberty for any act of mine committed in Ireland. That which this Court presumes to try me for has, I venture to say, the approval of the overwhelming majority of the people of Ireland. It was undertaken by me in the capacity of Sinn Fein Food Director on behalf of the Irish people against the policy of the usurping British Government in denuding this country of bacon and other Irish food products contrary to the needs and interests of the Irish people.
>
> It was also undertaken with a clear perception of what might be expected from the foreign militarism which curses this unfortunate country, and now my advice to the people of Ireland is to do as I have done. Better that some—hundreds if necessary—should suffer rather than have millions of our race die of starvation as they did in black '47—victims of the self-same British policy."

Serving his sentence of imprisonment in Dundalk Jail Diarmuid had a Deportation Order served on him there on 20th May. This threatened to interfere very seriously with his personal affairs. He was engaged to Kathleen Mary Quinn, daughter of the late Mr. and Mrs. John Quinn of Newbridge, whom he had first met in Dublin in 1914. The Deportation Order intimated that he was to be held in custody until he was put aboard a ship sailing for the United States. If he was unable to get married before he was deported his bride, not being an American citizen, could not under war conditions get a passport to the United States to join him there. He applied, through the prison governor, for permission to have the marriage ceremony in

Dundalk Jail. Expecting refusal of his request and believing that the Deportation Order might be put into effect even before his sentence expired, he decided to get married without the consent of the Prison Board.

At noon on 24th April, Kathleen Quinn, accompanied by her sister Carmel and a friendly priest, presented themselves at the prison and requested a visit to Diarmuid, Michael Brennan of Clare and Frank Henderson of Dublin, who were fellow prisoners. After the usual formalities the three prisoners were summoned to meet their friends, and during the fifteen minute interview the marriage ceremony was performed. Congratulations to the bride and groom were all the more hearty for the manner in which they had outwitted the prison authorities.

They barely succeeded. A few hours later Diarmuid was notified by the prison governor that his request had been refused, and on the same afternoon he was transferred to Dublin on his way to Liverpool in custody, where he was put aboard a ship bound for New York. By a coincidence, Mrs. Lynch, her sister and some friends entered the same compartment on the train from Dundalk to Dublin in which Diarmuid was travelling in charge of two detectives, so that he started his honeymoon with an official escort. His wife went with him to Liverpool next day, but was arrested there on the technical charge that being an American citizen she had entered England without a passport. She was not allowed to travel on the same boat with him to America, but after some weeks of waiting she was able to join him in New York.

In the United States his tireless energy found an immediate outlet in the work of organising the Irish there in support of the national effort at home. He was appointed National Secretary of the Friends of Irish Freedom, and became a member of the National Council and National Executive. In these positions of considerable responsibility and at times of severe strain he set a standard of integrity and forbearance which merited admiration. "He . . . studiously avoided participation in controversies, and never said an unkind or disrespectful word of any of his old colleagues."[1]

The differences on policy which had arisen in America did not disturb his steadfast loyalty to the Irish Republic, nor deflect his devoted labours for its establishment and welfare. His reaction to the Treaty is evident from a statement which he made to the Press on 7th December 1921.

> "With Irish coastal fortifications under British control, with power in the hands of the English Government to appoint a Governor-General for Ireland, with the Irish Government restricted in a dozen different ways by England, with an Ireland swearing allegiance to a foreign King,

[1] *Gaelic American*, 24th July, 1920.

> the use of the term 'Irish Free State' is an insult to the dead who died fighting for an Independent Irish Republic. It is also an insult to the intelligence of the living men and women in Ireland who will still continue to fight for absolute separation from England, and the intelligence of millions of Americans who appreciate the difference between a free America and a Colony of England."

From his return to Ireland in 1932 until his death he co-operated actively in every effort directed towards the collection of material for a reliable and accurate record of the historic events with which he was so intimately associated. The nineteenth anniversary of the Rising was commemorated by an impressive ceremony at the G.P.O. Dublin on 21st April, 1935. President de Valera unveiled a statue of Cuchulain in the G.P.O. in the presence of a distinguished gathering. A parade of 2,500 old Dublin Brigade men, members of Cumann-na-mBan, Army Units, and the newly established Volunteer Force took part in the ceremonies. Diarmuid was there and broadcast an address from Radio Eireann that night on the Easter Week activities in the G.P.O. area.

On many occasions before then calls had come, both from the veterans of the national struggle for freedom and from others, for some organised effort to record for posterity reliable accounts of the conflict. Something had been done in a piecemeal fashion by individuals, but there was as yet no comprehensive and definitive history, nor were the materials for such a history being collected.

That commemoration ceremony appears to have given a new impetus to the desire strongly felt by the diminishing survivors of the Rising, and in June of the same year Garrison Committees were set up in Dublin for the different command areas of Easter Week, charged with the task of collecting and recording factual accounts of the fighting. Diarmuid undertook the labour of gathering and compiling the records for the G.P.O. area.

It was a labour of love for him, although it took four years to complete. But the first partial result was available within a year. On 24th May, 1936, the 1916 Roll of Honour was presented to Mr. de Valera at Government Buildings, and is now in the National Museum. Diarmuid presented the Roll of deceased members, which then numbered 273. The Roll of members then living contained 1,226 names.

In a letter to the Irish Press of 6th December, 1944 he detailed the method he had adopted to secure the required information.

> "To secure the requisite data," he wrote, "I (acting for the Garrison Committee) posted to each member of the G.P.O. Garrison whose name and address were available a specially ruled sheet with spaces for Monday, Tuesday, etc., under the following headings :—

1. Day.
2. Post or subsidiary position.
3. Officer in immediate command.
4. Duties performed. Incidents of special interest recalled.
5. Hour, approximately.

Supplementary comment was requested on the back of sheet or on separate sheets.

> These ruled forms simplified the task of the narrators. The day by day recital was invaluable later. The replies were both immediate and satisfactory. Many were confined to one page; others ran to several pages. Each bore the signature and address of the narrator. Only facts within the personal knowledge of the narrator were required and these were given."

One hundred and forty-seven of these individual reports were returned to Diarmuid, and they gave rise to a considerable quantity of correspondence in the clarification of many points and in the elaboration of some matters of special importance. From them he compiled the Report presented in this book. It was, as he said, " condensed to suit the publication then anticipated," but is nevertheless the most comprehensive and reliable factual record yet available of the operations in the G.P.O. Garrison area during Easter Week. If similar Reports were available from the other Garrison Committees set up at the same time, the work which Diarmuid visualised as a factual record of the Rising would be complete. All the original reports on the G.P.O. area and the correspondence in connection therewith are preserved.

In March 1936 he broadcast from Radio Eireann a talk on his old friend John Devoy. In July 1938 he left Dublin and came to live near Mallow. In the following year he returned to his native Tracton, where he resided until his death on 9th November 1950.

A word may perhaps be said as to the form of the material included in this book. Had Diarmuid lived longer he would no doubt have continued his autobiography and incorporated into it in direct narrative form much or all of the material which he had set down in correction of statements made in published books, or in relation to his personal knowledge of historic events. In the circumstances, it has been thought desirable to leave the material in the form in which he wrote it.

F. O'D.

" And every comrade's honour, boys,
Will still be dear to me "

PREFACE

To satisfy the eager curiosity of old friends and that of boys and girls of the present generation to get details at first hand of incidents in which I had the honour to participate, I recounted such from time to time. Their next request was that I should write my reminiscences for publication,—a tall order !

The appeal of the youngsters who hungered for such data was a great temptation, but the idea was too fanciful to merit serious consideration. To begin with, I have neither literary pretensions nor the ambition to become known as an " historian." Next, I felt that the writing of an autobiography might well lead to the conclusion that I had far too exaggerated an idea of my own importance. Finally, there was the big doubt that the story, if written, would appeal to a publisher.

These considerations are still valid. Over recent years, however, I have devoted attention to noting errors of fact and opinion in books and manuscripts relating to the " Easter Week " period and commenting thereon. These comments were not written for publication but in the hope that the MS. might some day serve as a guide to future historians. But, friends for whose judgment I have high regard (among them one in particular with whose activities in the United States on behalf of Irish freedom I have been intimately associated for wellnigh half a century) having read those commentaries insist that it is incumbent on me to go further and record other memoirs. They hold that irrespective of my own feelings on the matter, the MS. would surely help to clarify certain historical incidents and thus serve a useful purpose. With the hope that they may be correct in this, I proceed. But, while writing I shall always have in mind the sarcastic remark current at one time in America : " Gee, that fellow hates himself."

D. L.

CHAPTER I

I

The writer of this autobiography, Diarmuid Lynch, was born at Granig, Tracton, Co. Cork, on the 10th January, 1878. Baptised "Jeremiah Christopher" I was for nearly 30 years known by one or other of these names (in varying forms as the personnel of my orbits changed) or by the initials "J.C.", and occasionally (in Gaelic circles) as Diarmuid. From 1907 when I returned from the U.S. to Ireland (for good as I then thought), I have had one name only,—the Gaelic form of Jeremiah, viz., Diarmuid.

Educated at Knocknamana "National" School under the tutelage of Michael McCarthy—a splendid teacher, proud of his Clan of MacCaura ancestry—though Irish History was not on the curriculum and was in fact taboo by the then pro-British Commissioners of Education in Ireland, he never missed an opportunity to relate some stirring incident in Ireland's fight against the invader. But, himself a product of the so-called "National" system and of the relentless denationalising agencies of which it was in the forefront, he knew but little Irish and only on odd occasions did he utter a Gaelic phrase.

Though most of the older generation in these parts spoke Irish in my youth it was deemed by them a badge of inferiority; we youngsters were given no opportunity to learn it. A few of the old stock were reputed to be "Gaelic scholars" who could read the language, and one was said to have books in Irish. This conveyed but little to me; I never saw Irish in print; the only written characters that came to my notice were on a scroll with the hand printed motto: "Cead Mile Failte." Phrases used by our old neighbour at Granig, Bessie O'Brien (whose family I saw evicted from their home when a boy) such as my conduct called for: "O, mo naire thu" (my shame thou art), and "Cuis gaire chughainn" (the cause of laughter to us) came to mind in after years as I studied my "O'Growney" in New York—when my joy on finding "naire" and "gaire" *in print* was unbounded.

I never heard any of those old Tractonians mention the "Tally-stick" as I did Sean O Cathasaigh of Mayo in New York: even so, they passed without leaving their children a knowledge of the language. As far as this locality was concerned the tongue of the Gael was apparently at its last gasp,—a fact which was only too true of the whole breac-Ghaeltacht. Nowadays, how I envy the boys and girls who are taught Irish in school, and how I deplore the fact that they do not speak it when they leave the school room!

What happy memories those school days at Knocknamana recall: Our hard-fought hurling matches when the rival "captains" of the day picked their "men" by calling alternately on the "man" each captain deemed best to bring success to his team. Our camans varied from the factory-made to those cut, "seasoned" and shaped by a few among us, and even to furze "crooks." From a purely exhibition standpoint there was the traditional test of how often one could continuously hit the ball vertically and forcefully from the "hop"—without moving outside a 12 foot circle. What competitions we had in running, jumping in all its phases; weight-throwing (nothing less than 28 lb. for us "men" of 10-12 years!) when we locals adjourned in summer evenings down by Coveney's woollen mills (now alas gone); in spearing the other fellow's peg-top, which called for a keen eye and governed hand. Marble-playing of our type also called for a high degree of expertness—shooting one from the forefinger and thumb and knocking another from the "pink" some five feet away, was as neat a performance in its way as any backspin golf shot Bobby Jones ever played,—the stakes being buttons or marbles, "brassies" being the choice among the former and vari-coloured "glassies" the latter. Then came the "conquerors" in the horse-chestnut competition, buttons again being the prize. My winnings in both games were considerable—the full of a home-made treasure chest—but what I was most proud of was my ability when about 10 years of age to shape and sew a two-part leather cover on my self-made hurley ball. We lads were expert trout catchers by hand under banks and large stones (the illegality of which we reckoned not) and had many other interests which the boys of the present sophisticated age do not enjoy. Happy memories, yes, but coupled now with a note of sadness; the Knocknamana Roll of my schooldays numbered about 140 boys and girls; to-day (1950) the total is less than 35!

As a youngster I heard snatches of a local ballad in praise of Tracton's prowess in the hurling field long before I was born. Each member of that particular team was referred to by name, among them my grandfather and one of his farm hands:

> There was Jerry Lynch so famous, a man of reputation
> And Timothy O Dalaigh of great activity.

Those Tracton Supple (pronounced soople) Goalers of more than a century ago were a headline for later generations—one of which at least (when I was a gorsoon) not only lived up to but excelled it.

This locality, however, had little or no tradition over a long period in Ireland's fight for freedom. From ancient times we could, of course, recall some of the history of Tracton Abbey founded by the Cistercians in 1224—of which some carved stones are the only remaining witnesses. Three fields

in front of my old home are still called the "monastreens," which may have been monastery lands or as the word implies may have been the site of chapels (little monasteries). Local tradition has it that there were divided opinions among the monks as to the most suitable site on which to build the Abbey—whether on a hillock in one of these "monastreens" or lower in the valley near the stream; that stones laid during the day on the former were found next morning at the valley site—which was eventually chosen. Supernatural interference is suggested, but (if the story has any basis) it might have been that the advocates of the lower site were the better tacticians.

When enquiring recently about local nomenclature my friend "Fiacra Eilgeach" informed me that Brady's Records of the Diocese of Cork, etc., mentions "Beata Mariae de Kilmanan prior ssa de Granig" which suggests that a community of nuns had a convent on one of those aforesaid "monastreens."

Old neighbours of my boyhood days used to tell me that I was of the ninth generation of the Lynches in Granig, but I have no means of checking this. On my first visit home from the U.S. I succeeded in deciphering inscriptions on the three Lynch headstones in Tracton graveyard, but the earliest name shown is that of Cathren Lynchy who died in 1750. This in itself was of particular interest, the spelling being the nearest anglified approximation to the Irish name O Loingsigh. Thereafter the name appears as Lynch.

In political affairs my father, Timothy Lynch, was typical of his generation; his interest was in "Home Rule" and he regularly read the very lengthy speeches of the Irish Nationalist Members of Parliament. He took me to see Parnell's great welcome to Cork (in 1886 I think), and I remember attending a monster Land League meeting at Minane Bridge which was addressed by those fiery orators William O'Brien and Dr. Charles Tanner—both M.P.s. But what stirred deeper national feelings in me were patriotic songs at family "parties" by my cousins Miah and John Ahern. Sentiments such as:

> "Yet, thank God e'en still are beating
> Hearts in manhood's burning noon,
> Who would follow in their footsteps
> at the Rising of the Moon."
>
> and
>
> "Through good and ill, be Ireland's still
> Though sad as theirs your fate,
> And true men be you, men
> Like those of Ninety Eight,"

thrilled and left an abiding impression. And, as in so many Irish homes, there was Robert Emmet's picture with the closing words of his immortal speech from the dock!

On my father's death when I was 13 years old, the "sling" and the catapult, the "crib" and the snipe snare were discarded, his shot-gun—which I was now at liberty to use—took their place. When I graduated to the "bagging" of snipe and woodcock and got an intimate knowledge of every bog and brake, every fence and "botharin" for miles around I felt confident of being a good scout and of my ability to handle a rifle to advantage if and when the opportunity offered in these parts for more serious work.

Soon, however, my future career was necessarily directed into a new channel,—I became a sorting clerk in the Cork G.P.O. Then I studied at Skerry's College for entrance to the British Civil Service, and in open examination secured a place as a "Boy Clerk"—with an appointment in London at the munificent salary of fourteen shillings a week.

The few Irishmen with whom I was acquainted on arrival in London lived at the opposite side of the city; my roommate in Islington was a Corkman who had no active interest in Irish national affairs; Frank P. Burke, a fellow clerk in the Mount Pleasant Money Order Office, had many views in common. Through the latter I was called on at the end of 1895 to make up a team in a hurling match in those early days of the G.A.A. in London. The teams had no distinguishing colours other than cotton sashes, one green and that of the opponents red. Mine remained among my treasures for more than a score of years. I have a mental picture of the small park in which the match was played, but of nothing else connected with it.

My further stay in that big metropolis was brief. I have since regretted not having had the opportunity of closer acquaintance with those players. Among them, I feel certain, were many members of the Irish Republican Brotherhood—the continued existence of which (either in Ireland or London), I was then totally unaware.

Not so many years later the London Gaels beat the home champions in Dublin. I deem it an honour to have been one of their early adherents. Even so, it was with a glad heart I grasped the chance to quit London where I felt cooped up in an alien atmosphere. I availed of the opportunity offered by my uncle, Cornelius Dunlea, in New York,—where I arrived in March 1896.

II

During my first year in Manhattan I visited every spot of historical or other interest, and venture to say I knew the city better than most native born citizens. The knowledge which they came by naturally about the working of the Federal and State Governments I acquired in large measure through study of Bryce's "American Commonwealth." Another twelve months' residence was, however, necessary to get these and kindred matters

into proper perspective. Though U.S. citizenship was acquired by me shortly after the minimum term of five years elapsed, I can say that on first sight of the Statue of Liberty I felt myself to be a good American.

For the inauguration of President McKinley on March 4, 1897, an Irish friend accompanied me to Washington, D.C. What with the magnificent Capitol Building over-topping the immense mass of people among whom I stood to witness the solemn ceremony with Old Glory floating freely from its dome, and then with multitude singing to the strains of the Star Spangled Banner, I experienced the deepest thrill of my young life.

Over 1896-7 my social activities were chiefly among German-Americans; splendid comrades they were. Our friendship remained intact over the eleven year initial period of my sojourn in the "Empire City," though my association with them diminished as the work of the Gaelic League came to occupy more and more of my spare time.

During the whole of that period my employment was with A. B. Farquhar & Co. (of which my uncle was junior partner and managing director)—exporters of farm implements and machinery manufactured by the A. B. F. Co. Ltd. at York, Pa. Our principal foreign markets included South Africa, South America, Mexico and Cuba. At first my job was that of bookkeeper and shipping clerk. Later (after my uncle's death in 1900) more important duties were assigned to me, and in time I became Assistant Manager. In the early years my salary advanced none too rapidly; my uncle continually urged that there was a wider field for me abroad. With this prospect in view I studied Spanish and Mechanical Drawing, and had all arrangements made to leave for Chihuahua, north-west Mexico, in 1898 when word came to postpone my departure. Next, I was offered a position in one of W. R. Grace & Co.'s houses in Peru but my preference was to remain in New York where by that time activities in the Irish language movement were all absorbing.

My first contact with Irish-American affairs was at the Irish Palace Fair in May, 1897. There I enjoyed the exhibits and walked on soil brought from each of the 32 Irish Counties, but met none of those responsible for the exhibition. Later on I read in the *Irish American* that classes in the Irish language were conducted by the New York Philo Celtic Society, which had functioned since 1876. The pleasure which this news evoked was, however, coupled with the fear that text books in the language (which I had never seen in print) must of necessity be beyond the reach of the $18 a week clerk. Even so, I decided to investigate and presented myself at the Society's room one hot summer afternoon, 1897. To my astonishment and delight I was handed a primer published by the Society for the Preservation of Irish Language, price 10 cents! On the other hand, my disappointment was acute to find not hundreds of students (as I had fondly anticipated) but half a dozen

old men—including Denny Burns, Joe Cromien and John Casey, veterans in the movement long long before the Gaelic League was established,—and an equal number of younger people.

The following December I was elected Secretary. By then the membership had assumed its normal proportions ; yet far from what it should have been. As the work in Ireland advanced and our activities became better known, the attendance at classes quadrupled. I venture to say that not even in Ireland itself could be found a group of finer calibre or more intensely patriotic from every standpoint. Their outlook was that enunciated by Padraig Pearse a decade later : " Ireland free as well as Gaelic, Gaelic as well as free." Among them were many boys and girls of the first American-born generation, and a few whose roots were further removed from the motherland.

All were imbued with Thomas Davis' dictum that " a nation's language is a more secure barrier than fortress or river." And, convinced that the restoration of the Irish language would increase the self-respect of the Irish people, we also deemed it our duty to eradicate any factor which militated against the good name of the race at home or abroad. " Stage-Irishism " was particularly obnoxious, and it seemed as though we in the U.S. had a keener perception of its repercussions than had our people in the old land.

" MacFadden's Row of Flats " which ran at the Fourteenth Street Theatre in the winter of 1901 was one of the worst of its type. The Philo Celtic Society organised a protest which, in the first instance, was confined to hissing the actors. The theatre folk brought in a strong-arm squad who manhandled and ejected both men and women. Among the latter I recollect Miss Sarah McKelvey and Miss Mary MacManus. My souvenir of the occasion was a " beautiful black eye," received while my arms were pinioned by two of the ejectors. Police arrived while the protest continued and arrested eight of our men who, however, were released next morning.

The show went uptown to the Star Theatre the following week. There the actors fared worse,—from eggs and similar " ammunition." This time the management had a squad of police ready in case of trouble. Several arrests were made ; the curtain came down. When the prisoners had been taken away, the performance was resumed. But, our " reserves " renewed the attack ; more police got into action ; the excitement was intense. At the police station the manager of the theatre deemed it the part of discretion not to press charges !

From New York the " MacFaddens " went to Philadelphia. What with the rough reception they got there (and I mean " rough "), plus a later protest at Buffalo, the show went " off the boards."

This was but the beginning of a campaign,—the " Stage-Irishman " had " as many lives as a cat " and he continued to exist chameleon-like. Years later the sponsors of " MacFadden's Flats " endeavoured to revive it elsewhere in " expurgated " form. But its inherently objectionable features were such that our friends in New Haven and Boston kept up the fight and it finally disappeared. Meanwhile, we New York Gaels had to be ever vigilant and impenitently emphatic in our protests irrespective of the auspices under which stage-Irishism showed its head. Too often the culprits were of our own blood, which shows how deeply the vicious propaganda had become operative.

While on this subject I may as well deal (out of chronological order) with the fight early in 1907 against the Russell Brothers' " Irish Servant Girl " —in which we had the co-operation of the United Irish-American Societies in New York, the delegates to which met once a month on Sunday nights. A meeting synchronised with the running of the show at Oscar Hammerstein's Opera House ; a delegation of three was sent to interview him. He received us courteously but said he could not break his contract with impunity. On receipt of our report it was decided to afford him " cause "—to attend at a performance in force as regular theatre goers. We did so, hissed vociferously in due course and the curtain came down. Then, our spokesman—Thomas P. Tuite, a grand old man who in his youth had joined the Federal Army in the Civil War as a drummer-boy and who later had come to Ireland to participate in the '67 Rising—made a dignified verbal protest whereupon we withdrew from the theatre. All very dignified, indeed, but we learned later that the considerable amount of money left at Hammerstein's box office did not bring commensurate results.

The show was billed for the Orpheum Theatre, Brooklyn, the following week, and a Manhattan delegation went across to organise a more effective protest there. I recall with pleasure that among those at the meeting of the Brooklyn Gaelic Society where such was discussed, Tom Clarke (who had spent 15 years in English convict prisons and in 1916 made the supreme sacrifice for the Irish Republic) was one of its most enthusiastic advocates. At the Orpheum neither the presence of some 150 uniformed police to the rear of the " orchestra " (" pit ") nor the " plain-clothes men " who lined the corridors proved a deterrent. Our men, on signal, delivered their " ammunition." Twenty-four were arrested,—ten of whom were held for " Special Sessions." We naturally expected something like this and had bondsmen ready to give bail. Dick Dalton and myself were among those who escaped arrest,—thanks to the fact that the detectives grabbed the " disturbers " nearest them, two just behind us and one immediately in front. I took care to get rid of my whistle at first throw. Our assistance came in useful for the men held for court proceedings. This latter phase was replete with interesting details, too numerous to recount here. Suffice it to say that the outcome was satisfactory. Similar protests were made in

a few other cities which brought "The Irish Servant Girl" to an inglorious end. Paradoxically, it had one decent item, the singing of "Where the River Shannon Flows," a composition of the Russell Brothers,—just one redeeming feature in an otherwise obnoxious production.

Reverting to 1901 : It was about that year the Philo Celtic first participated in the St. Patrick's Day Parade. This, as a rule, was a large and creditable turn-out, viewed by perhaps a quarter of a million spectators. There were bands and banners a-plenty but nothing to indicate that a new crusade in Ireland—the language revival—was reawakening the national soul of Ireland, of which the vast majority of those onlookers had little or no realisation. We injected some Irish-Ireland atmosphere by the display of artistic bannerettes, draped over the sides of our open carriages, bearing slogans in Irish : TIR AGUS TEANGA ! (Country and Language), TIR GAN TEANGA, TIR GAN ANAM (A Country without a Language is a Country without a Soul), MUSCAIL DO MISNEACH, A BANBA ! (Summon your Courage, O Ireland), BEIDH EIRE FOS CAIT NI DUBUIDIR (Ireland will yet be free). While this incident may be deemed by many as trivial it was indicative of our efforts "over the water" and we were proud of the widespread interest which it aroused.

III

My first visit home to Ireland was in 1902. I was then vice-president of the Philo Celtic Society, New York ; later that year I became president. At the Gaelic League Ard Fheis (parliament of the Gael) in Dublin I made the acquaintance of many of the leading figures in the Revival. What a thrill to find myself associated with them, and to listen to the traditional singers and story-tellers at the competitions ! A similar experience was in store for me at the Munster Feis held a little later, where I had the good fortune to get in with the younger element at the ceilidhe which followed the all-star programme. The old Irish figure dances which the Gaelic League had revived—the Four-hand Reel, Rinnce Fada, High Caul Cap, etc.,—were a revelation. With the help of competent partners I was able to participate in them and one of the cailini (Miss E. O'Connor, whose brother Fergus was a fellow "convict" after "Easter Week") wrote down full instructions for me later, of which more anon. With her co-operation and that of my fellow-Tractonian, Liam de Roiste, a group of singers and dancers attended an Aeridheacht which I arranged at Minane Bridge ; these were accompanied by our old New York friend, Edward O'Mahony (who was "out" in '67 and later was associated with the Carl Rosa Opera Company). Not since the great Land League meeting of my boyhood had Tracton parish seen such a large and enthusiastic gathering. What a breath of Gaelicism they experienced in that summer of 1902 !

"The Gaelic League of America" had been in existence since 1899, and by 1901 had forty affiliated branches—several of which had functioned for fully a quarter of a century. With this fact in mind I had to smile on reading a history of the "Easter Week" period (1916) in which it was intimated that it was only by the time Dr. Douglas Hyde visited America (1905) Irish language societies had been organised ! This, indeed, is but typical of how little Ireland knew of Irish-American activities either then or at a much later period.

Though interested in the work of the nation-wide organisation in the United States I had no connection with organisation other than membership in one of its constituent branches. I was glad of that as had I been a delegate to the 1902 Convention at Philadelphia, where discord reigned supreme, I suppose I would have been identified with one side or the other. Anyway, from that time forward "the Gaelic League in America" existed in name only.

"An Gaodhal," a monthly magazine printed solely in Irish, had for some twenty years been published by Michael J. Logan in Brooklyn. In or about 1898 it was taken over by Stephen J. Richardson, and appeared in a new format with the additional title "The Gael." Printed bilingually and splendidly produced in every respect, this journal was recognised as the unofficial organ of the Gaelic League in America. What with the split at Philadelphia it lost a large percentage of its supporters. The following June it published a most offensive caricature of Major John MacBride, against which some of us New Yorkers protested vigorously. This antagonism to MacBride could only have been because of his leadership of the pro-Boer Irish Brigade in South Africa, plus his uncompromising stand for an Irish Republic—in the fight for which he gave his life in 1916. Thenceforward, the days of "The Gael" were numbered.

The Gaelic League of the State of New York, founded about 1902, was more cohesive than the national organisation. Though it had but nine branches mostly in New York City, they were without exception very active. I have pleasant recollections of the co-ordinated work which it accomplished during my term as State President in raising funds for the League in Ireland and otherwise. The veteran John Casey who preceded me in the presidency of the Philo Celtic Society, became my successor at the head of the State League in 1906, and I am aware that under his guidance and that of Patrick Kavanagh who succeeded him the N.Y. State organisation continued to do effective work. It was still virile during my brief visit to the U.S. in 1914.

It was during my incumbency as State President that the remains of Father O'Growney reached New York en route from Los Angeles to Ireland. On us fell the duty of arranging the reception in the East, and of a fitting farewell.

Next to the religious ceremonies at St. Patrick's Cathedral where the remains of the Great Gaelic Scholar were to lay overnight, our first thought was to secure a Guard of Honour from the Irish Volunteer Regiment (the uniformed men of the Clan-na-Gael). None of the League officers had then any intimate contact with the Clan so far as I was aware, but John J. O'Leary and myself had an idea that Mr. Daniel F. Cohalan, then a practising lawyer, was an important figure in it and we requested him to use his influence with the Irish Volunteers on our behalf. He intimated that he did not hold the position attributed to him, and smiled at what he must have deemed our naïvetè. Nevertheless, the Guard of Honour materialised. Not alone that, but the I.V. officers also had the Regiment under orders to accompany the remains to the S.S. "Campania." This public demonstration was, however, cancelled at the last moment—the Cunard Company fearing the reaction of passengers if they became aware that the ship had a coffin aboard. At least, that was the reason given, their ultimatum was final.

The sailing date of the "Campania" (September 13, 1903) synchronised with that of the first issue of *The Gaelic American*,—the official organ of the Clan-na-Gael. We of the Gaelic League were delighted to find in it a long article set in Irish type,—with a promise that such would be a regular feature of the paper. But its policy with relation to the revival of the Irish language —as set out editorially by John Devoy—was confined to "the cultivation of Irish literature." Such was, of course, one of the ultimate aims of the Gaelic League but our immediate object was the restoration of Irish as the *spoken* language of Ireland. Though *The Gaelic American* continued to give splendid publicity to every phase of the language revival and the members of the Clan were supporters in all our activities the objective uppermost in their minds was the establishment through "physical force" of an independent Irish Republic. They did not then appreciate the fact that the winning of political freedom would have to await a favourable opportunity, and that if the "opportune time" did not come in their day it could be availed of by a future generation, whereas if the language (then dying) were allowed to disappear it could not be restored even by a free Ireland.

In the early winter of 1903 Daniel F. Cohalan—whose outlook on the language movement was identical with that of the Clan rank and file—was the principal speaker at an affair under the auspices of the Greenpoint Gaelic Society. I was particularly glad of his presence ; my talk as State President on the great urgency of the Revival was really directed at him. As he and I travelled back to Manhattan he brought up the points which I had stressed, and for a continuance of the discussion invited me to join him at lunch at the Lawyers' Club on lower Broadway. After several hours' chat there he not alone accepted the Gaelic League's philosophy but also agreed that the propagation of the language instead of hindering the objective of the Clan

was essential to its achievement. The success of this piece of missionary work gave me much pleasure—especially as by this time I had further reason to believe that he actually held an important position in the Clan-na-Gael. Soon thereafter he joined the Philo Celtic Society.

The propagation of the Irish figure dances by the New York Philo Celtic Society had infused new life into the Gaelic League branches. Members from each and representatives from the Monaghan and Cork County Associations came to learn, and in turn gave instructions in their own circles. The next stage of development in this line was that a team of eight gave exhibitions some 3 or 4 nights a week at Balls held throughout the winter of 1902-3 under the auspices of the numerous Irish-American organisations. Our "act" rarely went on before 1 a.m. and what with a light supper on the way home we usually reached our several destinations around 4 o'clock. This was an arduous undertaking as most of the team had to be at their respective jobs by 8 a.m. "Oh, the days of the Kerry dances, gone alas like our youth too soon"! But we felt well repaid,—the crowds of young people thus attracted to our branch meetings primarily to learn those Irish dances remained to study the language.

To cope with the increasing popularity an independent dance organisation —Cumann na Rinnce—was established. Sanguine as we then were that they would be taken up by Irish-Americans generally, and to the end that they should be as standardised as the waltz or two-step, the Cumann published a book of instructions with diagrams. That hope was not fulfilled, partly, I dare say, because those without actual knowledge of the "steps" found it difficult to follow the detailed instructions, and partly because the proper execution of these lively dances demanded an expenditure of energy which middle aged people might deem too much for them. Young enthusiastic Gaels however loved them for their sprightliness, and even the hot American summers were no deterrent.

IV

"Ar son Cait, a chead gradh" was the title of the first play in Irish ever produced in America. Written by one of our members, Andrew J. O'Boyle of Maugherow, County Sligo, it was staged by the Philo Celts in May 1904. This was an ambitious undertaking ; it proved a great success. Because of its novelty, it got splendid publicity in one of the City's evening papers,—the space given to it was in itself something for Irish-Americans to marvel at ! Our experience of the New York Press had been anything but satisfactory. It was evident that the audience included hundreds who had no previous contact with Gaelic League work, that the majority did not understand the language. But the ceilidhe scene appealed to one and

all,—the traditional songs in Irish, the step-dances, the Four-Hand Reel and the High Caul Cap, " brought down the house." Though the members of the cast were all novices, " naturalness " was the keynote of the performance ; they were not " acting " but just living their parts as they knew life at home in Ireland.

While putting aside the temptation to yarn about our players, I must say a word about our fiddler—Joseph McGuinness of Longford. Joe was a grand character, rather diminutive in size but big in every other respect, full of humour and full of determination. He was then and ever remained one of my dearest friends. We often talked of " sogering " together, and did in Easter Week—though not side by side. Later, while we were in Lewes convict prison he was elected M.P. for his native County on the " Sinn Fein " platform. The slogan was " Put him in to get him out." From that until his untimely death in 1922 he played a man's part in the Irish Republican movement,—though he never became a member of the I.R.B.

Within a month after the performance of " Ar son Cait " I happened to " see off " another friend who was sailing for Ireland on his annual visit. As I left the pier I felt so homesick that on reaching my office I informed the Manager that I required an extra week's holiday that summer for a brief visit home. At first demurring on the ground that I was there two years previously, he acquiesced ; and I assured him I needed only three weeks for the trip. The completion of a catalogue before my sailing date necessitated very late hours and a continuous rush ; by the time I got aboard the steamer I was " all in." Got ill during the voyage and ran a high fever on arrival at Cobh (then " Queenstown " !). Spent 10 days in bed under the care of two doctors, and what with the necessary period for recuperation I arrived back in New York after an absence of not three but six weeks—" fit as a fiddle " after the ocean voyage. Decidedly awkward for me of course. Even so, I had no need to add anything to my report sent from Ireland. But unfortunately, the real purpose of my visit—to establish a business connection at home—remained unfulfilled.

During my absence Dudley Digges and Maire Quinn (who later became his wife)—both of them " Abbey " players—had occasion to protest against a " stage-Irish " production at the St. Louis " World's Fair " where they were appearing. In this they had the co-operation of Major John MacBride who happened to be on the spot. Soon after my return the three of them attended a conference at the old Vanderbilt Hotel at which we New Yorkers backed them up and gave further publication to their protest. As the years rolled on and Digges achieved fame as an actor my thoughts went pleasantly back to that meeting in 1904 with him and his splendid Irish wife.

The following winter another Irishman visited New York,—one who had achieved fame along different lines, in the person of Señor William

Bulfin (" Che Buono ") editor of the *Southern Cross*, Buenos Aires. His *Rambles in Eirinn* had not then appeared in book form, but the series of articles had received wide publication in Ireland, America and elsewhere. The State Gaelic League requested him to deliver a lecture under its auspices ; he readily agreed and chose as his title " Irish Nationhood : How to achieve it." While preparations for the occasion at Carnegie Hall went on apace—including poster advertising on the " elevated railroad " hoardings—a few of us entertained him to supper at " Shanleys " ; in reality it was he who entertained us : Irish affairs got the go by for the nonce ; his inexhaustible fund of amusing stories about his life on the Argentine Pampas and of his " Gaucho " comrades was so enthralling that we lost track of time till we found ourselves the only party left in the restaurant.

A few days later we were stunned to find that our big, genial, great-souled friend was so seriously ill that he could scarcely move in bed,—and the lecture date only a week ahead. In desperation we wired Father Yorke at San Francisco to substitute for him—at our expense. We knew of no other man to fill Bulfin's place, but Father Yorke was unable to come ! Cancellation of the event seemed the only alternative ; this we postponed from day to day. Then, against our earnest protests Bulfin insisted on leaving his bed while still a very sick man and kept the appointment at Carnegie Hall. Even without the preparation which he had intended, the address of this uncompromising and philosophical Gael gave his large audience much food for thought and enthused them with his courageous arguments. My next, and last meeting with him was at St. Enda's College Aeridheacht, Dublin, many years later. His faith in Ireland's future freedom was undimmed, but he did not live to see even its partial fruition.

Of the great victories won by the " stars " of the Irish-American Athletic Club—Sheridan, Flannagan, Joyce, Daly and their colleagues—over the years before and subsequent to 1904, I have happy recollections. When Martin visited Dublin I had the pleasure of greeting him. The spectacle of this magnificent specimen of lithe, virile, graceful manhood—the embodiment of those Olympian victories of his—as he appeared on the balcony of the old Gresham Hotel in response to the cheers of the welcoming throng was one never to be forgotten. It was later, I think, that John Flannagan settled down in his native spot near Kilmallock where during the course of an afternoon's chat with him the ears of many old friends in New York must have " burned " fiercely.

One of the activities of the N.Y. State Gaelic League in 1904 was the raising of a Fund for the League at home. When gauged by present day standards the total was not large, but it was most welcome at Dublin headquarters in those " lean " times.

Came 1905, and the Philo Celts repeated their former success with " Ar

Son Cait,"—this time in a larger auditorium. At this time Father Michael O'Flannagan (whose name lives in the history of Ireland's War of Independence) was in New York collecting funds for the Loughglyn Industries, County Sligo, and Dr. Gertrude Kelly requested the Society to give him two benefit performances. She secured patronesses for the event from New York's "400"—including Mrs. Clarence Mackay. The old veterans of the P.C.S. who had to be satisfied with an admission fee of 25 cents to their annual concerts in the eighties were aghast on learning that the tickets on this occasion at Mendelssohn Hall would be $3 and $1. But as they approached the theatre on the evening of May 2nd 1905, and saw a long line of our patronesses' automobiles parked nearby they could scarcely believe their eyes. When the house became packed they thought the millennium had arrived. The same was true the following night.

The interest which the production aroused may be gauged from the fact that a request came from Mayor Edward F. Dunne of Chicago for a performance in that city. Highly gratifying of course, but the expense incidental to such a trip was beyond us.

Those wealthy New York ladies looked for novelty and they enjoyed it, but their interest in the Irish language movement went no deeper. Writing this I am reminded of an incident back in 1899 when with the enthusiasm of a novice it occurred to me that a reputed millionaire born in County Cork might be induced to finance the Gaelic League at home. I called to his Wall Street office and suggested that, if rumour were true, he had it in his power to save the language of Ireland,—meaning thereby that the number of organisers and travelling teachers could be vastly increased. He received me cordially but there my self-imposed mission ended. Perhaps his reputed wealth was a fiction. Be that as it may, and bearing in mind that several well-to-do men did subscribe generously to Dr. Douglas Hyde's campaign years later, it is a sad fact that millionaires of Irish blood in America have neither the race consciousness nor the spirit of financial open-heartedness which have been such distinguishing characteristics of wealthy Jews.

In 1905 also the State League established An Cumann Ceoil to popularise choral singing in both Irish and English under a competent instructor. Paradoxically, the supersensitiveness of a lady member regarding the words of "Father O'Flynn" led to a very inharmonious situation. Then the editor of "The Irish Advocate" (who had shown mighty little interest in the work of the Gaelic League) enlarged on the incident in an obnoxious manner. Richard F. Dalton and myself felt that "horse-whipping" was the most appropriate punishment. C. J. Lee, the man most closely involved, desired that he should be allowed to inflict it; the three of us drew lots and the job fell to me! The "whipping" was more or less nominal, but that editor gave Gaelic League affairs a wide berth thereafter.

In that year also Michael J. Doyle (of Athy) succeeded me as president of the Philo Celtic Society; R. F. Dalton succeeded him in that office the following December. The latter will be heard of over the ensuing 45 years,—the period yet to be covered by these memoirs,—and far beyond 1950, I trust.

The outstanding event of 1905, not for us Gaelic Leaguers alone but for all of Ireland's friends throughout America, was the arrival among us of Dr. Douglas Hyde. New York had the first opportunity to extend a welcome, and what a splendid, representative and enthusiastic audience greeted him at Carnegie Hall on November 26th! The illuminated Address which I on that occasion had the honour to present on behalf of the Gaelic League of the State of New York is referred to in his book "Mo Thurus go hAmerica."

Twenty-three years roll by: "An Craoibhin" becomes the first President of Eireann 1928. When at the reception in Dublin Castle, following his inauguration, I tendered my personal congratulations he enthusiastically recalled one of the phrases used by us in 1905—which may be translated thus:

> "We are full of hope, and it is our prayer by night and by day, that the God of Glory may give you—Prince of the Gael—long life and good health, and may He not take you to Himself until Ireland be free from the domination of the Saxon."

He gleefully commented on the measure to which our 1905 wish had come true, and remarked that the Address was one of his proudest possessions then hanging in the hall at Ratra, County Roscommon.

When Dr. Hyde's marvellously successful tour terminated, Attorney John Quinn, the man to whom first honours belong for his able Directorship of it from start to finish, in a long letter to the Press thanked all who co-operated with him, and then made special reference to Daniel F. Cohalan which (for reasons to become evident later on) I cannot resist quoting in part:

> "He aided me greatly in getting in touch with the men who organised and made successes of the meetings in other cities. I feel that he saved me, by his advice and counsel, always generously given, from making many a blunder in the organisation of meetings in other cities, and he did all this quietly but effectively.
>
> It would take a column even to name all the things he did. Those who had to do with the New York meeting know what his services were, but I want to say here, in order that it may be known by others who do not personally know the rugged character of the man and his power of working hard for any cause that is near to his heart, that to no one is a deeper debt of thanks due than to Mr. Cohalan."

John Quinn's letters to myself, in my official Gaelic League capacity, were numerous—one of them I still treasure. His forthrightness was refreshing. Memo. only—not for publication: (PS Nov. 12, 1905)

> "I'm saying nothing *now* but when this matter is over I'll know who did the most of the talking and who did the least—or no work. I've had a lot of *advice* but the workers have been few. You have been one of the best and I'll say so to Hyde and everyone else.
>
> Sincerely,
>
> J.Q."

The next incident of note, so far as we Philo Celts were concerned, was the production in April 1906 of Douglas Hyde's "An Posadh" (The Marriage)—the principal character in which was Blind Raftery the Connacht poet and musician, who though he looked and acted as when alive, had, unknown to the wedding party, died a short time previously. The sustained interest in Gaelic drama was evident in the fact that the Lexington Opera House was packed on the occasion. "An Craoibhin" himself who was still in America was unable to get there until near the close of the performance. This suited me personally as my portrayal of "Raftery" was, I fear, far below the author's conception of him. I was a success in one respect anyway: fellow members in the audience who never saw a fiddle in my hands marvelled at my expertness,—the explanation for which was that the actual musician was old Joe Norton who stood in the wings behind me.

Our next enterprise that received the flood-light came early in 1907: the protest against "The Irish Servant Girl," already described. One of the unrelated though amusing incidents connected therewith—another instance of unearned reputation—may as well be given here: Our attorney, ex-judge Haggerty, who successfully defended some of the "culprits," sent in a bill for $500—a lot of money in those days—much more than the United Irish Societies had in the treasury! Two Brooklyn colleagues and myself were delegated to interview him and we met at the Juanita Club house in that city,—Haggerty's political headquarters, where my friends also were members. They spent much time discussing local matters in which I had no interest, and about 11 p.m. another Juanita member not realising that the four already in the party had private business to transact invited us to a drink. Invitation accepted; in due course a waiter brought along a bottle of whiskey and a box of cigars. Local topics still held the field, accompanied by "round" after "round" in which good-fellowship I being a "guest" had no say. I could but "join"—and hope for the best. What with the old American custom of helping yourself to as much or as little liquor as

one deemed desirable, or accepting a cigar in lieu thereof, my consumption of the former was just sufficient to keep me awake but I smoked cigars all night and had my vest pockets full as well. It transpired that Judge Haggerty had been less judicious,—he went off to sleep about five o'clock! Meeting adjourned; nothing accomplished; I came back to Manhattan, had an unusually early breakfast at Park Row and went directly to my office in the old Cotton Exchange Building.

Another appointment was made with the Judge for the following Sunday night as Boss McCarron's Democratic Headquarters, Brooklyn. One of my colleagues announced our arrival and we were ushered into the main auditorium—where at least a hundred local politicians stood in groups chatting. Along came Judge Haggerty from the far end of the room, with a broad grin and his hand extended headed directly for me and at the top of his voice greeted me thus:

> "Put it there young fellow, I've got to hand it to you. I'm an old veteran at the game, but by——— you drank me down the other night, left me asleep in my chair, and went off sober to Manhattan."

Immediately, conversation ceased and all eyes were focussed on this youthful prodigy. However, myself and my "reputation" passed from their ken. Incidentally, I may remark that that occasion was my nearest approach ever to American "politicians" as such. And, the moment we stated our business to the Judge he agreed to cut his fee in half! Perhaps my readers will feel that this story of the incident might well have been cut even more radically?

From my earliest connection with the Irish language Revival the desire to return permanently to Ireland had grown stronger. By March 1907 I decided that for its fulfilment some drastic step was essential: I handed in my resignation to Farquhar & Co.—to take effect some three months later. Lest this homing desire should be attributed to aversion to life in America, let me say: I entertained none but the warmest feelings of devotion to the U.S.A.; I loved its flag; I revered its Constitution; I admired its people; I had pleasant business relations. For me the alien atmosphere of London never existed in New York. Time never hung heavily on my hands. In Gaelic League circles I was surrounded with splendid comrades and friends. My annual holidays, spent for the most part with young Americans with whom friendship was cemented in the early years, at Pocono Mountains, Lake George, Seneca Lake, in Maine and other summer resorts still afford me happy recollections.

The diversity of nationalities and religions met with in New York boarding houses (which for me meant a bed-sitting room with breakfast and perhaps dinner), run by genial old ladies who hailed from places as far apart

as Wexford, Venezuela, Virginia, New England, England, Scotland and Canada, furnished a basis for many anecdotes. An extreme instance of such admixture was my "home" on Lenox Avenue (then half a mile from the negro section and now in the very heart of it): the landlady was Scotch (Presbyterian): her two Canadian-born daughters (do), her American-born son-in-law (Baptist); three Germans (Lutherans); three other Germans (Jews); one Englishman (Episcopalian); one Canadian (Atheist); and myself, Irish and Catholic. Needless to say, religious discussions were never indulged in; we were a "happy family" when together at evening dinner. It was there I first read "Knocknagow"—on Saint Stephen's day, it so happened—and what with "Matt and Thrasher" "knocking a hatful of feathers out of a wee wren," and home associations "crowdin' in thicker than ever," I laughed and wept alternately. A few weeks later my Lutheran next-door neighbours joined in celebrating my 21st birthday.

During those eleven years of my first sojourn in America it was my good fortune to have become acquainted not alone with John Devoy ("the greatest of the Fenians")—with whom I had much more intimate associations in later times, but also with Dr. Thomas Addis Emmet (grand-nephew of Robert); Mrs. Mary Mitchel Page (daughter of John Mitchel and a member of the Philo Celtic Society); O'Donovan Rossa (the most typical of the Fenians) whose salutation rang out in his Munster Blas on Broadway occasionally: "Cionnas ta'n tu a Dhiarmuid?"; a brother and sister of Thomas Francis Bourke (one-time fellow boarders); Col. Ricard O'Sullivan Burke, leader of the Rescue at Manchester; John J. Breslin (famed for the Stephens and the "Catalpa" rescues); Captain Larry O'Brien who escaped from Clonmel jail in 1867; many other '67 men of lesser fame; and, last but not least, Tom Clarke after his fourteen years in English convict prisons. What an honour and inspiration it was for a young Irishman to have known such living links with Ireland's fight for freedom over the previous century!

Now that this first phase of my American experience draws to a close, my mind wanders back to the festive occasions spent with my German friends at the Leiderkranz and elsewhere; to our cycling trips far into country districts and joint camera work with particular pal, Hermann Wanderlich, at which he was an adept. And on the Irish side, to hurling and football indulged in at our Philo Celtic outings in summer; all careless and gay we were.

All told, a full life and a happy one—from which I was now about to divorce myself. Well, "the savage loves his native shore." The rest of the answer is that Ireland was the place where "Irish-Ireland" activities were all-important.

When my resignation reached the head of the Farquhar firm at head-

quarters, York, Pa., he came on to New York, urged me to reconsider my decision and offered special inducements—including a very considerable advance in salary. Next, he suggested that I take a six months' leave of absence—as a result of which he was convinced I would be disillusioned about life in the old country and would wish to return. Neither of these proposals appealed to me; I sailed for home in July. The status of A. B. Farquhar & Co. may be gauged from the fact that among many large orders received from South Africa at the termination of the Boer War, *one* was for ten thousand ploughs! Mr. A. B. F. was of Scotch descent; a man of unusual intellectual attainments, with many of the most admirable traits of his race. He was a recognised authority on finance and economics, and numbered among his friends President Grover Cleveland, Andrew Carnegie, Charles Schwab, "Andy" Mellon, and other men of high standing in the political, business and banking life of the United States. Thus, I deemed it quite a compliment when six months after my return to Ireland he wrote me that if I wished to go back I would "find the latch string out"—also suggesting that I should "take a trip to the Argentine in the interest of our business." At that date I was still without a job and without any immediate prospect of one.

While still an involuntary "gentleman of leisure" I took a hand in the North Leitrim election campaign in favour of Charlie Dolan, the Sinn Fein candidate. It was a losing fight but a memorable one. On one occasion Alderman Tom Kelly and myself were assigned to a meeting at Kinlough, and had an exciting day. Not alone was the majority of the local people opposed to us but we had to contend with one of the Belfast gangs imported by Joe Devlin. Armed with long sticks they menaced throughout the meeting. Their loud-voiced interference was so great that the speakers could scarcely hear themselves; people who wished to hear us certainly could not. As we continued to speak eggs began to fly; the wall of the hotel in front of which our wagonette was drawn up was as "decorated" as we were. On the return journey to Manorhamilton headquarters our reception was unpleasant—to say the least. The Redmond-Devlin beat us in Leitrim; their countrywide rout in 1918 was in the unforeseeable future.

In view of my friendship with leaders as well as with men of the rank and file in the Clan-na-Gael over many years prior to 1907, it doubtless seemed strange that I had not become a member of that organisation. There was a reason: William J. Balfe of the Gaelic Society who contributed a weekly column of "Gaelic Notes" to the *Irish World* (then an out-and-out supporter of the Irish Parliamentary Party) had attacked the State Gaelic League for being "under the influence of the Clan." So far as I was aware the accusation was without foundation. During my time as President of the Philo Celtic Society and of the Gaelic League of the State I never exper-

ienced any such interference or "influence" —for which there was neither occasion nor opportunity. We drew a measure of support from all friendly sources such as the Irish County Associations, and as the members of the latter were in the main followers of Redmond the charge was a mischievous one.

Shortly thereafter a few of my colleagues (well aware of my republican sentiments) became insistent that I permit them to nominate me for Clan membership. They were chagrined at my refusal and seemed to construe it as antagonistic. But, in face of *Irish World* antipathy to the Clan-na-Gael I deemed it advisable to remain in a position to deny membership therein. The attitude of my colleagues was disconcerting, and I felt it incumbent on me to discuss the matter with John Devoy with whom I had friendly though not intimate relations since the founding of the *Gaelic American* in September 1903. Devoy approved of my decision.

Eventually, in March 1908, I was glad to accept a rather minor position with Thomas McKenzie & Sons, Dublin,—in charge of Feeding Stuffs, Artificial Manures, and the Fittings Department. When attending to a County Dublin farmer who wanted, say, half a dozen socks for a certain plough or perhaps a bolt for a particular part thereof, my thoughts occasionally flitted back to that Farquhar order for 10,000 complete ploughs, and my salary was about one-eighth of that relinquished by me in New York. Even so, I was quite content, busy as I was endeavouring to get a thorough grasp of this retail trade—with an eye to earning a decent livelihood in the years ahead.

As representative of the New York State Gaelic League I had a seat on the Coiste Gnotha (the governing body of the League in Ireland). This continued up to Easter Week, 1916.

I have made it clear that though not a member of the Clan-na-Gael, I was close to it in every respect. Even so, it was not until Sean T. O Ceallaigh (now President of Eire) "approached" me in the Spring of 1908 that I became aware of the fact that the Irish Republican Brotherhood (established in 1858) still functioned. This personal experience of mine not alone indicates how secretly the I.R.B. conducted its affairs, but also explains in large measure why the British authorities were kept in complete ignorance of the plans for the Rising of "Easter Week" 1916. For me, my initiation into the Bartholomew Teeling Club, I.R.B., opened a new chapter.

CHAPTER II

THE I.R.B.

Some Recollections and Comments

by

DIARMUID LYNCH

1908.

I returned to Ireland from the U.S. in 1907. A few years earlier, while State President of the Gaelic League of the State of New York, colleagues asked me to join the Clan-na-Gael. Prior thereto, however, the *Irish World* —the chief supporter in America of the Irish Parliamentary Party—protested in its "Gaelic Notes" that the Gaelic League in New York was dominated by the Clan-na-Gael. Such was not the case, though many of our men were members of it. I was not a member and desired to remain in a position to assert that I was not in case the *Irish World* should pursue that line of criticism. Accordingly, I declined the invitation to join. In the course of my Gaelic League activities I had had many friendly contacts with Clan men and explained my attitude in this matter to John Devoy who agreed with my decision.

Shortly after I located in Dublin in 1908 Sean T. O'Kelly "approached" me about the I.R.B., and in due course I became a member of the Bartholomew Teeling Circle. I think it was somewhat earlier that I was requested by P. T. Daly to "meet a few friends" who desired to have a chat about the Irish situation in New York. The latter, to the best of my recollection, comprised John O'Hanlon, Fred Allen and Daly himself. In after years I realised that my inquisitors on that occasion had been prominent members of the then Supreme Council of the I.R.B.

1910.

I moved from Dublin to Cork and in due course became attached to the Cork Circle.

1911–1912.

Towards the end of 1911 I was selected as Divisional Centre for Munster on the Supreme Council. I was so notified by Sean O'Hegarty.

I continued to act in that capacity until Easter Week, 1916. Later, on release from prison in June 1917, I resumed office as D.C. up to the date of my deportation to the United States in April 1918.

The constitutional method of electing a Divisional Centre was that a provincial Convention comprising County and District Centres elected by ballot a special committee of five, and the latter in turn elected by ballot a Centre for the Division. Thus, these five were the only members in the province to whom the Divisional Centre was known as such.

My predecessor as Divisional Centre for Munster was, I believe, Michael Crowe of Dublin.

Before my period of office Cathal Brugha—who as a representative of his firm travelled extensively—had a sort of roving commission to do I.R.B. organising. I was informed that he kept in contact with "Centres" in various towns and enrolled men as occasion offered. It was not a constitutional function of the Divisional Centre to enrol members; his duty was to keep in contact with County Centres and thus keep posted on the state of the Organisation in his Division. Recruiting for the individual Circles was the business of the respective local Centres—who had an intimate knowledge of men in their respective localities and thus were the best judges of suitability for induction into the I.R.B.

Even so, I did on occasion take men into the organisation in places where no Circle existed—those whose names had been suggested to me by Centres elsewhere, or men whom I in the course of my visits had had opportunity to "sizeup."

In many instances I attended Circle meetings—where a meeting coincided with the date of my business visit to the locality. In such cases I acted in the capacity of an "organiser" and not as Divisional Centre. Periodically, I got reports from County Centres and District Centres with respect to other Circles and/or groups in various parts of the respective counties which I had no opportunity to visit in person; also of unattached members here and there. Local centres and even unattached members were definite focal points from which to do recruiting. But where neither existed the location of a likely prospect was more difficult than the proverbial "looking for a needle in a haystack"—the needle *was* in the stack but in those days of denationalisation there may not have been in a whole district a single man imbued with republican ideas!

Even in cases where one was assured that a certain man was a likely prospect, the official responsible for his induction had not alone to be certain that such "prospect" entertained the republican viewpoint but that his probity and tact were beyond question. And often when after tedious investigation a man was deemed fit in every respect the inquisitor found himself "up against a stone wall"—that of religious scruples in the matter of joining a

"secret organisation." This was a stumbling block in the matter of numerical progress.

1912–13.

During these years I regularly attended meetings of the Supreme Council in Dublin. I was also a fairly regular attendant at meetings of the Coiste Gnotha of the Gaelic League—whereon I represented the American Gaels since 1907.

Supreme Council meetings at that time were largely devoted to reports on the state of the Organisation in the several Divisions, on finance, on publications; on such events as the Wolfe Tone and Emmet commemorations; on possibilities for the advancement of the Irish Republican doctrine and contrariwise to defeat denationalising schemes.

As an outstanding instance of what may now seem to have been excellent material for the I.R.B.—of men in various parts of the country in 1912–13 who had proved themselves A1 in very many respects—and yet were not available as members, I may mention Terence MacSwiney. He was then writing excellent articles for *Irish Freedom*. Even so the consensus of opinion among my fellow members of the Cork Circle was that he was not to be "approached" with a view to membership in the I.R.B.—not in 1911–12 at any rate. My acquaintance with him at that time was only casual, and I forgot the actual reason for non-approach in his case; the religious ban may have been the obstacle.

The latter, to my personal knowledge, prevented many men from joining. Even some enrolled members occasionally developed uneasiness on that point. I believe it was to meet this situation that a visit to Ireland by the Rev. Denis O'Sullivan of Valentia was availed of in getting him to address the men of the Dublin District on the theological aspect. A "general meeting" of those was held in the Clontarf Town Hall for that purpose. This was during my membership of the S.C., but I was unable to be present and forget the exact year.

The only other "general meeting" of which I have any knowledge was that held in the Foresters' Hall, Parnell Square, Dublin, early in December 1913. This was addressed by Denis McCullough and myself. To the best of my recollection the purpose of this occasion was to emphasise the duty of I.R.B. men to co-operate to the fullest extent in the formation of Irish Volunteer Companies, and of choosing I.R.B. men as officers where possible. (The Irish Volunteer organisation had been formally established some two weeks earlier.) One feature of this meeting which stands out in my memory is that of Padraig Pearse occupying a seat in the rear of the hall. It was probably his first appearance at any meeting of the I.R.B. (Le Roux relates the circumstances of his admission to the organisation earlier that year.[1])

[1] Le Roux, "Tom Clarke and the Irish Freedom Movement," pp. 120, 121, 126, 127.

I have no recollection of a meeting of the Supreme Council held in the early formative period of the Irish Volunteers,—that is prior to its formal establishment—as mentioned by Le Roux. (Tom Clarke, p. 125). I do, however, recollect informal talks with Tom Clarke bearing on that question, and was aware that the "Executive" was quietly suggesting and directing various developments from the I.R.B. standpoint. Then, as prior thereto—1912–13—my visits to Dublin were but intermittent.

1914.

In January, 1914, Tomas Aghas and myself went on a mission to the United States to raise money for the Gaelic League. On the outbreak of the War in Europe the Clan-na-Gael decided to raise a Fund for the Irish Volunteers; Tomas and myself necessarily brought our campaign to a close. He returned home in September. I stayed on as I had another and a secret mission, viz., that of I.R.B. envoy to biennial Convention of the Clan.

In the latter capacity I had no contact with the Convention proper, the regular procedure being: First the envoy consulted with the "RD" (Revolutionary Directory) which then comprised John T. Keating of Chicago, John Devoy and Joseph McGarrity; next day to appear before and confer with the "Committee on Foreign Relations." One of my duties was to report on the "Home Organisation." On stating its strength to be approximately 2,000 I recollect an outburst of amazement on the part of an American-born member of the Committee. He, evidently, had been under the impression from previous reports that we had a much larger membership—coupled with the feeling that the heads of the Home Organisation were lax in recruiting. At any rate, my statement was based on returns made by the Divisional Centres at the meeting of the Council held prior to January 1914.

At that time this particular committee-man—a veteran in the Clan—had no conception of the conditions under which we at this side laboured. He probably had a recollection of a much earlier period when the Home Organisation included perhaps thousands—the remnant of the very large I.R.B. membership in the early days of the Land League. Meantime, of course, death had taken toll of that remnant, and the great majority of the survivors had been diverted from their Republican allegiance by the overpowering growth of the Home Rule movement under Parnell and his successors. A percentage remained *nominally* I.R.B. over many years but by 1913 only an odd man here and there belonged to an active Circle. Only the latter were included in the 1913 computation.

On returning from the U.S. in November 1914 (via Liverpool) I brought from the Clan-na-Gael a draft for £2,000 for the Irish Volunteers, carefully secreted. I also brought for my personal use an automatic pistol and

ammunition. These latter items I duly "declared" (on being questioned by the Customs inspector) lest a search of my person and belongings should bring the *draft* to light. The "firearms" were held by the Customs authorities,—against which I, as an American citizen, protested. Fortunately, I was not known to the officials in Britain as I had been to the police in Ireland; I was informed that if I sent an application—signed by a "J.P." and a clergyman—to the Home Secretary, the articles would doubtless be forwarded to me in Ireland. In due course the pistol and ammunition reached me by post; they remained in my possession for "Easter Week."

Soon after my arrival in Ireland I reported to the two available members of the "Executive"—Denis McCullough and Tom Clarke,—and was informed of developments during my absence: the split with Redmond, the gun-running at Howth and Kilcool, and on the report furnished by an "Advisory Committee" appointed for the purpose of drafting a plan for a fight in the Dublin area. This plan was deemed to be only provisional; Tom was very critical of certain points. I did not read it, nor do I recollect the personnel of the committee, which I understood included a considerable number of prominent Irish Volunteer officers. To my mind, the drafting of military plans for an insurrection (which purpose was not perhaps stated to the committee) was necessarily of a secret nature and should accordingly be entrusted to a much smaller committee; that the latter should in the course of their deliberations have the closest contact with the I.R.B. Executive. I urged that the "Advisory Committee" should be dissolved; it was allowed to lapse.

1915.

Shortly thereafter, Pearse, Plunkett and Ceannt co-operated in drafting plans for an Insurrection. About the end of May, 1915, at a meeting of the I.R.B. Executive (on which I functioned as Acting-Secretary,—MacDiarmada being in prison) Pearse, Plunkett and Ceannt were, on my action, formally appointed a "Military Committee." (The co-operation of Clarke and MacDiarmada later in 1915, and the addition of Connolly and MacDonagh in 1916, is referred to elsewhere.)[1]

The 1915 Divisional elections (I.R.B.) were due a few months later. In the ordinary course Sean MacDiarmada would have later supervised those in Connaught—which he represented on the Supreme Council. Due to his many activities in Dublin over previous years, plus his physical disability, he had been unable to give more than casual attention to the organisation in that province. He was now in prison so it was agreed that I should visit the Division, attend to any necessary preliminaries there and conduct the

[1] See p.p. 102, 131 and footnote.

election. Tom Clarke furnished me with the names of Centres and some prominent men in the province. First I went to Limerick for the Volunteer parade (May); thence partly by train and partly by bicycle,—never entering or leaving any town by train. My first official call was at Athenry where I met Larry Lardner and Liam Mellows,—both of whom undertook to attend to pre-election details in County Galway. Thence I proceeded to Castlebar, Westport, Newport, Ballina, Ballaghaderin, etc. The organisation in Mayo was at a very low ebb, except in Westport. One of the few contacts I had in County Sligo was the name and address of a schoolmaster who was deemed eligible for membership. I "swore him in." Further electoral preliminaries were conducted by responsible parties whom I interviewed, and a date was set for the *Divisional election at Claremorris*.[1] I attended the latter. One of the delegates present was elected Divisional Centre to replace MacDiarmada (whom Tom Clarke and myself had agreed to nominate for co-option to the Supreme Council). Just as our work at Claremorris was in progress, a telegram (prearranged should a certain event arise) reached me at the hotel where we were in session; I took the night-goods train, the only means available; reached Dublin next morning and Cork in the afternoon.

Evidently, the police were ignorant of my whereabouts during those visits to Connaught—to which end I had taken pains. Contrary to the British Government attitude to American citizens generally, I was ordered in June 1915 to register as a "Friendly Alien." This meant that I should report to the police when leaving any "Proclaimed Area" and again when entering another. As I did not so register I was summoned to appear before a magistrate at Inns Quay Court. Tom Clarke was of opinion that I should refuse to register; that deportation to the U.S. was certain to follow, and that this would afford the Clan material for anti-British propaganda. Under the then circumstances—with a fight in prospect—I preferred to register as ordered and remain in Ireland. I did so just before appearing in court; the charge against me was accordingly dismissed.

Gaelic League Ard Fheis—Dundalk, July 1915.

The non-political plank of the Gaelic League (by which it was understood that any person whether a Home Ruler, Orangeman, or Sinn Feiner should not inject his particular political viewpoint into Gaelic League Branches, classes, etc.) was always respected by the I.R.B. and by its members who held seats on the Coiste Gnotha. But, on this governing body of the League an element advocated lines of procedure with respect to the Board

[1] Alec. McCabe states the election was at Carrick-on-Shannon.—Ed.

I. DUNDALK JAIL, 1915 1916

(Back row, left to right) Diarmuid Lynch, Ernest Blythe, Terence MacSwiney, Dick McKee, Michael Collivet.

(Front row, left to right) Frank Thornton, Bertie Hunt, Michael Brennan.

II. MANCHESTER MARTYRS COMMEMORATION CORK, 1915

(Back row, left to right) Paddy Cotter, Sean Nolan, Daithi Cotter, Sean Scanlon, Fred Murray.
(Second row, left to right) Ted Sullivan, Seamus Courtney, Tom Barry, Diarmuid Lynch, Con Twomey.
(Seated) Sean Murphy, Tomas McCurtain, Sean MccDiarmada (who delivered the oration), Herbert M. Pim, Sean O'Sullivan, Sean O Murthille.



III. *Sean Mac Diarmada.*



POBLACHT NA H EIREANN.

THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
OF THE
IRISH REPUBLIC
TO THE PEOPLE OF IRELAND.

IRISHMEN AND IRISHWOMEN: In the name of God and of the dead generations from which she receives her old tradition of nationhood, Ireland, through us, summons her children to her flag and strikes for her freedom.

Having organised and trained her manhood through her secret revolutionary organisation, the Irish Republican Brotherhood, and through her open military organisations, the Irish Volunteers and the Irish Citizen Army, having patiently perfected her discipline, having resolutely waited for the right moment to reveal itself, she now seizes that moment, and, supported by her exiled children in America and by gallant allies in Europe, but relying in the first on her own strength, she strikes in full confidence of victory.

We declare the right of the people of Ireland to the ownership of Ireland, and to the unfettered control of Irish destinies, to be sovereign and indefeasible. The long usurpation of that right by a foreign people and government has not extinguished the right, nor can it ever be extinguished except by the destruction of the Irish people. In every generation the Irish people have asserted their right to national freedom and sovereignty; six times during the past three hundred years they have asserted it in arms. Standing on that fundamental right and again asserting it in arms in the face of the world, we hereby proclaim the Irish Republic as a Sovereign Independent State, and we pledge our lives and the lives of our comrades-in-arms to the cause of its freedom, of its welfare, and of its exaltation among the nations.

The Irish Republic is entitled to, and hereby claims, the allegiance of every Irishman and Irishwoman. The Republic guarantees religious and civil liberty, equal rights and equal opportunities to all its citizens, and declares its resolve to pursue the happiness and prosperity of the whole nation and of all its parts, cherishing all the children of the nation equally, and oblivious of the differences carefully fostered by an alien government, which have divided a minority from the majority in the past.

Until our arms have brought the opportune moment for the establishment of a permanent National Government, representative of the whole people of Ireland and elected by the suffrages of all her men and women, the Provisional Government, hereby constituted, will administer the civil and military affairs of the Republic in trust for the people.

We place the cause of the Irish Republic under the protection of the Most High God, Whose blessing we invoke upon our arms, and we pray that no one who serves that cause will dishonour it by cowardice, inhumanity, or rapine. In this supreme hour the Irish nation must, by its valour and discipline and by the readiness of its children to sacrifice themselves for the common good, prove itself worthy of the august destiny to which it is called.

Signed on Behalf of the Provisional Government,

THOMAS J. CLARKE.
SEAN Mac DIARMADA. THOMAS MacDONAGH.
P. H. PEARSE. EAMONN CEANNT.
JAMES CONNOLLY. JOSEPH PLUNKETT.

IV. *Proclamation of the Republic, Easter, 1916.*
Courtesy. The National Museum.

of Education and "Dublin Castle" (on matters affecting the language movement, of course) which to many of us were objectionable. There was a multiplicity of such moves, and thus there was a growing divergence between what may be termed the "Right Wing" and the "Left Wing" over the years prior to 1915. When "Left Wing" opposition to those methods was voiced, the Right deemed it Sinn Feinism and politics. The initial factor, however, was that Right Wing policy developed very definitely along Redmonite Party lines, which was at variance with that of "Sinn Fein"—the term then generally used for all national opponents of the Parliamentary Party. Dr. Douglas Hyde, the President, was in fact the leader of the Right Wing. I remember an incident at the Ard Fheis 1913 at Galway: His rulings from the chair were distinctly one-sided throughout the proceedings. Though I was able to follow the discussions my knowledge of Irish was too slight to enable me to participate in the debates, or "appeal from the ruling of the Chair"—(a very ordinary feature of American deliberative assemblies). So, I had to content myself with the pertinent query: "An *tusa* an Ard Fheis"? During the greater part of 1914 I was absent in the United States. On my return I found that the cleavage between the two wings of the Coiste Gnotha had widened. Prior to this the I.R.B. Executive had taken no official steps with regard to the election of the Coiste Gnotha, though our members on the latter body did to very limited extent. This in itself was proof that the I.R.B. had no wish to inject "politics" into the work of the Gaelic League. The "Right Wing" comprised men and women who had given veteran service to the language movement; all *we* had previously sought was to keep them from pursuing tactics which savoured of "parliamentarianism."

By the summer of 1915, however, when the stage was being secretly set for Insurrection against Britain, the time had come in my opinion when the "Left Wing" should control the Coiste Gnotha—not to use it for the propagation of Republicanism but to obviate the possibility of tactics contrary thereto. I discussed this with my I.R.B. colleagues on the Coiste, and probably with Tom Clarke though I have no distinct recollection of such discussion with the latter. Well in advance of the Ard Fheis date I communicated with prominent Gaelic Leaguers throughout the country—who were also I.R.B. men—urging that delegates favourable to our political views should without fail be selected to attend at Dundalk. Colleagues on the Coiste next suggested that we endeavour to elect men then in prison: Sean MacDiarmada, Earnan de Blaghd, and one other I think.[1] It was felt that *their* election would convey a salutary lesson to all concerned.

Our delegate friends at Dundalk (not all I.R.B. men) held a caucus meet-

[1] A. McCabe.

ing ; the decision was unanimous with one exception. Nominations were made accordingly. As the result of the ballot was being announced and Sean MacDiarmada's name appeared high on the list, An Craoibhin's uneasiness became apparent. When the election of the next prisoner was read Dr. Hyde swept his papers from the rostrum and left the Convention Hall. A delegation to him at his hotel brought back word that he had resigned from the presidency. This situation had not been sought or expected by us. But, had he given that as an ultimatum when the list of nominations was read, we would not have swerved from our plan at that juncture in national affairs. The new Coiste was safe from the I.R.B. viewpoint !

O'Donovan Rossa Funeral

Though a member of the Funeral Committee I had hardly any hand in the arrangements. Just then I had been busy with the Ard Fheis at Dundalk, whence we returned to Dublin a day or two prior to Sunday, August 1st.

Meeting for Reorganisation of the Supreme Council

This was held in Dublin either about the middle of July, 1915 (before the G. L. Ard Fheis) or about the middle of August (on my return from the Officers' Training Course, Dublin-Wicklow, under " Ginger " O'Connell). There was not a full attendance of the elected Divisional Centres. Those present proceeded with the completion of the membership of the Supreme Council. Tom Clarke, Sean MacDiarmada, Padraig Pearse and Dr. MacCartan were *co-opted.* Dr. Mac P.P. Be co-opted

Robert Monteith

Towards the end of August Monteith was ready to proceed to Germany —via New York. Tom Clarke and I decided to give him £100 for his expenses ; this sum was handed to him in Tom's shop.

First meeting of the new Supreme Council

This, I think, was held in September. Denis McCullough was elected President (which, be it noted, meant President of the Irish Republic virtually established by the I.R.B.). Sean MacDiarmada was re-elected Secretary and Tom Clarke re-elected Treasurer. These three now comprised the " Executive."

Denis McCullough was the elected representative of Ulster. The other Divisions were represented as follows : Leinster, Sean Tobin ; Munster, Diarmuid Lynch ; Connaught, Alex. McCabe ; South England, Dick Connolly ; North England, Joseph Gleeson ; Scotland, Pat. McCormick.

Padraig Pearse and Dr. MacCartan—co-opted members in addition to Clarke and MacD.—completed the Council. I would say that all eleven were present, but am not certain.

Casement pamphlet distribution—see separate statement.

Landing Place for Cargo of Arms

Later in September, I had a talk with Pearse. He desired that I secure the views of Tralee men and others in that part of Kerry as to the relative merit: of Ventry Harbour and any other advantageous spots in that region for the landing of a cargo of arms and their expeditious distribution therefrom. proceeded to Cork, reported there to the police under the " Order " an transacted some business in the ordinary course. " Reported " again th I was leaving for Tralee (my insurance managership took me to all parts of Munster). The telegraph operators at Cork Station were usually I.R.B. men and they were aware that the " G.man " on duty there always wired ahead to the police at my destination. (Sean O'Hegarty, Tommy O'Riordan, etc. were able to decode his messages.) So, on arrival at Tralee I again duly " reported." On presenting my Registration Book the constable on duty remarked : " Aren't you an Irishman ? " to which I answered " yes." He continued " Then what the blazes do you want to register for ? " and handed back my book unendorsed. I said " O.K." and left. As matters turned out later, I should have insisted on the usual endorsement to show that I had " reported." After some months I had reason to wonder whether that R.I.C. man was really friendly and was afraid to acknowledge his own remissness when the matter of my non-registration at Tralee arose, or whether he had acted on orders and " put one over on me."

My visit coincided with a meeting of the Tralee Volunteers. There I contacted Austin Stack and a few of his chief lieutenants. All favoured Fenit as the landing place—from which a light railway ran to Tralee. The local " G.men " kept peeping over the wall of the laneway, but that sort of thing was commonplace and no notice was taken of them. Next afternoon I went on to Dingle (a few miles from Ventry). One of my first calls was to the R.I.C. barrack (not for the purpose of " reporting " which was unnecessary at Dingle) where I canvassed the men for Life Insurance. In the light of my real mission to that town, and especially in light of actual happenings in the Tan War, that solicitation does seem ironical.

Then I contacted the I.R.B. Centre. In the dusk of the evening he, accompanied by two of his men, met me outside the town. Sitting in the middle of a field we had our chat. They also favoured Fenit, —pointing out that Ventry was some twenty miles from Tralee (where the necessarily large body of Volunteers needed for the first stage of transmission was located) ;

that the conveyance of the cargo from Ventry through the bottle neck of the Dingle peninsula would be extremely hazardous as a small body of police posted there might bring the whole enterprise to disaster. The Centre at Listowel was equally convinced that Fenit was preferable to any other point on the Kerry coast.

The result of my visit was promptly reported to Pearse; also to Clarke and MacDiarmada. I have no recollection of the matter being discussed at any meeting of the Supreme Council. (Here I may remark that it is certain James Connolly had no knowledge whatever of the expected cargo of arms from Germany until January 19th-21st, 1916,—when it was agreed that he become a member of the Military Council.)

Pearse's Secret Instructions for I.V. Comdts. (I.R.B. Men)

1916.

These Pearse gave to me early in January, 1916, at St. Enda's; I was to convey them orally to the Cork, Kerry, Limerick and Galway Commandants. He outlined the positions which these Brigades were to occupy on the Volunteer manoeuvres which had been decided on for the Easter week-end, viz.: Cork to hold the County to the south of the Boggeragh Mountains—left flank contacting the Kerry Brigade which was to extend eastwards from Tralee; Limerick was to contact the Kerry men on the south and those of Limerick—Clare—Galway to the north. Limerick, Clare and Galway were "to hold the line of the Shannon to Athlone."

There was no immediate hurry for the transmission of these orders so I remained on in Dublin for the scheduled Supreme Council meeting.

Then the "ENEMY ALIEN" Order was served on me (based on my non-registration at Tralee!). This confined me to a five mile radius from my residence in Dublin and resulted in the cancellation of my mission.

(Further details respecting those secret orders are given in The Countermanding Orders of Holy Week, 1916.[1])

Supreme Council Meeting, January, 1916

Denis McCullough presided. At least ten and perhaps the entire eleven members of the Council were present. Clarke and MacDiarmada—accepted as leaders and known to be the two members of the "Executive" resident in Dublin and in closest contact with events which would govern decisions of the I.R.B.—had the entire confidence of the Council. At that meeting they initiated all the leads to the principal matters discussed; Pearse had little to say on any subject. To me, possessed as I was of knowledge of many of their moves (as already detailed), it was evident that neither of these three

[1] See p. 44 et. seq.

desired to report the full extent of their progress,—not, I am satisfied, because of any lack of confidence in their colleagues but for the obvious reason that the secret decisions and plans of the Military Council had better be kept within as narrow a circle as possible. In my opinion, then and now, this attitude was the part of commonsense and wisdom.

MacDiarmada's motion that "we fight at the earliest date possible" was in line with that attitude, and the Council as a whole was fully justified in being satisfied with that decision.

(R. M. Fox's remarks about "nods and winks"—which obviously refer to my statements appearing in Le Roux's "Tom Clarke and the Irish Freedom Movement"—exhibit not merely a lack of grasp of the situation but are hypercritical in his ridiculous effort to prove that only for Connolly's insistence there would have been no insurrection.)

Detention of James Connolly

1916.

Connolly "disappeared" on January 19, 1916; he was back at Liberty Hall on the 22nd. During his "disappearance" I spoke with Sean MacDiarmada on the matter. Sean's only answer was a smile—which "spoke volumes" to me (perhaps Mr. Fox would now add "smiles" to "nods and winks"!). I was satisfied that Sean knew of Connolly's whereabouts and did not wish to discuss him. I was equally satifised that Sean's colleagues on the then Military Council also knew. Having the fullest confidence in the five members thereof I pursued this question no further. And, when early in March I saw Connolly in conference with those whom I knew to be members of the Military Council, and coupled this with his previous impetuous outspokenness and threats regarding lone action by the Citizen Army—which bid fair to bring to disaster all the I.R.B. plans for the Rising—the definite conclusion was not far to seek that his "arrest" in January was the deliberate act of the I.R.B. Military Council. When discussing Connolly's disappearance with William O'Brien, in Richmond Barracks after the "Easter Week" surrender, he agreed with that conclusion. He told me that when speaking with James Connolly after his return on January 22nd, Connolly refused to say anything about his whereabouts during the previous few days.

Committee on Telegraph-Telephone "Manholes"

First meeting called by Sean MacDiarmada about the 1st of April—Andy Fitzpatrick, Sean Byrne, Dick Mulcahy and myself. Additional members later—John Twamley and the brothers King. The report was compiled by me and delivered to Sean MacD. on Monday of Holy Week. (Other details given in my "Supplementary Statement on Easter Week".)

Military Council—Co-option of Tomas MacDonagh

See my "Supplementary Statement on Easter Week."

"EASTER WEEK"—G.P.O. Area

The Report on Operation in this area, compiled by me and ratified at a general meeting of the survivors of the Garrison in 1938, is in the hands of the G.P.O. Garrison Committee. A copy of it was handed to An Taoiseach a few years ago and I believe was deposited by him in the National Library.[1]

Post "Easter Week" Reorganisation of the I.R.B.

1917.

When the "Convict" prisoners were released from Pentonville in June, 1917, Dr. MacCartan joined us—at Holyhead, I think—and informed me (I was the only member of the pre-Easter Week Supreme Council among them) that a temporary Council had functioned in our absence.

The following autumn the Supreme Council was regularly re-established—thanks to the preliminary work done by Michael Collins at Frongoch and during 1917 while Secretary of the National Aid Assn. I forget the full personnel of the new S.C. so at the moment I will name only the members of the "Executive": Sean McGarry (President), Michael Collins (Secretary), and Diarmuid Lynch (Treasurer).

The "Easter Week" Proclamation had revealed the continued existence till then of the I.R.B. as a functioning organisation. One of the post-Easter developments was that a few veteran members (Cathal Brugha among them) decided that there was no further need for the secret organisation. (Commandant de Valera informed me immediately after leaving Pentonville that he would discontinue membership, but gave no reason for his decision). Others who had participated in the Insurrection felt that while remaining in the I.R.B. they should no longer be subject to the old discipline. Those who desired to relinquish membership were, of course, at liberty to do so. But the new Supreme Council determined that the continuance of the I.R.B. was still essential; that an amended Constitution was necessary; that discipline would be rigidly enforced; that whole-time organisers would be put in the field. Draft of revised Constitution was drawn up by Tomas Aghas, Con Collins and myself. This was further revised by Mick Collins and me. In due course, it was ratified by the S.C.

(In the matter of this Constitution we find an instance of the oft-alleged knowledge by British officials of secret I.R.B. and other documents as at the time they were issued or were in effect; in "The Secret

[1] See p. 150

Societies of Ireland" by H. B. C. Pollard (published 1928) he includes what he cites as the "Constitution of the I.R.B. in 1914." But it so happens that the Constitution reproduced by him (Appendix J) as for 1914 is not the pre-Easter Week Constitution but that revised and adopted at the end of 1917. Copy of the latter probably fell into the hands of the British during the Black and Tan raids. It is not pertinent to this statement to comment on any other feature of Pollard's book).

Comment on the Constitution of 1917

I never saw an official printed copy of this amended Constitution; it had not been printed at the date of my imprisonment in February 1918. Therefore I am not in a position to say if the version given by Pollard is a full reproduction.[1] Under clause 32 as cited by him, I note a reference to clauses 33, 35, 36 which clauses do not appear. Otherwise, from my recollection of the changes made I would say the text of the document is correctly quoted. Some of the principal changes from the previous Constitution were:

(*a*) A provision to expel any member who subsequent to initiation into the I.R.B. should join any other oath-bound organisation. There was a particular reason for this in 1917 and the Supreme Council was determined that the I.R.B. should continue to have but *one* object, and that is members should not be dominated by any other secret organisation. (Clauses 5, 6.)

(*b*) The sub-division of each geographical province in Ireland into *two* I.R.B. Divisions—thus laying the foundation for more intensive recruitment, and incidentally enlarging the membership of the Supreme Council (elected and co-opted) from 11 to 15. (Clause 10.)

(*c*) More specific regulations partaining to a Declaration of War. (Clauses 20, 21.)

(*d*) The addition of a proviso for the appointment of a "Military Council" and limitation of its powers. (Clause 31.)

Sinn Fein Convention, October, 1917

The Provisional Executive Committee of Sinn Fein discussed the draft of a constitution to be submitted to the coming Convention. Griffith, Milroy and other old-time Sinn Feiners were in favour of retaining the original Sinn Fein idea of "The King, Lords and Commons of Ireland,"—an unbelievably retrograde step a year and a half after "Easter Week." I.R.B. members of the Provisional Committee led by Mick Collins, supported by non-I.R.B. men who included Joe McGuinness, vigorously protested against this move; the prospect of their success was not encouraging.

Though not a member of that Committee I had an interview with de

[1] It is a full reproduction.—Editor.

Valera who was, in which I stressed the definite I.R.B. attitude—that we would fight against any backdown from the "Easter Week" Proclamation. He also wanted to hold to the latter and evidently had a plan to meet the situation. Those other members of the Committee who opposed the retrograde proposal held a private meeting—at which I recollect Count Plunkett, Joe McGuinness, Piaras Beaslai. The result of our talk was that steps should be taken to contact in advance delegates chosen to attend the Convention. The I.R.B. accordingly decided to re-enact the plan followed in the case of the 1915 Gaelic League Ard Fheis—with a view not merely to ensure a "republican" constitution for the reorganised Sinn Fein organisation, but also the election of a permanent Executive Committee which could be relied on to uphold it. Immediately prior to the Convention de Valera had suggested a preamble to the Constitution reading :

> "Sinn Fein aims at securing the international recognition of Ireland as an independent Irish Republic. Having achieved that status the Irish people may by Referendum freely choose their own form of Government."

Fortunately, Griffith and his supporters on the Provisional Committee accepted that, but the I.R.B. was still doubtful as to what might happen at the Convention. It proceeded with its plan. Our efforts were not confined to I.R.B. men. The delegates communicated with reported at the Foresters' Hall and were informed of the circumstances. Also, they were handed a list of those whom we deemed it wise to elect on the permanent governing body. Some of them, or others in whom they confided, reported this move to the Convention—where it was sharply criticised. This did not worry us—our purpose was not personal but national. The tenseness of the situation was relieved by Griffith's laudable withdrawal of his candidacy for the Presidency in favour of de Valera. De Valera's draft constitution was adopted unanimously : nothing further was heard of "The King, Lords and Commons of Ireland." While the personnel of the Executive elected differed very considerably from that suggested by the I.R.B. it was entirely satisfactory. Sinn Fein had become a definitely Republican organisation.

Sinn Fein Food Control

1918.

While the seizure of pigs (on their way to the North Wall for export) and their detention in Dublin was effected in my capacity as Sinn Fein Food Director, it may be said to have been a combined Sinn Fein—I.R.B.—Irish Volunteer undertaking.

It was a prelude to my deportation to the U.S.—which terminated my membership of the Supreme Council of the Irish Republican Brotherhood.

Some details of the I.R.B. organisation in Munster, 1912-1916, are given on pages following :

I.R.B. Organisation in Munster, 1912–1916

After a lapse of over 30 years I find it impossible to recall fully the location and strength of the various circles and groups in the province. I had all the information then of course—through County and District Centres.

I give such details as I can recall : these apply for the most part to 1912–13. I was absent in the U.S. during 1914. Then, personal business confined me chiefly to Dublin over 1915. When any special I.R.B. matters called me South at the latter period, efforts to transact business were camouflage to a large extent.[1]

Some of the names mentioned hereunder will serve for the securing of further particulars.

As previously stated I reported to the Clan-na-Gael Convention, 1914, that the strength of the "Home Organisation" (i.e. in Ireland, England and Scotland) was approximately 2,000. This figure probably represented the strength in Ireland alone by 1916.

The Irish Volunteers after the Split with Redmond furnished not alone a favourable but a definite recruiting field for the I.R.B. But as active Volunteers were for the most part looked on by the I.R.B. as men who would participate in an Insurrection when the right moment was revealed, there was no longer any necessity for a great increase in I.R.B. membership, especially as the great majority of Commandants and senior officers of the Volunteers were already members of the secret organisation.

KERRY

I have no recollection of having ever attended a Circle meeting in Kerry. Austin Stack was County Centre and I kept contact through him. I did, however, on my own initiative swear in four men at Valentia Cable Station : Tim Ring, "Tos" O'Sullivan, W. Scaife and Alec Smith. In the matter of selecting a landing place for arms cargo I interviewed men at Dingle and Listowel. Of the prominent Tralee men still living there, Eamonn O'Connor is the only one I can remember—I'm pretty certain he was I.R.B. as well as Volunteer.

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[1] In a letter to Florence O'Donoghue 31/10/45, Diarmuid Lynch wrote :

"Since I became a member of the I.R.B. in 1908 there was no regular organiser for Munster—not up to 1918 anyway. Mick Crowe in the course of his railway duties did some spasmodic work in that line, so did Cathal Brugha as he travelled the country on his own business, so did I after I became representative for Munster on the Supreme Council, as I made constant trips through the South as Manager for Munster for the Equitable Life Assurance Society of the U.S. (1911-16). My opportunities were more widespread than theirs."

CLARE

There was a circle at Ennistymon, and one at Crusheen—with groups at various places: Carrigaholt, Ennis, Kildysart, etc. I have a very happy recollection of the circumstances under which I swore in a man at Carrigaholt —but that is not for the record.

Whether Michael and Paddy Brennan were then members I cannot say for a certainty. Sean O'Muirthille, Gaelic League Organiser, was in touch with the entire County. That he gave me information concerning certain districts I'm certain but cannot recall details. There was what might be termed an unofficial Circle somewhere in the country beyond Ennistymon (I forget the name of the locality), which occupied a peculiar position. The Centre was Tomas O'Loughlin, an old man of 70 or thereabouts, who held the strange idea of keeping his men apart from any official contacts. Though this was irregular he was permitted to have his way. He was very secretive in all his talk and actions. I recall with pleasure an incident in which he figured:

At Ennistymon, 1915, I learned from Sean O'Muirthille that the local Irish Volunteers were negotiating with the Redmond Volunteers (then defunct as an organisation) for the purchase of twenty Enfield Rifles, but had not the cash to complete the transaction. I went straight to Dublin and The O'Rahilly gave me the requisite £40. Returning, I put up at Sean O'Muirthille's headquarters—a small hotel where Tomas O'Loughlin was also staying at the time. It was agreed that the local IVs. should retain ten rifles. The other ten were to be distributed at my discretion; these were brought to my bedroom and eventually went: 2 to Carrigaholt, 2 to Ennis, and 6 to Crusheen. Next morning, I learned that old Tomás on his own initiative and without saying a word to anybody had remained on guard all night on the stairs outside my room—he having been suspicious of a young R.I.C. man going home on leave who happened to stay at this hotel overnight. In post-Easter days this would have seemed very trivial but back in 1915 we were enthused and proud of the old man's spirit.

Other collaboration during my visits to County Clare which I recollect with pleasure was that of two clergymen. They were splendid.

This incident of the Ennistymon rifles throws a light on the then dearth of arms among the Volunteers, and how essential the prospective "Aud" cargo was for the plans of the I.R.B. in 1916.

LIMERICK

I completely forget the strength of the I.R.B. in the County. Under the influence of the old veteran, John Daly, whom I never missed an opportunity to call on (he was incapacitated in my day), and his active lieutenants Jim Leddin, Colivet, etc., I am satisfied that the organisation was fairly strong in the city. I never attended a meeting of the Limerick Circle; none of my visits coincided with one.

I recollect contacts with individuals and groups at Pallasgreen, Doon, etc.

TIPPERARY

Frank Drohan had a Circle at Clonmel; William Benn one at Tipperary town; P. C. O'Mahony one at Cashel (of which one or more Rockwell students were members). I attended a meeting at Tipperary and one at Cashel,—about 15 members present at each, not the full membership. There were, I believe, one or two groups further north in the County, but I was never in those localities.[1]

WATERFORD

Willie Walsh had a Circle at Waterford City. I believe there were one or two groups elsewhere in the County; the facts have escaped my memory.

CORK

The Circle at Cork City—to which I was transferred about 1910—was then in its infancy with a small membership which included: Sean O'Hegarty (Centre), Thomas Barry, Tomas MacCurtain, Sean Murphy, Domnall Og O'Callaghan, Diarmuid Fawsitt, Bob Langford, Tadgh Barry, Tommy O'Riordan, Tommy O'Mahony, Sean O'Sullivan, Billy O'Shea.[2] The latter was the only man of the organisation of former years (which had faded out) now attached to the reorganised Circle. Quite a number of city men then living had belonged to the I.R.B. but for one reason or another they were not now deemed up to standard.

The Circle made considerable progress over 1912–16 but my contacts during the latter years were few. Elsewhere in the County the only Circles I recollect were at Macroom, Cobh and Millstreet. There were groups at Kinsale, Fermoy, Glanworth, Mitchelstown, Skibbereen and Tracton. I swore in men in some of these places.

(Signed) DIARMUID LYNCH.

March, 1947.

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[1] In a letter to Florence O'Donoghue, 31/10/45, Diarmuid Lynch wrote:
"I attended some two or three meetings of the Circle in Tipperary town, and had other talks with the 'C' . . . I have a faint recollection of only one of his men—a likely looking lad who wore distinctly brown clothes. Whether or not he was Sean Treacy, who I take it was then a member, I cannot say. As new men became available in that district they would have been enrolled by the Centre. My last visit to that Circle would probably have been in 1915; the total membership was, I'm pretty certain, not more than ten."

[2] Sean O'Hegarty states that Edward Corcoran, Michael Prior and Jack Mahony were also members—Editor.

CHAPTER III

CASEMENT PAMPHLET

The Distribution of, 1915

The story of this item of I.R.B. activity during the First World War is given herewith in detail as requested by the Bureau of Military History.

The difficulty envisaged by the I.R.B. in 1915, in what nowadays seems such a simple matter, throws a light on pre-"Easter Week" conditions. As in other matters, a way was found to circumvent the extreme watchfulness of British Government officials in Ireland.

The pamphlet comprised a series of articles written anonymously by Sir Roger Casement some years earlier. The outbreak of the 1914 war brought Casement's ideas into the realm of "Practical politics." The series was published in the *Gaelic American*, New York (the official organ of the Clan-na-Gael) in 1914, and then reproduced by it in pamphlet form. Subsequently it ran in *Irish Freedom*, Dublin.

The Supreme Council, prior to my return from the U.S. in November 1914, ordered a large edition printed by the *Enniscorthy Echo*—the editor, sub-editor and most of the staff of which were I.R.B. men. When printed, the pamphlets were placed temporarily in Larry de Lacy's house. Soon afterwards a raid was made thereon by the R.I.C. for the purpose of arresting Sean O'Hegarty (head of the I.R.B. in Cork who had been dismissed from the Post Office there because of his national activities, and who was then staying with de Lacy) in connection with the posting in the Enniscorthy area of leaflets controverting some British propaganda. Reference to these matters in the *Enniscorthy Echo*, April 19, 1930, states that the stock of pamphlets escaped the notice of the police. They were promptly transferred to a friendly farmer's place "somewhere in Wexford," and there they remained for many months.

At a meeting of the Supreme Council in the Spring of 1915 the difficulty of advantageous distribution was stressed—circulation by "Sinn Feiners" (which term included I.R.B. men) might defeat its purpose, viz., an impartial study of them. Though important, this matter of distribution was not urgent; the meeting passed on to other items on the agenda. At a later meeting I mentioned a plan for getting them into the hands of each County, Urban, and Rural Councillor and to professional men throughout the country; the job was left in my hands.

Among the leading seed merchants in Dublin, Cork, etc., were staunch "Unionists" whom the British Government officials would never dream of associating with the dissemination of documents savouring of "disloyalty" or contrary to the "Defence of the Realm Regulations." This and the fact that the season was at hand for the issuance of their bulb catalogues (about the size of the Casement pamphlet) suggested the scheme.

"All is fair in love and war," so I decided to have sets of envelopes imprinted with the name and address of one seed firm in each of six centres,—Dublin, Galway, Tralee, Cork, Waterford and Dundalk, and of a concern in Belfast engaged in a different but extensively advertised line. I was, of course, fairly certain that in due course all these firms would be interrogated sharply by Dublin Castle; also that they would receive indignant protests from pro-British elements among their customers. Even so, I was fully satisfied that eventually no injury would result from the ruse—other than the momentarily outraged feelings of those whose names had been thus used. Anyway, the stratagem gave the best assurance of hoodwinking the Post Office in the execution of good national work.

The lists of Councillors were not available, except those in Co. Cork (which were given in Guy's Directory). We therefore had one of our members in the Local Government Board headquarters write the secretary of each Council for the names and addresses. The latter were promptly turned over to me. The next step was to ascertain the total number to be covered from respective centres, added to which was a large number of professional men grouped likewise.

Suitable envelopes having been procured, the imprinting was done by James Connolly at Liberty Hall.[1] The addresses were typed by the staff of one of our men. Next, the requisite bundles were delivered at four addresses to await the pamphlets.

We were now ready to bring the pamphlets from Wexford. I arranged with William Sears, editor of the *Enniscorthy Echo*, to have an escort of I.R.B. men meet me at Ferns, and then guide us to the cache.

Joe Dunn, a taxi driver and I.R.B. man, arranged for the taxi. We started from Dublin in the early afternoon. Half way to Ferns, with time to spare, we stopped for a roadside snack. Soon a large motor car hove in sight. As it came abreast of us Joe pretended to be working at his engine. The driver of the car—whose passenger was a British Naval officer—asked if he could be of help—an offer which Joe graciously declined as he had "only a little

[1] In a comment on the script of a radio talk by Donagh MacDonagh on James Connolly in 1945, Diarmuid Lynch wrote:
"In the fall of 1915 I had a confidential printing job on hand for the Supreme Council I.R.B. Tom Clarke recommended that Connolly be asked to do it; he co-operated with alacrity and efficiency. At this time he was on most friendly terms with Clarke, Pearse etc."—Editor.

engine trouble." We were to meet that car again. Further on we stopped at a hotel for tea—the "tourist" being shown to the "coffee room" and Joe to the kitchen. Reaching Ferns at dusk, our escort met us as arranged —Seamus Doyle, P. Keegan and M. Davis—which was fortunate. A heavy fog had set in, and as one of them directed Joe along a bye-route the number of four-cross roads we came to—with right and left turnings—exceeded anything either Joe or myself had ever experienced. Arriving at the spot, we found that it was "Oulartleigh House" belonging to Thomas Murphy who did an extensive threshing mill business. The number of farmers etc. present was embarrassing; this occasioned a long delay before we could load the potato sacks in which the pamphlets had been packed. They filled the back of the taxi.

It was 2 a.m. when we reached Arklow on the return journey—with the fog growing more and more dense. Just past the town we came to a cross road, and neither Joe nor myself knew which we should take for Dublin—and Anthony Mackey was waiting up at his home on the south side of the city to take delivery of our precious load! As we wondered how or where we could get our direction we deemed ourselves fortunate to see a light not far away and to this we drove. Imagine our surprise to find it shone not from a private residence but from that British Naval officer's car.

The chauffeur informed us that we were on the wrong road; that we should have turned left at the cross. Just then a Coastguard, armed with carbine, hopped over the wall and plied us with questions—we had the front windows open: Where are you going? Where did you come from? etc., all of which Joe answered quite calmly. Then he placed his hand on the handle of the rear door, but instead of opening it he asked: "Anybody in the rear"? to which Joe replied "No." Fortunately for us, and for all concerned, the fog had made the windows opaque. Had that Coastguard opened the door and seen the rear piled with burlap bags containing bulky material, certain it is that further investigation would ensue—with the alternative of shooting our way out. Great was our relief when our inquisitor concluded without more ado that we were "law-abiding" travellers; he obligingly told us that the road straight ahead was impassable for a car; that we should go back to the cross and turn to the right. We felt doubly grateful then as had shooting started we would unquestionably have driven straight ahead from our waiting position—to almost certain disaster on the rocks. (The presence of that Coastguard convinced us that the building near by was a Coastguard Station; but "Nada" in the *Enniscorthy Echo* refers to it as Kynock's Ammunition factory. It is now the Arklow Pottery Works.)

When a few miles along the Dublin road one of our lamps gave out. While Joe was in the act of recharging with carbide we noticed an approaching bright glow behind us—evidently from a strong electric light which could have been none else than that of the car we parted from at Kynock's. Our "guilty conscience" convinced us that the British officials had on second thoughts decided to investigate us further—folks who at that hour of the morning didn't know the road to Dublin. Our first thought was to pull to the side of the road, get inside the fence and be ready for eventualities. But in the next few seconds Joe got the lamp alight and decided to "give them a run for it." Off we tore through the fog at an uncomfortably high speed; it was impossible to see clearly more than a length or two ahead. When nearing bends it seemed that only a miracle could save us from crashing. Joe was, however, equal to the task. He admitted never having experienced a more difficult one. That powerful naval car could, I'm sure, have caught up with us. Instead, over a stretch of miles he kept about 150 yards to the rear, taking advantage doubtless of getting the lay of the road from us. Our guess was that we would be trailed all the way to Dublin, but, no,—at a certain cross we turned left and he continued straight on towards Wicklow. Another sigh of relief, and yet another twinge of misgiving: "Would that naval man telephone the Bray and Dublin police to be on the lookout for a 'suspicious car.'"?

It was daylight when we reached Bray, and apart from the last mentioned possibility it would be too risky to be seen unloading such sacks from a new taxi so early in the morning—at the house of a "Sinn Feiner." So, at my suggestion, Joe made a detour and headed through the Dublin mountains for Rathfarnham and St. Enda's college. In the avenue there we secreted the sacks among the shrubbery. Joe cleaned out his taxi the best he could and set out for Dublin. I went up to the college to talk with Padraig Pearse. I found him already dressed; he came with me to see the sacks. He thought they could be hidden to better advantage so we dragged them to a thicker patch. I told him I would have a grocer's van call for them as early as possible, and he remarked that he would inform his lodge keeper, Miceal Mac Ruaidhri (?). Though I knew the old man to be one of the best, I demurred, whereon Pearse remarked: "Oh, I must tell Miceal; if he should come across them during the day and realised that I had not trusted him with my knowledge of their whereabouts he'd never forgive me."

The sacks reached the houses where the envelopes were in readiness. There the members of each household and other helpers got the material ready for mailing (letter post).

An All-Ireland Final at Croke Park was imminent. I advised I.R.B. men in the Provinces to meet me after the match, at a central location—where suitcases containing bundles were ready for them. These were to be handed in at the respective Post Offices exactly at 6 p.m. the following Thursday—not earlier and not later. Thus, should the contents by some mischance be

discovered at any one Post Office, the probability was that those posted elsewhere could be delivered to the addresses before the authorities could issue a warning.

The area covered from Dublin was the largest, and this delivery almost came to grief at the post office. The young lad entrusted with the posting reached the front office of the G.P.O. promptly at 6 o'clock, only to find that *bulk* post should be handed in at the rear platform. To get to the back was but a matter of a minute or two but when he got there it was, of course, after six, and six was the closing time for such deliveries; the postman on duty refused to accept them. The boy, however, had "an old head on young shoulders"; he pleaded the excuse that a pal met him on the way to the G.P.O. and insisted on his having a drink; that if the postman did not take his letters from him he would lose his job. The plea succeeded.

Early that Thursday I left for Cork. Next day I visited Kinsale on business and called on an Urban Councillor who was well disposed to "Sinn Fein." He expressed his astonishment that he should have received by the morning post from a "Unionist" firm in Cork city a very ably written pamphlet entitled "Ireland, Germany and the Freedom of the Seas," and that colleagues of his also received copies. He was much impressed by the contents but simply could not understand how or why it should have come from such a firm. The news was most welcome to me,—it was proof that the ruse worked satisfactorily at Cork. I offered a possible "explanation" of the envelope and quickly went on to discuss my personal business.

Later it became evident that Cork was not the only efficient centre; deliveries were duly made from all the others. Then the fun began.

Special orders were issued immediately by postal headquarters that thereafter items of bulk postage should be opened and examined on receipt at any post office. This information was conveyed to us by I.R.B. men in the Dublin G.P.O. White, Tomkins and Courage of Belfast offered a reward of £100 for information giving the name of the party who had thus used its name. Nicholas Hardy & Co. Dundalk offered £100 likewise. But though at least 40 individuals knew the man who had directed the job at various stages, their loyalty to the cause of Irish Independence was proof against any "reward."

DIARMUID LYNCH.

March 25, 1947.

Diarmuid Lynch does not give exact dates either for the printing in Ireland or the distribution of the pamphlet. The following notes are supplementary to his record.

The pamphlets had been printed and were stored in Larry De Lacy's house at 8 New Street, Enniscorthy, before Sean O'Hegarty was arrested there on

24 February, 1915. The raiding party on that occasion overlooked them.

The distribution date was shortly before 20 September, 1915. The *Northern Whig* of that date attributes the pamphlet to Kuno Meyer and another unnamed Professor, and says it was apparently printed in America. The *Daily Express* of the same date says that envelopes bearing the names of the following firms were used: The Co-Operative Wholesale Society Ltd., Mulgrave Street, Limerick; Messrs. R. Fennessey and Sons, Waterford; Sir James W. Mackey Ltd., Dublin. The last named firm, in a letter appearing in the *Freeman's Journal* of 21 September, 1915, disclaimed responsibility for the issue of the pamphlet and exonerated their staff.

The following advertisement (quarter page) appeared in the *Irish Independent* of 20 September, 1915.

£100 REWARD

"Will be paid for such information as will lead to the conviction of the person concerned in circulating through the post to different parts of Ireland in envelopes, on which our name and address are printed,

Pamphlet entitled:

'Ireland, Germany'—price 5 cents.

White, Tomkins and Courage Ltd.

Clarendon Mills, Belfast."

In the *Freeman's Journal* of 21 September an advertisement in similar wording (4 inch, single column) appears over the name of Messrs. Nicholas Hardy & Co. Ltd., Auctioneers and Seedsmen, 72 Park St., Dundalk.

Diarmuid Lynch told me that the names of other firms in Cork, Galway and Tralee were used also, but he was unable to recollect the names with any certainty.

Editor.

My wife (then Miss Agnes Ryan, M.A.) brought the consignment for Belfast up by train and had them posted there, in the "White, Tomkins & Courage" envelopes.

DENIS MCCULLOUGH.

CHAPTER IV

THE COUNTERMANDING ORDERS OF HOLY WEEK, 1916

BY

DIARMUID LYNCH

That part of the article on Commandant Tomas MacCurtain published in the February, 1945, issue of *An Cosantoir* which dealt with the failure of the Cork Brigade to participate in the Easter Week Rising suggests two thoughts: First, that the conflicting orders issued from Dublin to the Irish Volunteers at Easter-time, 1916, which so mystified Commandants outside the Metropolitan area, remain a mystery even to-day to anyone who has not made an intensive study of prior developments among the men who then controlled or sought to control the destiny of the Volunteers; second, that a chronological sketch showing the sequence of events would help to elucidate the situation.

In October-November, 1913, a Provisional Committee was formed in Dublin to bring into existence a Volunteer organisation. Eoin MacNeill was elected Chairman. The majority of the Committee were members of the Irish Republican Brotherhood, a fact unknown to the minority (which included the Chairman)—the I.R.B. being a secret body, the continued existence of which was unknown to the public.

At a public meeting held on November 25th in that year, the "Irish Volunteers" organisation was formally established. Its objects were declared to be:

1. To secure and maintain the rights and liberties common to all the people of Ireland.
2. To train, discipline, arm and equip a body of Irish Volunteers for the above purpose.
3. To unite for this purpose Irishmen of every creed and of every party and class.

The "rights and liberties" mentioned were never defined, nor were the means whereby they might be "secured." Some people construed them as meaning defence of the anticipated "Home Rule" position to oppose which the Carsonite Volunteers had been organised previously in the North. The I.R.B., with an eye not alone to the hostility of the British Government

to the establishment in Ireland of any organisation, national and military in character, but also to the antagonism of the Irish people in general at that time to any policy savouring of "extreme-ism" or opposed to that of the Irish Parliamentary Party, decided not to oppose openly such a construction. For itself, however, the I.R.B., true to the Fenian tradition of the 'sixties, which it had ever fostered, definitely construed the terms to mean: maintenance of the right of Ireland to national independence as a Republican State, and to secure that right through an Insurrection in arms.

This difference in outlook on the aims and objects of the Volunteers existed also among the members of the governing body of the Volunteer organisation. To this can be traced the serious crux which arose in Holy Week, 1916. If the revolutionary aims of the I.R.B. or its purpose to enlist the Irish Volunteers as a fighting force in an Insurrection were to succeed, it necessarily had to keep them secret from men who held different views.

In June, 1914, Tom Clarke and Sean MacDiarmada—representing the "Executive" of the I.R.B.[1]—were definitely opposed to Redmond's demand that the Provisional Committee should co-opt twenty-five nominees of his, which in effect would give him control of that body and of the Volunteer organisation. Bulmer Hobson, Secretary of the Committee and a member of the Supreme Council I.R.B., not alone decided to vote for capitulation to Redmond, but induced other members of the Committee to support his view. Redmond thus won control of the Volunteers. Hobson was compelled thereupon to resign all offices held by him in the I.R.B., but was permitted to retain membership in that organisation.

In the following September, Redmond attempted to throw the strength of the Volunteers behind Britain's war effort. The Split in the Volunteers ensued. Ninety-five per cent. of those enrolled followed Redmond under the title "National Volunteers." Approximately 10,000 "Irish Volunteers" remained loyal to the original Committee; these retained the original title.

Twenty members of the reorganised Provisional Committee of the "Irish Volunteers" (including MacNeill—Chairman, Hobson—Secretary, Pearse, MacDiarmada etc.) issued a call for a Convention, and proposed (among other points) to

> "2. Reaffirm without qualification the manifesto proposed and adopted at the inaugural meeting.
>
> "3. Oppose any diminution of the measure of Irish self-government which now exists as a Statute on paper, and which would not now have reached that stage but for the Irish Volunteers."

[1] This "Executive" comprised the President, Treasurer and Secretary of the Supreme Council. When the Council was not in session, control of the organisation vested in the "Executive."

In this the I.R.B. leaders were guided by the same considerations as at the inception of the Volunteers in 1913, with the additional purpose of winning back from Redmond as many as possible of those who followed him at the Split. While proposal number three gave colour to the construction placed on the terms "rights and liberties" by the so-called "moderates" on the Committee, the I.R.B. members of it had no misconception on this point.

The Irish Volunteer Convention was held on October 25th 1914. Its policy was, generally speaking, a reiteration of previous declarations. It elected an "Executive Committee."

Subsequent to the capitulation to Redmond, the difference in outlook between what may be termed the "moderate" element and that of the revolutionary wing of the Volunteer Executive Committee was not emphasised to any appreciable extent until Holy Week, 1916. Over this period Hobson did occasionally stress the purpose of the Irish Volunteers as a purely defensive one, and he, due to his former positions in the councils of the I.R.B., had a deeper insight into the attitude of MacDiarmada and Pearse than that possessed by his "moderate" colleagues. Pearse and MacDiarmada did not force an issue on this question; it would not suit their purpose to do so. But, so well had they guarded the secret of their insurrectionary preparations, that not until Holy Week, 1916 (and then only by chance), did Hobson realise that a Rising was actually imminent. He then did his utmost to frustrate the plans which they and their colleagues of the Military Council had perfected for it.

From the very inception of the Irish Volunteers, men prominent in the I.R.B. throughout the country, especially in the most populous centres, took a leading part in organising and training the various Companies and Battalions. What with this and the further fact that the secret organisation was well represented among the rank and file of the Volunteers, the force as a whole gradually, and perhaps unconsciously, became inbued with an "offensive" rather than a "defensive" concept.

Pearse's writings and speeches were a powerful influence in that respect; O'Donovan Rossa's funeral on August 1, 1915, marked a tremendous step in the same direction. The marching contingents were marshalled by Commandant Tomas MacDonagh on behalf of I.V. Headquarters Staff; uniformed Volunteers headed by their officers, formed the most striking feature of the procession; Volunteers comprised the firing party at the graveside. Pearse's oration (from which we quote) was a clarion call to the nation, and particularly to the Irish Volunteers:

> "... if there is anything that makes it fitting that I, rather than some other, I, rather than one of the grey-haired men who were young with him and shared in his labour and in his suffering, should speak here, it is perhaps that I may be taken as speaking on behalf of a new generation that has been re-baptised in the Fenian faith, and that has accepted responsibility of carrying out the Fenian programme. I propose to you then that, here by the grave of this unrepentant Fenian, we renew our baptismal vows; that, here by the grave of this unconquered and unconquerable man, we ask of God, each one for himself, such unshakable purpose, such high and gallant courage, such unbreakable strength of soul as belonged to O'Donovan Rossa.
>
> "Deliberately here we avow ourselves, as he avowed himself in the dock, Irishmen of one allegiance only. We of the Irish Volunteers, and you others who are associated with us in to-day's task and duty, are bound together and must stand together henceforth in brotherly union for the achievement of the freedom of Ireland. And we know only one definition of freedom: it is Tone's definition, it is Mitchel's definition, it is Rossa's definition. Let no man blaspheme the cause that the dead generations of Ireland served by giving it any other name and definition than their name and their definition.
>
> "... Our foes ... cannot undo the miracles of God who ripens in the hearts of young men the seeds sown by the young men of a former generation. And the seeds sown by the young men of '65 and '67 are coming to their miraculous ripening to-day ... The Defenders of this Realm have worked well in secret and in the open. They think that they have pacified Ireland. They think that they have purchased half of us and intimidated the other half. They think that they have foreseen everything, think that they have provided against everything; but the fools, the fools, the fools!—they have left us our Fenian dead, and while Ireland holds these graves, Ireland unfree shall never be at peace."

That the Volunteers who heard, and read, these inspiring words felt themselves "re-baptised in the Fenian faith," and were confirmed in the determination to "carry out the Fenian programme," cannot be doubted.

Few, however, realised that Pearse and his I.R.B. colleagues were at that moment perfecting plans "for the achievement of the freedom of Ireland" as defined by Tone and Mitchel and Rossa.

In the summer of that year (1915), the then "Executive" of the Supreme Council, I.R.B. (on which I substituted for MacDiarmada) appointed a "Military Committee." The original members of the latter were Padraig Pearse, Joseph Plunkett and Eamonn Ceannt. Later, Tom Clarke and Sean MacDiarmada (the two members of the I.R.B. "executive" resident in Dublin) actively co-operated. Henceforth, the body may be termed "THE MILITARY COUNCIL"—by which title it became known in after years.

James Connolly was co-opted late in January, 1916, and Tomas MacDonagh early in April. Thus the Military Council eventually numbered seven—the seven signatories to the Easter Proclamation of the Irish Republic.

The date of the projected Rising had been selected by the end of 1915 ; the method by which the effective participation of the whole Volunteer force could be arranged without exposing the secret purpose of the Military Council was a problem of prime importance. Mindful of the 1914 capitulation to Redmond—contrary to the judgment of the I.R.B. Executive—the question of such participation could not safely be left to a vote of the governing body of the Irish Volunteers. A simple and what at the time seemed an effective solution was decided on ; Pearse, besides being a member of the secret revolutionary group, was also Director of Organisation on the I.V. Headquarters Staff, and in this latter capacity it was one of his functions to order any general exercises or manoeuvres by the Volunteers throughout the country. The issuance by him of such an instruction for Easter-time, 1916, was calculated not to arouse the least suspicion and to ensure a general mobilisation under arms at the opportune moment.

Pearse's order appeared in due course in the *Irish Volunteer* of April 8th, 1916. In the light of subsequent events, the camouflage in the first and third paragraphs is of particular interest :

> " 1. Following the lines of last year, every unit of the Irish Volunteers will hold manoeuvres during the Easter Holidays. The object of the manoeuvres is to test mobilisation with equipment.
>
> " 3. Each Brigade, Battalion or Company commander, as the case may be, will, on or before 1st May next, send to the Director of Organisation a detailed report of the Manoeuvres carried out by his unit.
>
> P. H. Pearse, Commandant,
> Director of Organisation."

This was published with the approval of the Volunteer Executive and of Eoin MacNeill, Chief of Staff, but Pearse did not tell them that he had already issued secret orders to the Brigade Commandants as to the areas in which their respective " manoeuvres " were to be held. Nor did he inform them of the ultimate purposes which those manoeuvres were intended to serve.

MacNeill when reviewing a muster of Volunteers at Lough Gur, Co. Limerick, about the end of March, 1916, inadvertently got an inkling that Commandant Pearse had issued certain orders of which he had not been aware. The O/C on that occasion, in the belief that the I.V. Chief-of-Staff had cognisance of all orders issued, casually remarked that he as Commandant of the Limerick Brigade had received instructions to " hold the line of the Shannon in the event of actual hostilities." This seemed rather peculiar to

MacNeill but he did not dwell on the subject and its real significance did not then occur to him.

There is no other evidence available to me to show the approximate date on which these secret instructions had been issued by Pearse, nor by whom they had been conveyed. I happen to know that the initial strategic positions to be occupied by the Brigades of the South and West had been envisaged at the end of 1915 : Cork was to hold the County to the south and west of the Boggeragh Mountains—left flank contacting the Kerry Brigade which was to extend eastwards from Tralee ; Limerick was to contact Kerry on the south, Clare and Galway to the north ; Limerick, Clare and Galway were to hold the line of the Shannon to Athlone. These details were given to me by Pearse at Saint Enda's in January, 1916 ; they were to be transmitted orally by me to the respective Commandants. My mission was, however, cancelled ; I had no further association with these despatches. (Though irrelevant here, the reason for my disconnection with this phase may be mentioned because of its relationship with a matter of historical interest. In the autumn of 1915, on instructions from Pearse, I paid a special visit to Tralee, Dingle, and other coastal points in the south-west to ascertain the most suitable spot at which a shipload of arms from Germany could be landed and from which they could be most expeditiously distributed. I reported in favour of Fenit, which was the point eventually chosen. Another result of this visit was that the British Government held I had not on entering a " proclaimed area " fulfilled the regulations pertaining to registration by " friendly aliens," and in January, 1916, served me with an Order under which I was classified as an " enemy alien " and confined to a five mile radius from my temporary residence in Dublin.)

On Spy Wednesday, April 19th, the famous " Castle document " was read at a meeting of the Dublin Corporation. To cope with the alleged plans of the Castle authorities as detailed therein, MacNeill, Chief-of-Staff, issued an Order that day to the Irish Volunteers :

> " Your object will be to preserve the arms and the organisation of the Irish Volunteers. . . In general you will arrange that your men defend themselves and each other in small groups so placed that they may best be able to hold out."

The fact that the Volunteers were thus keyed up at this particular moment suited the Military Council admirably. But, a rude shock was in store for them.

Bulmer Hobson (according to Le Roux in " Tom Clarke and the Irish Freedom Movement "), at a meeting of the Volunteer Executive held that same evening (Wednesday), overheard a conversation between I.R.B. members of that body from which he deduced that a Rising was contem-

plated. He immediately informed MacNeill who now coupled this information with what he had learned at Lough Gur; both decided to thwart the plans.

Late that night (apparently) they drafted an order instructing Commandant J. J. O'Connell to proceed to Cork, and authorising him to "take chief command . . . over all Volunteers in Munster." It also stipulated that "all orders issued by Commandant Pearse, or by any other person heretofore, are hereby cancelled or recalled," and that officers in Munster should "report to Commandant O'Connell as required by him on the subject of any special orders which they had received and any arrangements made or to be made by them in consequence."

On Holy Thursday night, MacNeill (accompanied by Hobson) called on Pearse at St. Enda's and put to him the direct question as to whether an Insurrection was planned. Pearse answered in the affirmative, MacNeill then said that he would do his utmost short of informing the British Government, to stop it. Accordingly, MacNeill and Hobson during the small hours of Good Friday morning took further steps to call off the Easter manoeuvres of the Irish Volunteers ordered by Pearse as Director of Organisation.

This attitude of MacNeill with respect to participation by the Irish Volunteers in an armed insurrection is understandable on the basis of his interpretation of the inaugural policy of the Volunteers. It also furnishes justification for the Military Council in having withheld its revolutionary plans from MacNeill and from the Volunteer Executive as a whole.

The fact that Easter-time, 1916, was a most "opportune moment" for Irishmen to strike for Ireland's freedom—a time at which Britain was engaged in a desperate struggle with a powerful enemy, and when many small nations sought to secure or maintain their independence by engaging in that conflict—cannot now be gainsaid. And, had the Volunteers not participated in the Easter Rising, this question would have arisen in after years: Why did the Irish Volunteers—a military body pledged to secure and maintain certain undefined "liberties,"—not avail of that opportunity to fight for the achievement of National Independence?

The supplementary orders drafted Holy Thursday night by MacNeill and Hobson were sweeping in character, but as these do not seem to have been promulgated (for a reason apparent in the next paragraph) it is unnecessary to quote them.

Copy of MacNeill's order pertaining to Commandant O'Connell (dated April 19th) reached an office in O'Connell St., early on Friday. It was read there by Tomas Aghas and myself about noon. I immediately reported its contents to Clarke and Connolly; this was the first intimation they had of it or of any other move of MacNeill's to stop the Rising. Before 1 p.m. MacDonagh arrived at the O'Connell St. address. I showed the MacNeill order to him, and he asserted that "the matter is alright." Questioned

further as to what he meant, MacDonagh stated that MacDiarmada and himself (and Pearse, as I learned later) had interviewed MacNeill that morning at his residence, that they "put all their cards on the table," and that MacNeill on learning for the first time that a shipload of arms was due to arrive "abdicated his position as Chief-of-Staff"—thereby permitting the Military Council to take control of the Volunteers as they had planned.

Pearse, after receipt of MacNeill's ultimatum on Holy Thursday night, contacted MacDiarmada and MacDonagh; the three of them lost no time in interviewing MacNeill; between 8 and 9 o'clock Friday morning they called on him at his residence, Woodtown Park, Rathfarnham. He was in bed at the time and received MacDiarmada in his bedroom. MacDiarmada for the first time recited to him facts pertaining to the Rising; that it was to commence on Easter Sunday. He also told MacNeill that a shipload of arms and ammunition was expected from Germany; MacNeill on hearing this for the first time, replied, "In view of that, the fight is inevitable and we are all in it." MacDiarmada also told him that a Proclamation was to be issued on Easter Sunday; on being asked what its terms were MacDiarmada stated that the document was not yet complete. MacNeill then dressed and came downstairs where he found Pearse and MacDonagh waiting; the three visitors joined him to breakfast. (These details were furnished to me by Eoin MacNeill on August 14, 1936. They confirm, substantially, MacDonagh's remarks of Good Friday afternoon, 1916).

Thus the disaster which threatened the plans of the Military Council had been warded off—temporarily. The way was again clear for action. Lest news or rumours of the crux just overcome should have reached the country, MacDiarmada at once sent despatches to various centres. That for Cork was taken by Jim Ryan (later Minister in the de Valera Cabinet). It read:

> "Commandants MacCurtain and MacSwiney are to proceed with the Rising. Commandant O'Connell is to go forthwith to (?) as per previous advices."

MacCurtain's reply: "Tell Sean we will blaze away while the stuff lasts," showed that the Military Council had the Cork situation well in hand Saturday morning, April 22nd. But subsequent orders and events confused the whole position.

The Military Council received word that Saturday that the German arms ship had been captured by the British.[1] The efficient arming of the Volunteers in the South and West had thus become impossible. News of the

[1] The statement in *An Cosantoir* of February, 1945, that "the *Aud* was under continuous observation from the time she left port until she arrived in Tralee Bay," gives a wrong impression. Captain Karl Spindler's account of the voyage—"The Mystery of the Casement Ship"—demonstrates how the *Aud* under the neutral Norwegian

capture reached MacNeill later ; he called several advisers into conference that night and decided once more to take matters out of the control of Pearse, MacDiarmada, etc., he despatched messengers throughout the country with this countermanding order :

> " Volunteers completely deceived. All orders for special action are hereby cancelled and on no account will action be taken."

About 10 p.m. he summoned Jim Ryan (who had just returned from the South) and gave him copies of this order—one to be delivered to Commandant MacCurtain, Cork. The O'Rahilly was despatched to Limerick, others elsewhere. Thus the plans of the Military Council were again disrupted. The Rising based on those plans was scheduled to commence the following afternoon (Easter Sunday) !

About midnight (Saturday) MacDonagh arrived at 27 Hardwicke Street —MacDiarmada's headquarters for the night—with news of MacNeill's latest countermand. The situation was appalling. Pearse and Plunkett arrived later. The four sat in conference—in which I, by virtue of my membership of the Supreme Council I.R.B., was called on by MacDiarmada to participate. Clarke, Connolly and Ceannt, who had not stayed at their own homes that night, were not available. The consensus of opinion among those present was that the Rising should be proceeded with, and it was decided that a full meeting of the Military Council be called for next morning at Liberty Hall.

To ensure widespread circulation of Saturday night's cancellation order, the following appeared in the *Sunday Independent*, April 23rd :

> " Owing to the very critical position, all orders given to Irish Volunteers for to-morrow, Easter Sunday, are hereby rescinded, and no parades, marches, or other movements of Irish Volunteers will take place. Each individual Volunteer will obey this order strictly in every particular.
>
> EOIN MACNEILL."

---

flag, successfully bluffed British naval units whenever she passed them en route. The proof of this is evidenced by the fact that more than twenty hours elapsed between her arrival (5 p.m. Thursday) and the hour of her virtual arrest by the British (1 p.m. Friday)—during which time the cargo of arms could have been landed had the Volunteers been at Fenit to receive them. (The explanation of the Tralee men's failure to contact the *Aud* on arrival is to be found in Devoy's " *Recollections of An Irish Rebel* ").

The British had been on the look-out for the German steamer, *Libau*. She, in her Norwegian guise as the *Aud*, fooled them. She also fooled the Captain of *Shatter II* twelve hours after arrival in Tralee Bay, when the latter interviewed Spindler at 5 a.m. Good Friday. But, papers found on Casement on his arrest later that morning (Spindler p. 169) evidently directed suspicion in a special manner to the *Aud*. The challenge of the British " wireless boat " at one o'clock that afternoon can thus be accounted for.

Undismayed, the Military Council in session at Liberty Hall Easter Sunday forenoon made two important decisions :

First : To send despatches immediately to the various Commandants confirming MacNeill's cancellation of that day's manoeuvres ;

Second : That the Rising would commence in Dublin next day at noon —despatches to this effect to be forwarded that night to the country Battalions.

The first was intended to obviate the possibility that units outside the Metropolitan area might start operations before the Dublin Battalions could occupy their allotted positions on Easter Monday. Also, that should the British perchance become aware of this follow-up of MacNeill's countermand, any suspicion on their part of impending action by the Volunteers may thereby be allayed.

Messages implementing decision number one were despatched from Liberty Hall about 1 p.m. In addition to the twofold purpose mentioned in preceding paragraph, it is obvious from the following note written by Pearse at 5.5 p.m. Sunday, that the intention was to convince MacNeill also that the Rising had been called off—thus obviating any further untoward action by him :

> " To Eoin MacNeill, Woodtown Park.
>
> " Commandant MacDonagh is to call on you this afternoon. He countermanded the Dublin parades to-day with my authority. I confirmed your countermand as the leading men would not have obeyed it without my confirmation."

The second decision of the Military Council—THAT THE RISING WOULD COMMENCE IN DUBLIN NEXT DAY, EASTER MONDAY, was the vital one. These indomitable men could not be swerved from the task to which they had set their hand.

Couriers were notified to be present that Sunday evening at the rooms of the Keating Branch of the Gaelic League North Frederick Street. Pearse arrived there about 8 p.m. He had ready on small slips of paper a brief despatch which read :

> " We start operations at noon to-day, Monday. Carry out your instructions."
>
> Signed either " P.H.P." or " P.H. Pearse."

Some of these left Dublin that night ; others not until next day. The " opportune moment " had arrived. No human act could now stop the Rising. The effects of MacNeill's countermands had been minimised so far as the Dublin Battalions were concerned, and Hobson was under arrest

since the afternoon of Good Friday. Even had the British military machine in Ireland got into action prior to noon Easter Monday, the fight would have gone on, though the initial operations would thereby have taken a different turn.

When during the last few terrible days the plans of the Military Council were at times on the verge of irretrievable disaster, these valiant men remained unshaken in their resolve. Once the Insurrection got under way, their heartrending experiences were for the most part forgotten by them. They had "saved Ireland's honour" and were content.

We who have had opportunity to ponder on incidents in Ireland's fight for Freedom during the subsequent years, may well feel that the outcome of those untoward experiences of Holy Week, 1916, were Providential in more than one respect.

The valedictory words of Padraig Pearse, Commander-in-Chief of the Irish Republican forces, written in the burning G.P.O. on Friday, April 28th, 1916 (with respect to the failure of most of the country battalions to participate in the Rising) will serve as a fitting close to this review of what proved to be a bewildering chapter in the history of the Insurrection:

> "Of the fatal countermanding order which prevented those plans from being carried out, I shall not speak further. Both Eoin MacNeill and we have acted in the best interests of Ireland."

There is, however, another noteworthy phase: Historians when dealing with previous Irish revolutions belaboured the fact that the organisations responsible for them were cursed and thwarted by spies and informers. They also insinuated that all Irish revolutionists against British domination were "easy marks" for such spies, and were fools to think that their plans could be kept secret from the eyes of the British Government. These critics sidestepped the well-known fact that every great Power has had its spies continually prying into the military secrets of its rivals—often with considerable success. The point I wish to stress in conclusion is that neither the leadership of the I.R.B. in 1916 nor that of the other organisations which participated in the Rising of "Easter Week" was cursed by either spies or traitors. Herein we have splendid testimony to the extreme care in recruiting exercised by the men responsible for the I.R.B. over a generation (coupled with propitious circumstances), and in particular to the methods followed by the members of the Military Council who guarded their secrets so jealously that the insurrectionary forces were enabled to march unopposed into their several strategic positions on Easter Monday, 1916.

CHAPTER V

"THE HISTORY OF THE IRISH CITIZEN ARMY"[1]

By
R. M. Fox

Comments by Diarmuid Lynch
(April, 1946)

FOREWORD

Due to prolonged absences from Ireland over 1917–32 I missed some published accounts of the Rising which, it seems, gave the main credit for "Easter Week" to the leadership of James Connolly. Mr. P. S. O'Hegarty's remark in "The Victory of Sinn Fein":

> "There has been much talk, and much writing, as to who was responsible for the insurrection, and I doubt if Mr. Robert Lynd's sentimental attribution of it to the Dublin Strike and the Citizen Army and James Connolly will ever be overtaken,"

directed my attention to the extent to which this aspect of the history of the period had lacked impartial presentation.

In later years Mr. R. M. Fox's "Green Banners" and his "History of the Irish Citizen Army" further emphasised one aspect of events. Repeatedly, Mr. Fox decried the organisation and the men to whom the greater credit belongs, viz., The Irish Republican Brotherhood, the members of its Supreme Council, and the members of its Military Council.

Clearly, the author was ignorant of many factors in the pre-Easter situation. But, surely, he cannot have been ignorant of outstanding and indisputable facts which came to light after the Rising—including the important preparations made by the I.R.B. Military Council *prior* to the date on which James Connolly was co-opted a member of that Council (January 19–21, 1916).

The extent to which Mr. Fox's narrative lacks impartial presentation of all the facts makes it incumbent on me to refute his numerous misstatements. Criticism of a general character would be entirely inadequate. I have therefore quoted numerous excerpts and *commented on each.*

[1] Published by James Duffy & Co., Ltd., Dublin, 1943

If the annoyance engendered by his type of "history" has led me into an occasional censorious attitude towards the Irish Citizen Army as an organisation (whose members were my esteemed comrades in arms), and towards General James Connolly (my revered commanding officer in the G.P.O.) as a leader, I can only regret the circumstances responsible therefor.

DIARMUID LYNCH.

(May, 1946).

P. 3. "The idea of the workers organising their own force . . . was the weapon used by James Connolly *to force the Easter Insurrection.*"

Comment:

The claim that Connolly "forced" the insurrection of "Easter Week" is a *myth*—which, due to reiteration, has been accepted widely as fact. An unbiased historian on examining the record cannot fail to recognise that the I.R.B. Military Council, prior to Connolly's membership thereof, needed no "forcing."

P. 3. ". . . The organised force, which, under the leadership of James Connolly, advanced from being a purely workers' defence force to the point of becoming the advance guard of the movement for insurrection in 1916."

Comment:

There is no factual basis for this further claim that the Irish Citizen Army was "the advance guard of the movement for Insurrection in 1916." Prior to January 19th 1916, Connolly had no knowledge even of the existence of the I.R.B. Military Council. In ignorance of this Council's insurrectionary plans—extensive and far advanced towards maturity at that date—Connolly's tactics threatened irretrievable disaster. Hence his arrest and detention by the Military Council.

P. 6. (Monteith quoted): "When the men of the Irish Transport and General Workers' Union . . . formed *another battalion of the Citizen Army.*"

Comment:

In the light of subsequent developments such references to Battalions of the I.C.A. might well be forgotten.

P. 8. "For some time" writes O'Casey in his *Story of the I.C.A.* . . . "Thousands of working men zealously endeavoured to learn 'The soldiers' glorious trade.' Yet many who paraded . . . could not give the time needed for training and discipline. The solid core of the army numbered only a few hundred men."

Comment:

I do not blame Connolly, nor any of his lieutenants, for the fact that the large number of Liberty Hall men who paraded, etc., with the I.C.A. after its inception in 1913, later withdrew from its activities and from the opportunity "to learn the soldiers' glorious trade." Their outlook was a purely "Labour" one; it was not National and not Republican. But the fact that the active I.C.A. members dwindled to some 200 is a striking commentary on the ridiculous claim made for Connolly that he was the outstanding man in the propagation of Republicanism in Ireland and made "Easter Week" possible.

P. 8. "*From the beginning* the Citizen Army, besides being a strike force, stood firmly to those *principles of national* freedom which Connolly had voiced since the earliest days of his public activities in Ireland."

Comment:

"From the beginning"?

P. 9. "The Citizen Army . . . was *in the field* about a month earlier than the Irish Volunteers."

Comment:

It was first in its own field—the Labour field, but not in the National sense.

P. 9. "The *Irish Times* report (of meeting November 25th, 1913, at which the Irish Volunteers' organisation was established) . . . hostile to both the C.A. and the I.V.s, exaggerated the disorder. One speaker was howled down on account of his attitude to the strike. . . ."

"It is true that some of the leaders of that body were distrusted, *especially in the days when the Redmondite* section dominated the Volunteer councils."

Comment:

Here the writer introduces a *reason* of what may be deemed a *national* character as applied to I.C.A. opposition to the Irish Volunteers on the date of their inception—*which reason did not arise until June,* 1914. Redmond's nominees were in a majority only from June, 1914, to the following September, but the hostility of the I.C.A. existed from the establishment of the Irish Volunteers—to which the *Irish Times* report refers. If the I.C.A., between November, 1913, and June, 1914, had been imbued with a broad National and Republican outlook, its leaders, instead of having been hostile to the Irish Volunteers, would have welcomed the establishment and progress of the latter.

P. 9. "The Citizen Army considered the working class as *the most resolute section* of the movement *for national independence.* A period of rivalry resulted."

Comment :

This is written of a time, November 1913—August 1914, when the Citizen Army had no aim beyond the protection of its own sectional interest. The vast majority of Labour, as was the case of the vast majority of the Irish people outside the I.R.B., the Gaelic League and G.A.A., had lost their sense of Nationalism. The " rivalry " he writes of was entirely on the part of the I.C.A. which failed utterly to appreciate the *National* aim of the Irish Volunteers.

The first of the declared objects of the *Irish Volunteers* was :

> " *To secure and maintain the rights and liberties common to all the people of Ireland.*"

P. 10. Fox quotes *The Irish Worker :*

> " *Let others who may prate about ' the rights and liberties common to all Irishmen.' ' "*

Comment :

Here we have hostility not merely to some speaker whose attitude to the Strike was deemed unfriendly by the I.C.A. nor to Redmond's enforced domination of the Irish Volunteers (which, as already mentioned, did not take effect until seven months after the establishment of the I.V.s), but *a most uncalled for slur on the Irish Volunteers as a whole* (which included the I.R.B.).

At this period, of course, the I.C.A. was as ignorant of the existence of the I.R.B. as was practically the entire Irish people (with very few possible exceptions) outside the membership of the I.R.B. itself. Not until Easter Monday, 1916, did the people of Ireland come to realise that the I.R.B. of the 60's never ceased to function : that over the 49 years which elapsed since '67 it kept alive and fostered the ideal of an independent Irish Republic ; or that its members were the core and the backbone of the Irish Volunteers ; or that it was the leaders of the I.R.B. who alone comprised the secret Military Council up to January 21st, 1916, and who had *prior to this date perfected the plans for* a Rising at Easter time, 1916.

P. 10. " Right from 1896 . . . Connolly had striven for an open revolutionary Republican movement in Ireland. *He had always objected to conspiratorial groups cut off from the mass of the people, condemned to futile and ineffective whisperings and plottings.*"

Comment :

While it is true that James Connolly in 1896 openly advocated an Irish Socialist Republic (free from the political domination of Britain), the revolutionary element in his policy was the *Socialistic* one,—" the public ownership by the Irish people of the land, and the instruments of production, distribution and exchange ; agriculture to be administered as a public function, under boards of management elected by the agricultural population and responsible to them and to the nation at large ; all other forms of labour necessary to the well-being of the community to be conducted on the same principles."

In 1896, and later, it was safe enough for an individual Socialist or a Socialist organisation to advocate *openly* a Republic the dominant feature of which advocacy was socialistic. The attitude of the British Government would have been very different had Connolly had an armed organisation (numerically strong) under his command whose *first* and only immediate objective was to break the political connection with Britain, and whose purpose was to achieve national independence through armed insurrection.

Mr. Fox's comments on p. 10 about " conspiratorial groups . . . condemned to futile and ineffective whisperings and plottings " (and similar statements elsewhere), fail to do justice to the men who planned the Rising.

To glorify Connolly—and in the effort to disparage Clarke, Pearse, MacDiarmada and their colleagues of the I.R.B. as mere ineffective whisperers and plotters—he evidently believes in the maxim: "Audacity, audacity and then audacity " !

P. 10. " As the plans for the insurrection matured, Connolly came to an understanding with the Irish Republican Brotherhood element in the Volunteers."

Comment :

The plan—the worth-while plans—moving towards maturity in January, 1916 were those of the I.R.B. Military Council—a fact which Mr. Fox does not state. In that month this Military Council deemed it necessary to arrest Connolly to keep him from wrecking those plans of which he had prior thereto been ignorant. He had known nothing about the agreement with Germany for a supply of arms and ammunition, nor of their plans for the Volunteers throughout the country. When informed of them (after he was sworn to secrecy, doubtless), Connolly agreed to act in unison with the I.R.B. Council. Thus, he became a valuable " *conspiratorial* " ally.

P. 11. " The Citizen Army *always* asserted the demand for national independence—for an ' Irish Workers' Republic.' "

Comment :

The Constitution adopted by the I.C.A. in March 1914 (see O'Casey's *The Irish Citizen Army*, p. 71) while setting out Connolly's socialistic

ideas, makes no mention of an Irish Republic as one of its objects. The fact is—as O'Casey admits (as of 1914 apparently)—that "labour though fundamentally democratic, is far from being national."

P. 14. "Connolly feared at one time that the opportunity for an insurrection would be lost. He set himself to counter this possibility."

Comment:

That Connolly felt this way before he was taken into the confidence of the Military Council (January 1916) is unquestioned.

But when his ignorance of the actual situation was dispelled by the Military Council on January 20th or 21st, 1916, when he came to learn of the plans already perfected and that the Military Council had selected Easter time for the Rising, he could no longer fear "that the opportunity for an insurrection would be lost."

P. 14. Mr. Fox continues (after the word "possibility" in above extract): "First, he wanted to know how far he could depend on the Citizen Army. This was *a few weeks before the rising when he had made up his mind.* One by one he called them into an upper room at Liberty Hall *and to each* he put the unequivocal question: '*are you prepared to come out in a rising if the Citizen Army stands alone.*'" ?

Comment:

Now, *in "a few weeks before the Rising"* marks the date of these alleged *interviews* as *early in April.* This alleged incident raises some pertinent questions, viz., ;

(1) Was Connolly not satisfied before *the first of April* 1916 of the spirit of the I.C.A. to obey his orders as Commandant thereof, and of their readiness to fight at his command ?

(2) Was he not satisfied in these respects when in November 1914 he was ready to call out the Citizen Army to prevent the deportation of Monteith which the British Government had ordered ?

(3) Was he not thus satisfied when he ordered the I.C.A. to conduct fake attacks on Dublin Castle, Magazine Fort, etc., in 1916—when faced with the possibility that the British Command might have deemed either of these "attacks" as genuine, and might have opened fire on the I.C.A. accordingly ?

(4) Was he not so satisfied when early in January 1916 (or thereabouts) he had issued orders to his Vice-Commandant, Michael Mallin, that if Connolly "were taken" (for "disappeared") that the Citizen Army should "*fight at once*" ?

(5) Another and more important question enters into the incident

of the alleged interviews Connolly had with the I.C.A. on or about 1st April, 1916:

Ten weeks had elapsed since the date on which Connolly was co-opted a member of the Military Council and became party to the arrangement that on *Easter Sunday* the Rising was to begin with the Irish Volunteers and Citizen Army entering on it *as a combined force.* He was also aware of the fact that the Military Council would not divulge either the decision to strike or the date thereof until the last possible moment arrived for giving instructions to the various Commandants who were to lead their respective Battalions into action. This secrecy was an all-important factor, lest through loose talk on the part of any individual the British Government officials in Ireland might learn of what was afoot—with disastrous results.

(6) Why should Connolly, in view of the secret knowledge in his possession, ask each member of the *rank and file* of the I.C.A. *early in April* 1916: "*Are you prepared to come out in a Rising if the Citizen Army stands alone ?*" Here was a definite *intimation to each* of 200 men that a *Rising was an immediate prospect.* In the first place, Connolly must have been convinced since the date of his association with Clarke, MacDiarmada, Pearse, Ceannt and Plunkett[1] in January that the Citizen Army would not be fighting alone—just as those men must then have been fully satisfied that the Irish Volunteers would not be fighting alone. The alleged *quiz of the I.C.A. men* does not accord with common sense. And, it was *as dangerous as it was needless.*

From my association with men of the I.C.A. in the fight during Easter Week, and from what I learned of the fight put up by the rest of that Army in other Garrisons, I know that no finer or more loyal body of men ever fought for Irish Freedom. I can say the same of the Irish Volunteers. But if any of the responsible leaders were to quiz similarly any 200 or any 20 of the I.V. rank and file three weeks before the appointed day of the Rising, I would deem such action worse then foolhardy. In everyday life how often does the possessor of a secret confide that secret to "a friend" in whom he has confidence, and this friend confides in another friend, etc.

Had even a rumour of this secret—that a *Rising* was imminent—

[1] (MacDonagh was not a member of the MilitaryCouncil until the week of 9th-15th of April, 1916).

reached Dublin Castle, there would have been no "Easter Week"!

In the absence of irrefutable confirmatory evidence, I do not accept Mr. Fox's statements with regard to those alleged interviews—which, if true, would be tantamount to an accusation against James Connolly that he broke faith with his colleagues on the Military Council.

P. 36. "In the same issue of the paper (*Irish Worker*, Nov., 1913) *Madame Markievicz . . . also* struck the *national* note.

Comment:

What is this intended to suggest? That the I.C.A. (and Liberty Hall) had a national and republican outlook in 1913?

P. 41. "Connolly was a man in whose mind the physical force tradition of Irish revolutionary history was *always* a strong and vital influence."

Comment:

Seeing that Connolly was a man who believed in organised effort, it is strange—if Fox's statement is true—how he failed to be linked up with either the I.R.B. in Ireland or the Clan-na-Gael in the U.S.A.

P.50. "There was no further unpleasantness with the police, and the *band* went unmolested.

"Such an incident indicates how the Citizen Army rose directly out of the situation and grasped the first handy weapon to aid itself in the struggle. In after years critics have tried to give the Citizen Army a theoretical basis either of a labour or a national character. But these men marching with hurleys to protect their band or trying to hold their own in the day to day struggle *had no carefully worked out theories.*"

Comment:

This is not in accordance with claims made elsewhere by Mr. Fox for the I.C.A. and it does admit that there is a difference between a National and a Labour character in an organisation.

P. 60. "And now the Irish Volunteers were competing for the allegiance of workers."

Comment:

Ridiculous! The I.V.s competed with no organisation. It appealed to the manhood *of Ireland*—which included the men of every class and calling. (Beaslai in his *Life of Collins* gives a good picture of the situation.)

P. 64. *The Constitution of the I.C.A.*

R. M. Fox claims more for this document than a reading of it will convey. It left much to be desired and much to be explained. (See text p. 64 of *History of I.C.A.*) ("See Comment on p. 184 *Green Banners*")

P. 67. "The next issue of *The Irish Worker* (April 1914) began a series of

notes . . . signed *S. O'C.* The first stressed Larkin's advice *to have nothing to do with the Irish Volunteers.*"

Comment unnecessary!

P. 69. "*The Dublin Trades Council—representing the organised workers of the city—officially approved the Citizen Army on April 6*, 1914."

(Date on which it wanted to evict the I.C.A.? See p. 101, p. 124 of *History of I.C.A.*)

P. 70. "The Volunteers . . . had their left wing of the I.R.B., who stood for a Republic, and their right wing owing allegiance to Redmond, with the immediate and limited aim of Home Rule."

Comment:

No dates are given here, but, judging from matter on p. 69 and p. 70, the alleged Right Wing and Left Wing were in evidence in *April-May*, 1914.

The fact is that there was no such segregation at this date. The Irish Volunteers as such owed no allegiance to Redmond. He had opposed the organisation until its rapid advance in strength impelled him to seek its control. The I.R.B. had no occasion to intervene until Redmond, by dictatorial methods, achieved control of the I.V. governing Committee. It was only during the three months of Redmond's control that a Right Wing and a Left Wing may be said to have existed.

The influence of the I.R.B. in maintaining the Left Wing and in the expulsion of Redmond's nominees from the I.V. Executive Council Committee remained a secret until Easter, 1916.

P. 70. "*The Citizen Army was not satisfied with them—Right, Left nor Centre. It was separatist and Republican.*"

Comment:

I wonder if through frequent repetition he himself now believes that this is a correct picture of the I.C.A. in the Summer of 1914, or that said attitude (as of a later date) of the I.C.A. to the Left Wing of the Irish Volunteers and the men behind it is justified. I DOUBT IT.

P. 71. Captain White's unauthorised offer to the Volunteer executive of "two companies of fully uniformed and equipped men of the I.C.A. *if the I.V. executive would allow them to remain an independent and affiliated body.*"

Comment:

This was ridiculous from my point of view. The "full equipment" of the I.C.A. at this date (May 1914) included just ONE RIFLE. (Even though, technically, the term "full equipment" may not include rifles, the average reader would, I hold, deem "full equipment" to include

them.) At this date Tom Clarke wrote John Devoy "Larkin's people for some time past have been making war on the Irish Volunteers."

P. 72. "Connolly wrote in *The Irish Worker* (30th May, 1914) '*We believe there are no real Irish Nationalists in Ireland outside of the Irish Labour Movement.*' "

Well, well!

P. 72. "Here is the key to all Connolly's later activities and to the activities of the Irish Citizen Army. *He is completely and militantly national.* Believing that Labour alone fully expresses that view, his aim was *to put Labour in the forefront* of the national struggle. Then—given a crisis—he *relied on all* sincere national elements *coming in on the same side.*"

Comment:

"All out of step" but—Connolly and the I.C.A.

P. 73. *Comment:*

Here again Fox proceeds to show that the continued hostility of the I.C.A. was because of the grip Redmond got on the Volunteers in June 1914—which grip was of short duration.

O'Casey continued his relentless hostility to the Volunteers—going so far as to endeavour to compel Madame Markievicz to sever her connection with the Irish Volunteers *or else clear out of the I.C.A.*

The majority of her colleagues on the Citizen Army Council had the decency and common sense to vote down O'Casey's contemptible effort (p. 73).

P. 74. (Memo). Howth Gun running. 26th July, 1914.

P. 76. (Memo). William O'Brien (I.T.U. Congress)—(an old I.R.B. man).

P. 77. (Memo). Some of the Volunteers were criticised for riding home on "Murphy's trams" which had been used to bring the military out to Clontarf!!

P. 77. "At the time of the Howth Gun running (26th July, 1914) Connolly . . . was in Belfast. His daughters, Nora and Ina . . . helped to dispose of them (the rifles) at safer places in the city. As a reward for their services they were given two to take back to Belfast. *Connolly* was most enthusiastic over the gun running. . . *He was even then considering the use of arms.*"

Comment:

The last sentence is particularly noteworthy.

P. 78. "At once he (Connolly) *began his propaganda* through *The Irish Worker* (8th August, 1914) *for a united front of the Citizen Army and the Volunteers.*"

Comment:

And *at last* the *hostility of the I.C.A. to the Irish Volunteers ceased* (August, 1914).

P. 80. "*Make up your mind to strike before your opportunity goes.*" (*Irish Worker*, 5th September, 1914).

"The last sentence was Connolly's guiding thought. He hammered it home continually until The Citizen Army became the embodiment of that idea, *the spearhead of* the movement for an armed rising."

Comment:

Here we have the same old repetition that the I.C.A. was *the spearhead* of the Rising—in the effort to propagate the idea that the I.R.B. had not made up its mind to strike before the opportunity passed.

The records show that it not only had made up its mind to that end but used every effort for the preparation to strike.

Two years later the Proclamation of Easter Week, 1916, read:

"Having organised and trained her manhood through her secret revolutionary organisation, the Irish Republican Brotherhood, and through her open military organisation, the Irish Volunteers and the Irish Citizen Army, having patiently perfected her discipline, *having resolutely waited for the right moment to reveal itself. She now seizes that moment . . . She strikes . . .*"

P. 81. (25th September, 1914. Asquith meeting at Mansion House. Citizen Army demonstration at Stephen's Green).

"The main body of the I.C.A. carried *rifles and* bayonets." "Except for revolver bullets there was little ammunition." "The great difference between the two armies was that the R.I.C. men had ammunition while the *Citizen Army men had none.*" (P. 82).

P. 83. "The Citizen Army had brought the rebel movement out on the streets and Connolly must have felt a thrill of satisfaction with the way in which this had been accomplished."

Comment:

The Citizen Army was not alone in this. From the inception of the Irish Volunteers in November, 1913, its members had purchased arms and ammunition whenever and wherever possible and *carried their rifles and ammunition openly.* Did he not consider that the landing of rifles and ammunition at Howth and Kilcool and transportation of them therefrom by the Irish Volunteers (and I.R.B.) brought the rebel movement out on the streets?

P. 84. (Memo) Redmond's Woodenbridge Speech, 20th September, 1914.
(Memo) The original I.V. Prov. Com. seized Vol. Hqrs. on 24th September, 1914.

P. 85. *Irish Worker, 10th October,* 1914 suggested certain things for which the Volunteers might at once initiate a campaign :

" Pledge the Irish *National* (sic) Volunteers to remain in armed service in Ireland and to resist all attempts of any other Nation to deprive Ireland of their services."

Comment :

What did he think the Irish Volunteers broke with Redmond for except to do exactly what he suggests ? The " *National* Volunteers " was the title by which Redmond's Volunteers were known *after the Split.*

P. 85. Connolly also suggested (*Irish Worker, 10th Oct.,* 1914).

" *Pledge the services of their armed forces* in Ireland to enforce the *repeal of all clauses in the Home Rule Bill denying to Ireland* Powers of self government *now enjoyed by South Africa, Australia and Canada.*"

P. 85. *Mr. Fox comments :*

" It is clear that he (Connolly) would never refuse co-operation with the Volunteers in a *forward policy . . .*"

Comment :

But the above suggestion did not represent a *forward policy* for the Irish Volunteers. This Dominion Home Rule policy was a *backward* one from the I.R.B. (and Volunteer) standpoint.

P. 85. " This statement, it should be emphasised, in its practical proposals, does not represent Connolly's own aims so much as the irreducible minimum upon which he thought the Volunteers could agree."

Well ! Well ! *Comment would be superfluous.*

P. 86. " Connolly's articles *at this critical period* (October, 1914—when the Citizen Army had very few rifles and *no ammunition*—D.L.) indicate his thought and the programme which he later worked out through the Citizen Army."

Comment :

Mr. Fox also recognises that the foregoing explanation (p. 85) of Connolly's " *Dominion Home Rule* " *policy* did not explain it away. He resorts once again to " big drum tactics " to emphasise Connolly's impetuosity for " action " and to throw odium on the I.R.B. " secret conspirators," thus :

P. 86. " He (Connolly) stresses the need for action and the danger of delaying too long. He refused to regard a *rising* as something *to be whispered about behind closed doors.* It was part of his democratic faith that an *open appeal should be made to the masses* before whom it should be possible to justify any given line of policy."

" *All this does not mean that Connolly was ready to reveal military plans to the enemy.* But he saw no reason for concealing his aims from the mass of the people. In this he struck a new line, *for the tradition of Fenian activity was one of secret conspiracy tinged on occasions with contempt and distrust for the ordinary people.* Whenever a revolutionary movement is on the upgrade its solidarity with the aspirations of the people is stressed, but when it grows distrustful of its own strength and buoyancy, it retreats into *secret conspiracy and whisperings, portentous head-shakings, and all the trappings which accompany pompous futility.*"

" When Connolly came forward impetuously *demanding action,* it was a sign that there *was a rising wave of revolt* which was bursting through all the little coteries that were satisfied with secret conspiratorial talk."

Comment :

This interpretation merely indicates that Mr. Fox is not aware of, or has failed to appreciate, the facts in the public record of the revolutionary movement over many years prior to 1914, as well as other facts pertaining to the I.R.B. which came to public knowledge only with the promulgation of the Proclamation of Easter Week 1916. Compared with others of his generation, Connolly was, in 1914, but a novice in the broad national Republican movement.

Those who were experienced in the revolutionary movement over, say, the period 1900–1914—and who had intimate knowledge of public feeling throughout the country—knew :

(1) That the I.R.B. through *The Republic* (Belfast 1906)—which was shortlived through lack of support—and through *Irish Freedom* from 1910 to the date of its suppression in 1914, preached the doctrine of Republicanism and the establishment of an Irish Republic ; that Pearse in *An Barr Buadh* openly advanced " the political independence of Ireland " and preached the elementary political truth that the liberty of a people can be guaranteed only by its readiness and ability to vindicate it in arms. The I.R.B. through the Wolfe Tone Memorial Committee lost no opportunity to *openly* preach the doctrine of Republican independence.

But the I.R.B. did *not openly* advocate a " *RISING.*" It used common sense in planning and preparing in secret for a *Rising* and " Easter Week " was the outcome.

(2) That notwithstanding the open preaching of Republicanism and secret recruiting to the I.R.B., the vast majority of the Irish people became and remained, in 1914 and later, denationalised to an alarming extent.

(3) That such "open appeals made to the masses" in favour of absolute independence were either greeted with derision or fell on deaf ears.

(4) That the mass of the people had lost its aspirations for *national independence*. Talk of "a rising wave of revolt" prior to Easter 1916 is so much extravagant nonsense.

(5) That the "physical force" (I.R.B.) ideal of '67 had become submerged to such an extent (1900–1916) through the policy and teaching of the Parliamentary Party and through the influence of the Church—as well as by the failure of previous revolutionary endeavours—that efforts to locate a possible recruit for the I.R.B. were like "looking for a needle in a haystack";

(6) That, as a result, the membership of the I.R.B. in Ireland did not exceed 2,000 in 1916;

(7) That talk about an "*Open Appeal*" to prepare for a "*Rising*" under such circumstances was arrant nonsense;

(8) That the British Government, if face to face with such an appeal for a Rising, would not need, nor would it await, the revelation of any "military plans" for such proposed Rising. True to its immemorial policy, the British Government would have pounced on any organisation identified with such an appeal, if such organisation were deemed capable of carrying its plans into operation. Had the Irish Volunteers *openly* advocated a Rising in 1914, 1913 or 1916. there cannot be the least possible doubt of the result. There would have been no "Easter Week."

(9) That neither the Irish Volunteers (as such), nor the Irish Citizen Army (from a *national* standpoint) could be said to be a revolutionary body in 1914.

The fact that the I.R.B. had a secret revolutionary concept for the Volunteers, or that Connolly had a similar concept at *the end of* 1914 for the I.C.A., does not disprove the foregoing assertion. The I.R.B. leaders were not so blind to hard facts and the lesson of experience as to expose its purpose to the British Government. An open appeal to the people at large to participate in a Rising (before such Rising got started) would be barren

of results so far as the people were concerned, and to have given such information to the enemy would have proved disastrous. Furthermore, it would have (as is apparent from the events of Holy Week 1916) created a split in the Irish Volunteer organisation.

(10) History proves that "secret conspiratorial talk" of the "little coterie"—the I.R.B. Supreme Council or the Military Council—was not futile. And, finally, when James Connolly's eyes were opened to facts of which he had been oblivious, *he joined this "little coterie" in its "secret conspiratorial talk."* When Connolly reached this stage and learned how far the "conspirators" had advanced their deep and nation-wide plans, I wonder what he must have thought of his own attitude prior thereto, and of how near he had come to destroying the possibility of a worthwhile Rising?

See *Labour and Easter Week* (1949), p. 10. In January 1916 "*Connolly* immediately *joined the I.R.B.* and became a member of the Military Council."

P. 88. (Memo) *Parnell Anniversary Commemoration. Oct.* 1914.

"The Citizen Army men were armed with Howth rifles but there was *no ammunition.*"

Comment:

How many rifles?

P. 88. (Memo). I.V. Convention, Oct. 25th, 1914.

Demonstration—Stephen's Green—same day by the Irish Volunteers. The Citizen Army participated.

"It was soon revealed that the Irish Volunteers in shedding the Redmond section had lost the bulk of their members in the country, but had retained those who were most militant.

Their temper was now nearer to that of Connolly and the Citizen Army."

Comment:

Of course, Fox would not admit fact No. 1: that the Irish Volunteers who refused to go over to Redmond (which included the large and very important I.R.B. element) were now more in consonance with the standard which the *I.R.B.* leaders sought to effect in the Volunteers since the inception of the latter, nor would he admit that the break with Redmond was effected by the I.R.B. Or, is it that he just did not know the facts?

P. 90. *Comment:*

Fox has discovered the existence of a "scout" movement initiated

by Michael Mallin (no date given and no policy mentioned for *these* scouts) but we get the usual type of claim :

P. 90. " This scout movement *was the forerunner of Fianna Eireann formed by Madame Markievicz a little later.*"

Comment :

The Fianna Eireann established by Madame Markievicz in 1909—with the assistance of Bulmer Hobson and other I.R.B. men—was both a national and militant organisation. I venture to say there was no analogy between it and Mallin's " Scouts." If Madame M's organisation can be said to have a " forerunner " in practice established in 1902[1] in Belfast by Bulmer Hobson, its forerunner was " Fianna Eireann."

Query :

What is known of Mallin's national proclivities back in 1909 and earlier ?

What contacts did he have, if any, with Madame Markievicz between say 1909 and 1913 ? Mallin had been, I believe, a British soldier and mighty few ex-soldiers would touch any kind of *national* movement prior to the establishment of the Irish Volunteers in 1913.

The fact that Mallin and Madame M. were both connected with the I.C.A. 1913 and commanded the I.C.A. contingent at Stephen's Green in the 1916 Rising proves nothing so far as 1909 is concerned.

That Michael Mallin proved himself a splendid *fighting* man and a thorough Republican in 1916, I am proud to assert and acknowledge. The fact that I question his standing in 1909 is forced on me by Fox's tactics.

P. 94. *Monteith's deportation from Dublin ordered (Nov. 1914) by the British.*

Excerpt :

" Connolly's decision." " If I had the handling of this matter, I would put you in a position in Dublin, turn out every Volunteer in the city and say to the Government : 'Now come and take him.' "

Comment :

Yes, and " the Government " would take him—incidentally smashing the Irish national militant movement.

And *to what purpose ?* Would the inevitable fight be deemed as one for the establishment of AN IRISH REPUBLIC ?

By citing this Monteith incident, Fox evidently convinced himself that he was boosting Connolly's decisiveness and fighting spirit. Instead, he has done Connolly a disservice by taking from his stature as a responsible leader.

Fox also was evidently unaware in 1943 that through the " secret

[1] The *Sunday Press*, 23rd April, 1950.

conspiracy," etc., of Tom Clarke and Diarmuid Lynch (August, 1915) the I.R.B. sent Monteith to Germany to help Casement. Even if he were aware of it, I presume he would not mention it.

P. 97. " Attack on Dublin Castle." (October 1915).

I have commented on this elsewhere.

P. 101. " *Opposition to Citizen Army association with the Hall and the Union.*"

P. 102. This opposition " was always there and was rooted in the feeling that it was not judicious or advisable for the union to be closely identified with a militant, armed and revolutionary body."

Comment :

The Citizen Army had by September 1915 developed into a body as just described. But what of the Union officials ?

Fox mentions another instance of such opposition and states : " This was by no means the end of attempts to separate the Citizen Army and the Union and its headquarters." (See correspondence in the Irish Press, May 1946, between Frank Robbins and R. M. Fox.)

P. 103. " On 24th July, 1913, under the heading 'Street Fighting,' Connolly gave a résumé of lessons in recent articles . . . He proceeded openly to instruct his readers in general, and Citizen Army men in particular, concerning the technicalities of armed revolt."

Comment :

Here it may be asked : do not these instructions by Connolly, and the fact that the British took no steps to interfere with the Citizen Army, disprove my contention in Comment (8) on page 68 hereof ? It would be of interest to know exactly what Dublin Castle's reasons were. My surmise is :

(*a*) The Citizen Army was founded in 1913 as a purely protective force for the strikers ; it had no national revolutionary background ; in 1915–16 it numbered only a couple of hundred men with Headquarters at Liberty Hall.

(*b*) To strike at it may arouse the thousands of Irish Volunteers enrolled in the various battalions in Dublin which had their several headquarters, were better armed (July, 1915) than the I.C.A. men ; and, in addition, the other I.V. Battalions in Cork, Kerry, Limerick, Wexford, Tipperary, Galway and throughout the country.

(*c*) The war was going badly for the British and they wanted more Irishmen to " join up " and they feared to arouse the latent national spirit of the people.

(*d*) They also feared the effect in America at a time when they were exerting every effort to influence the U.S. to side with them against Germany.

(*e*) Then, too, they evidently were satisfied that there was no likelihood that the Volunteers would start a "Revolution"; the I.V. declared policy they deemed "safe" and they knew that MacNeill and other men high in the Councils of the Volunteers were not "extremists."

(*f*) The British had no idea whatever of the outlook and influence of the secret I.R.B. with respect to the Volunteers.

(*g*) They had *not the remotest idea* of the possibility that the Volunteers and the I.C.A. would one day coalesce in starting a *Revolution*.

Had the Volunteers (or their leaders, I.R.B. or non-I.R.B.) talked openly of armed revolt, street fighting, etc., the situation would in all probability have been very different—the British would unquestionably have struck and struck hard. By a sudden swoop, backed by overwhelming military force, they could have arrested all the leading men, not merely of the Volunteers but of the I.C.A. and other nationally-minded organisations. That this could not be effected without casualties is true, but the effect on the people at large (who were supporters of Redmond) might have been very slight *at that pre-Easter* stage. (July 1915.)

Instead of OPEN reference to armed REVOLT by the I.R.B. they planned SECRETLY to make REVOLT a practical undertaking. References to the ultimate purpose planned for the Volunteers were necessarily *cloaked in guarded language*. Listen to Pearse in New York, 2nd March, 1914: "To-day Ireland is once more learning the noble trade of arms. There is again in Ireland the murmur of a marching, and talk of *guns and tactics*." The Clan-na-Gael in America knew what the "guns and tactics" were for, viz., armed REVOLT, and to *this* end the *Clan* subscribed tens of thousands of pounds.

Other remarks by Pearse, similarly cloaked, could be cited.[1] He and the I.R.B. leaders of the Insurrectionary Movement aimed at the goal of an independent Irish Republic and laid extensive plans for the Rising to achieve it; they in their wisdom left Britain in the dark regarding the use to which the "guns and tactics" were to be put.

P. 120. Dealing with Connolly's "disappearance" on 19th January, 1916, and the interview or interviews which members of the Military Council had with him while detained (MacDonagh is mentioned by Fox as one of three who conducted the interviews but he was not then a member of the M.C.), Mr. Fox states:

"*They were in a position to inform him that Easter Sunday had been fixed provisionally as the date for action.*"

Comment:

I had earlier—in January, 1916—personal knowledge which bears out my contention (set forth elsewhere) that the Military Council by the end of 1915 had already decided *definitely* that the Insurrection would commence at Easter time, 1916. Good Friday seems to have been the original date. (See my remarks on extract from page 235 of *Green Banners*.)

He (Fox) admits that:

P. 120. "*What actually happened during these discussions is not known, as neither Connolly nor the others ever divulged the details.*"

Comment:

William O'Brien (Connolly's colleague) gave me confirmation in Richmond Barracks, 1916—after the surrender—on this point regarding Connolly's attitude after release, viz., that *he refused to discuss any aspect of his "disappearance."*

P. 121. "It had been agreed earlier that if Connolly were taken, the Citizen Army would fight at once. . . *Mallin also appeared before the Military Council of the Volunteers* (*sic.*) *to demand Connolly's release.*"

Comment:

In the Irish Volunteer organisation there was no body named the Military Council.

"*The Military Council*" was an I.R.B. institution founded by the Executive of the Supreme Council.

At the date of Connolly's detention neither he nor Mallin knew of its existence. But I presume Mallin did interview Pearse or MacDiarmada whose connection with the Volunteers was publicly known.

P. 123. "The Citizen Army mustered (at the Rossa funeral) (1st August, 1915) to the number of 400 *to* 500. *Every Citizen Army man carried a Gun.*"

Comment:

Here I am satisfied we have an exaggeration. Else how came it that only 200 fought in the Rising, notwithstanding all the boosting about the intense Republican spirit which Connolly is said to have instilled into the I.C.A.?

P. 124. "The hoisting of the *Green Flag* under Citizen Army auspices at Liberty Hall on Sunday, 16th April."

[1] See Appendix II for Diarmuid Lynch's comments on Pearse's remarks on 6th February, 1916—Editor.

Comment:

This incident is also detailed in *Green Banners*. It is difficult to understand why so much has been made of it, and why the hoisting of this *Green Flag* involved such "grave and earnest deliberation" by the Council of the Citizen Army. It is also hard to understand why the majority of the Executive of the Transport Union formally opposed the hoisting of the *Green* Flag. Had their objection been against the hoisting of the *Republican Tricolour* their attitude would be easily understood, but all the fuss about hoisting the Green Flag is incomprehensible.

P.S. O'Casey, p. 56 of *The Story of the Irish Citizen Army*, states that the flag hoisted on this occasion was "the Irish Tricolour of Orange, Green and White"—which was *not* the fact.

Shortly after the foregoing paragraph was written, letters appeared in the *Irish Press* relative to orders issued by Pearse to the Irish Volunteers directing them to display in their parades the old Green Flag (with harp) as "the National Flag."

I shall show elsewhere (in a statement to the Bureau of Military History) that such use of the old Green Flag *as the National Flag* was camouflage—to divert attention from the I.R.B. determination that the Irish Volunteers should participate in the proposed Insurrection through which it was hoped to achieve the permanent establishment of the Irish Republic.

(Query: Was Connolly cognisant of the idea underlying Pearse's flag orders to the Irish Volunteers, and was it for similar camouflage *with respect to the* I.C.A. that Connolly hoisted the old Green Flag on Liberty Hall, Palm Sunday, 1916?)

The opposition to the hoisting of the Green Flag on Liberty Hall gave rise to a very extraordinary incident. According to Mr. Fox, Connolly threatened to resign his position and issue a statement cancelling the ceremony. . . The majority of the Committee (i.e. the T.U. Executive) was still opposed, so he *asked permission to speak to John Farrell, one of his strongest opponents,* in private. They went into an adjoining room and here Connolly *took Farrell into his confidence explaining that an insurrection was to take place.*

The date on which this alleged interview took place was Thursday, 13th April—ten days before the date set for the Rising—a date which was the secret of the Military Council. Pearse did not expose this secret to Eamon de Valera, Commandant of one of the Dublin Battalions, I.V., until Wednesday, 19th April. Also, it was only on this latter date that Sean MacDiarmada officially informed me that the Rising was to start on Easter Sunday. Thus did the I.R.B. members of the Military Council guard zealously their important secret. In contrast, we find

V. *The interior of the G.P.O., 1916.*
Reproduced from an imaginative painting by Walter Paget.
Courtesy, The National Museum.



In order to prevent the further slaughter of Dublin citizens, and in the hope of saving the lives of our followers now surrounded and hopelessly outnumbered, the members of the Provisional Government present at Head-Quarters have agreed to an unconditional surrender, and the Commandants of the various districts in the City and Country will order their commands to lay down arms.

P. H. Pearse
29th April 1916
3.45 p.m.

I agree to these conditions for the men only under my own command in the Moore Street District and for the men in the Stephen's Green Command.

James Connolly
April 29/16

On consultation with Commandant Clarke and other officers I have decided to agree to unconditional surrender. So

[illegible]

VI. *The Surrender Order.*
Courtesy. The National Museum.



VII. *President de Valera receiving one of the Rolls of Honour from Diarmuid Lynch, 21st April, 1935.*
Courtesy. Irish Press and National Museum.



VIII. (*Standing, left to right*) *Harry Boland, Liam Mellows, Eamon de Valera, Dr. Patrick McCartan, Diarmuid Lynch*
(*Seated*) *John Devoy.*

"TAKEN ON THE ROOF OF THE OLD WALDORF ASTORIA HOTEL, N.Y. JUNE 1919 ON THE OCCASION OF A RECEPTION FOR DE VALERA BY IRISH-AMERICAN WORKERS IN THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT" IRISH PRESS LETTER, MAY 10. 1938, MS 31-405 (1) NATIONAL LIBRARY OF IRELAND.

James Connolly (according to R. M. Fox) confiding it ten days in advance of Easter Sunday to a man who opposed the hoisting of even the Green Flag on Liberty Hall.

From the few contacts I had with James Connolly prior to the start of the Rising, I had formed the opinion that he was as discreet, and as capable of keeping secret things that should be kept secret, as Clarke, MacDiarmada, Pearse, etc. I have argued thus over the years on his behalf. My personal regard for him was so high that I would not accept as true assertions that he had confided to "this one, that one and the other one" weeks prior to Easter Sunday, the secret that this date had actually been set up for a RISING. What am I to think now—in face of this alleged Farrell incident?

Postscript January 1948.

On another phase of this important matter—the approximate date on which *Commandants* of the Irish Volunteer Battalions *in the provinces* were informed that the Rising was planned for Easter time, 1916, may be cited.

It was, of course, essential that *such Commandants* should receive advance information that a Rising was contemplated in the immediate future—to enable them to perfect *their* respective plans.

Apropos of this, I read in the *Enniscorthy Echo* of 23rd April, 1930, that in the "Athenaeum," Enniscorthy, in March, 1916,

> "Pearse informed the *responsible officers* on this occasion that the date of the Rising was only 'a matter of weeks,' and a code was arranged for the transmission of the order."
>
> "On *Holy Thursday* the order arrived."

In *Kerry's Fighting Story*, A. Cotton makes what is, in my opinion, a very serious error, viz., that Austin Stack and himself visited Pearse in *the Fall of* 1915 and that Pearse informed them that "*a Rising had been planned for Easter*, 1916."

There is no evidence that I know of that the Military Council had prior to *Christmas*, 1915, selected Easter time, 1916, as the date of the Rising, or had issued any instructions respecting the positions to be occupied by the Kerry, Cork and Limerick Battalions at the time set for the Easter "Manoeuvres."

Had Pearse given these last mentioned instructions to Austin Stack, the Commandant of the Kerry Battalion, prior to January 1916, he would not have included the Kerry Commandant among those to whom I was to convey such instructions in January.

Furthermore, Cotton's reference to other important matters which, definitely, were not decided on until the early months of 1916 prove

conclusively that Pearse could not "in the Fall of 1915" have given such information.

Finally, there is abundant evidence to show that Pearse was extremely careful not to expose the Easter Sunday date to anyone unnecessarily far in advance.

Chapter entitled *Final Plans.*
Chapter entitled *The Fight Begins.*

These chapters contain a series of inaccuracies and exaggerations. I have annotated the pages and will now confine myself to noting a few and commenting on a few others :

P. 138. "Early on Sunday morning Connolly got word that something was wrong (MacNeill's final cancellation of mobilization orders for Easter Sunday. D.L.) . . . at once he sent . . . messengers to the other members of the Military Council with the request that they come immediately to Liberty Hall. . . Now he exerted himself *to save the Rising.*"

Comment :

That Connolly took this step to get such a meeting is a fact. This is confirmed by his message to Ceannt, published in Le Roux's *Life of Tom Clarke* (p. 206), which Le Roux states was received by Ceannt between 6 and 7 a.m.

"*MacDonagh and I agree that we have a conference immediately.*"

But MacDonagh's visit to Connolly *very* early, Sunday morning, was in accordance with the decision reached Saturday night (between midnight and 2 a.m.) (subsequent to receipt of information that MacNeill, earlier that night, had despatched couriers to the country Commandants with orders cancelling all "parades" on Easter Sunday) at the Conference held at 27 Hardwicke Street between MacDiarmada, Pearse, MacDonagh, Plunkett and myself, viz., that all seven members of the Military Council should meet at Liberty Hall next morning (Sunday) to consider the new situation and "save the Rising."

While *that* meeting of the Military Council (Sunday, 9 a.m. to 1 p.m.) was in session, Liberty Hall could truly be said to be "the heart of the revolt" (p. 138). The application of this term to Liberty Hall as on any previous date would be an exaggeration.

P. 138. "The decision of the Council (the main and final decision, D.L.) was that . . . the Rising should be postponed until Easter Monday at noon."

Comment :

When the meeting of the Military Council adjourned at 1 p.m.

Easter Sunday, an all important element in the situation was that "Dublin Castle" should remain in blissful ignorance of the arrangement for Monday and remain convinced that MacNeill's cancellation of the Sunday "parades" (published in the *Sunday Independent*) had removed all chances of immediate trouble. Otherwise, the plan of the Military Council to occupy the G.P.O., Four Courts, Jacob's Factory, South Dublin Union, Boland's Mills, etc., might have been made difficult, if not impossible. It was important that MacNeill should remain under a similar impression. I have dealt with this elsewhere.

P. 139. Yet, Mr. Fox tells us that :

"At about 4 p.m. (Sunday) the Citizen Army set out . . . each man was fully equipped for the fight. They marched . . . to Dublin Castle —all through the centre of the city. . .

"If there had been any interference by police or soldiers, *they were ready to attack the Castle and start the Fight.*"

Comment :

It seems scarcely credible that the I.C.A. and its leaders would have acted in such an irresponsible manner.

P. 141. "When the fate of the arms ship was known, it was quite evident that the rebels would have to rely on their own resources. *Connolly had always believed that they should do this.*"

Comment :

Connolly had known nothing about the arms coming from Germany until he was co-opted a member of the Military Council on or about 21st January, 1916. When he got this information, *did he still believe (prior to Easter Saturday) that the rebels should rely on their own resources or await an extra* 20,000 *rifles and a million rounds of ammunition ?* Obviously not !

All all events, it is an historical fact that the Irish Volunteers from the date of their inception (with the secret assistance of the I.R.B.) never missed any opportunity to arm themselves (irrespective of the shipload from Germany) and their activities in this respect antedated the efforts of the I.C.A. to procure arms.

P. 149. "There was never any question of taking the Castle. The forces available were too small for the Castle to have been taken and held."

Comment :

It is evident to me that Commandant Connolly (on Easter Monday at any rate) did not intend that Sean Connolly should attempt to take and hold the Castle. Otherwise, he would surely have allotted him more men (which could have been spared) than the 25 I.C.A. men Sean

Connolly had. But the fact that Sean Connolly did attack the guard at the Upper Castle Yard entrance and did "take" the guard room, complicates the matter. And, against the latter, is the fact that as he advanced along Dame Street, he placed men in occupation of the "Henry and James" shop building—evidently for the purpose of preventing the British from coming out through the Lower Castle Yard gate; further, that he did not attack the guard at *this* entrance from Dame Street to the Castle.

As mentioned in my comment on this Dublin Castle phase (*Green Banners*, p. 249), it is obvious that Commandant Connolly was not aware of the fact that the total military guard in Dublin Castle consisted of only *six men*.

With respect to the foregoing, I place very little reliance in Connolly's alleged "last words" (p. 147) to the Dublin Castle contingent:

"*The Citizen Army will have the post of honour. Your detachment will attack.*" "*The others will* be taking up *defensive* positions.

"Open fire at the strike of the Angelus bell."

Comment:

Connolly, in my opinion, would have simply said, "*Open fire at 12 o'clock* (noon)."

But, if Thomas Kane did not just dream these alleged remarks of Connolly (to heighten the I.C.A. picture); if Connolly did issue instructions:

"Your detachment will *attack*,"

the question is, against what and whom was the attack to be made?

P. 172. *Comment:*

I have set out elsewhere how I was deputed by Sean MacDiarmada, early in April, to secure from Andy Fitzpatrick, Sean Byrne and Dick Mulcahy—and later from John Twamley and two King brothers—all details about those manholes (Telephone and Telegraph) throughout the city. "Keys" and sets of demolition tools were provided by these men under my instructions; they were distributed to the several Battalions on Good Friday. (The Details and Sketches had been handed in the first instance to Sean MacDiarmada on Monday of Holy Week). (Compare this with Fox's version on p. 172).

This whole idea about the demolition of the telephone and telegraph wires *emanated from the Military Council—several weeks* before the Rising.

P. 174. "*Without Connolly and the Citizen Army the Rising might never have taken place.*"

Comment:

This is a fitting finale to the extracts from R. M. Fox's book—except

in one particular. If Mr. Fox had proved all the claims he has made for Connolly and the I.C.A. one would expect to find the words "would not and could not" instead of the words "might never." The impartial verdict of history must be that, although Connolly's influence on the Rising was significant and important, many of the claims made in this book are not proven.

DIARMUID LYNCH.

The marginal notes on Diarmuid Lynch's copy of *The History of the Irish Citizen Army* are as follows:—

P. 138. "But on Sunday morning MacNeill—after some vacillation—had issued his order cancelling all Volunteer mobilisations arranged for that day."

Comment:

Confirmed or reiterated his order of Saturday night.

P. 138. "Connolly had always been opposed to what he regarded as the excessively conspiratorial note of the I.R.B. and to their plan of a dual leadership."

Comment:

He knew nothing of the I.R.B. "conspiratorial plan" until his detention in January, 1916.

P. 138. "At once he sent out girls as messengers to the other members of the Military Council with the request that they come immediately to Liberty Hall."

Comment:

This Sunday meeting had been decided on Saturday night at Hardwicke Street. The decision had been made at a Conference Saturday midnight between Pearse, MacDiarmada, MacDonagh, Plunkett and Diarmuid Lynch.

P. 138. "It was held under a strong guard of Citizen Army men."

Comment:

A number of Volunteers were there for the same purpose.

P. 139. "They were ready to attack the Castle and start the fight."

Comment:

Notwithstanding Connolly's arrangement as a member of the Military Council!! Seemingly they were so damn foolhardy that on little provocation they would mess up things even on Easter Sunday.

P. 140. Quoting the evidence of Major Price at the Commission of Enquiry, R. M. Fox writes:

" What they meant to do, he added, was to surround the place with about 1,000 soldiers and take all the leaders together."

Comment :

" All the leaders ", i.e. the members of the Military Council, never met together in Liberty Hall until Easter Sunday morning.

P. 141. " Monteith sent word by a Volunteer to MacNeill telling him the position and saying that if the Rising was contingent on German help it should go no further."

Comment :

Monteith himself did not know even on Sunday that the arms ship had been captured.

P. 142. " She came to them at about 2 a.m. on Monday morning with Connolly's final instructions."

Comment :

Fox would have it that these final instructions were Connolly's though the slips of paper containing these instructions were written and signed by Pearse.

P. 144. " Connolly told his men on the eve of the Rising that there was now no Citizen Army and no Irish Volunteers but only the Army of the Irish Republic."

Comment :

Did he—" on the eve of the Rising " ?

P. 144. " Under the command of McCormack the first section of Citizen Army men left Liberty Hall about 11.35 a.m. on Easter Monday morning. His instructions were to take possession of Harcourt Street railway station and other points of vantage in that area."

Comment :

Was he not told that hostilities were to begin at noon ? Twenty-five minutes to reach Harcourt Street Station ?

P. 144. " Their instructions were to seize some of the buildings commanding the Castle. . ."

Comment :

On what authority is this statement made ? If correct, why was attack made on entrance to upper Castle yard ?

P. 146. " Connolly had detailed to each officer his part in the general plan . . ."

Comment :

Perhaps—and perhaps not.

P. 146. " He says that Connolly wished to use the Bank of Ireland as rebel headquarters instead of the G.P.O."

Comment :

What information had Captain McCormack on this ? How could he have got any ?

P. 147. Referring to the orders in regard to Dublin Castle, Diarmuid Lynch comments :

Kane was one of the detachment for the *attack* on the Castle. If the orders were as stated on p. 144 the action of Sean Connolly's men would also fall into the *defensive* category.

P. 148. " Yet here, within fifty yards of Dublin Castle, the I.C.A. were now busy pulling back hammers and bolts on weapons that were charged with death."

Comment :

As they marched towards the Castle ! !

P. 172. " A Citizen Army member—M. King—who worked in the Telephone Engineering Department, has given details of activities from Good Friday to Easter Monday, when plans for destroying the telephone system were being made."

Comment :

I'm pretty sure King was one of my men. Connolly had detailed information (and sketch) showing the exact position of each manhole in the G.P.O. area and the Castle telephone headquarters area since early in Holy Week—prepared by me from information supplied by Fitzpatrick, Mulcahy, etc. Sets of " Keys " and demolition tools were procured about ten days before the Rising and delivered to respective areas on Good Friday.

Fitzpatrick did not know that I handed over sketches, etc., to Sean MacDiarmada on Monday of Holy Week, nor of their subsequent disposition.

P. 173. In quoting M. King, R. M. Fox refers to a " necklace of dynamite " to be used in the destruction of cables.

Diarmuid Lynch comments :

These necklaces were made up by Jim O'Neill and myself Easter Monday morning when I learned the number of men available was small, with the idea that gelignite would make a quicker job than saw and files. The manhole near the Castle was the one I had in mind.

CHAPTER VI

"GREEN BANNERS"

BY

R. M. FOX

Quotations from and comments thereon by DIARMUID LYNCH

P. 10. The Proclamation.

"Promulgated on *Easter Sunday*, 23rd April, 1916, at *Liberty Hall*, Dublin."

Comment:

How's that for "History"? Two glaring errors right at the beginning of the book. The promulgation was from the *G.P.O.* on *Easter Monday*.

P. 12. "When Liberty Hall . . . was shelled and the General Post Office . . . burnt out . . . then *Connolly's* challenge rang round the world."

Comment:

Was the challenge only that of Connolly? The challenge was that of the signers of the Proclamation—The Provisional Government of the Irish Republic.

P. 13. "During the Rising the country had *seemed* apathetic."

Comment:

The vast majority of the people was not merely apathetic but antagonistic—steeped as they were in Parliamentarianism.

P. 13. "*Last* of the signatories was Sean MacDiarmada, Manager of the militant weekly, *Irish Freedom*."

Comment:

While it is true that Sean had been Manager of *Irish Freedom* (1910–1914), it was *Nationality* he was Manager of in 1915–16.

P. 14. "The Proclamation . . . was read out *on the steps of the* G.P.O. by Padraig Pearse."

Comment:

There was but *one low* step. Other writers have also used the phrase "the steps of the G.P.O."—evidently with the idea that the "steps" afforded an elevation from which to speak.

Personally, I am unable to deny or affirm that Pearse read the Proclamation *at the entrance* (to the G.P.O.). I do know that he read the "Manifesto to the Citizens of Dublin" out in the centre of O'Connell Street.

P. 39. "Hyde went to America in 1905–6 and lectured on the work of the League. *By this time* branches had been formed in American cities."

Comment:

Several Irish-Language Societies had been established in New York 30 years before 1905 and at least nine had been in operation in New York State alone several years before Dr. Hyde's visit.

P. 55. *Davitt's Land League Policy.*

"John Devoy, a prominent Irish American, carried his proposals through the Clan-na-Gael in America."

Comment:

No mention is made by Fox of the meeting of the Supreme Council I.R.B. at Paris in 1878, which Devoy came from America to attend for the special purpose of getting the support of the S.C. for what became known as "The New Departure," nor of Devoy's success (on conditions) nor of the fact that the direct result of the agreement reached was that the weight of the *I.R.B.* in Ireland was thrown behind Davitt's Land League and proved one of the main causes for the success of the League.

(See Devoy's Recollections . . . pp. 314 & 344)

P. 65. "He (Davitt) brought the small farmers into the national struggle. . . When they once realised that this . . . was that country which figured in the glowing periods of national politicians and the *perorations of the physical force men* then . . ."

Comment:

Here we have Fox's first sneer (in *this* book) at the "physical force men." He overlooks the fact, or it may be that he was unaware, that those same small farmers constituted a very large element in the I.R.B. of those days—these same "physical force men" who were the backbone of the Land League.

P. 93. "He (Connolly) sought to build a bridge joining Sinn Fein with Labour. In 1916 *he* did succeed in effecting a junction between Labour and National forces, represented by the Citizen Army and the Irish Volunteers."

Comment:

In 1916 "Sinn Fein," as such, was non est. The "junction" between the Citizen Army and the Irish Volunteers was effected by the Military

Council of the I.R.B. through the arrest of Connolly in the first place, and then—based on his agreement to co-operate—by his co-option as a member of the Military Council.

P. 94. "Finally Connolly insisted on the *leading* role to be played by the *working class* in the fight for national independence, summarising his case as follows:

"First———

"Second . . . only the Irish working class remain as the incorruptible inheritors of the fight for freedom in Ireland."

Comment:

Obviously, this latter assertion is far too sweeping. In the limited sphere to which the term "Irish Working Class" applied in the early years of this century (and before that) it is untenable. And, even since the "working classes"—as represented by Trade Unions—came to embrace practically all wage and salary earners—including school teachers—to claim that these classes alone are "the incorruptible inheritors of the fight for freedom in Ireland" is likewise untenable. And in 1916 it was ridiculous to claim a "leading role" for any particular class in the fight for national independence; the only effective forces available were the men and women then in training in the Volunteers, Citizen Army, Hibernian Rifles and Cumann na mBan.

P. 96. "Connolly's distinctive contribution to the Irish Labour and National struggles. In Dublin he founded the Irish Socialist Republican Party, noteworthy,—as he proudly claimed in later years—for the fact that *it brought Republicanism out of an atmosphere of secrecy, of something to be whispered about in conspiratorial fashion* and *made it an issue for public debate and discussion.*"[1]

[1] In a comment written in 1945 on Donagh MacDonagh's script of a radio talk on James Connolly, Diarmuid Lynch wrote:

That Connolly's ideas gradually developed beyond the purely socialistic and took on a more national turn (as the term was usually understood) is of course beyond question. I wonder to what extent this change was brought about by the fact that many of his colleagues in the Labour Movement were old members of the I.R.B.,—William O'Brien, P. T. Daly, Cathal O'Shannon, Seumas Hughes, etc.?

We know that on occasions he was dissatisfied with what he deemed a disinclination to fight on the part of the Irish Volunteers. But surely he must have been aware that the published policy of the Volunteers was not a revolutionary one. And I could never understand why he did not discuss the point with Tom Clarke and Sean MacDiarmada of whose revolutionary aims he could not have been in doubt—even if he knew nothing about the existence of the I.R.B.

On the other hand, it is obvious that as the main purpose of the I.C.A. was an economic one, Clarke and his I.R.B. colleagues were justified in not confiding their insurrectionary plans to the impetuous leader of the I.C.A. prior to 1916.

Comment:

This is one of those exaggerated and foolish comments with respect to the working of the I.R.B. which mar this book. (Further comment on excerpt from p. 10 *History I.C.A.* See p. 58.)

P. 97. "The Capitalist system, he maintained, was the most foreign thing in Ireland . . . but leaving aside 'might have beens,' this enabled him to mobilise national feeling on his side and to use the force of national tradition against what he thought was an evil thing."

Comment:

This reference is apparently to the years 1900–1902. What evidence exists for the big claim that he had mobilised National feeling on his side or gained any headway *through the force of National tradition?*

The sole purpose for which the I.R.B. existed was the establishment of Ireland's national independence; its succession from the Fenians of 1867 was unbroken. While its aims were revolutionary its leaders were circumspect; they had learned the lessons of previous insurrectionary efforts.

Connolly was different. He had shown himself to be too impetuous. Take the Monteith incident in 1914. Here was a mere Captain and organiser of the Irish Volunteers who was dismissed from the post he held under the British Government, and served with a deportation order to leave Dublin immediately and not enter a "prohibited area." Connolly's reaction to this was: "If I had the handling of this matter, I'd put you in position in Dublin, turn out every Volunteer in the city and say to the Government, Now come and take him."

Had such a course been pursued—with Monteith in some one building, protected by the Volunteers and the I.C.A., and with an inevitable result—what label would the Irish people at home and abroad have attached to the fight? And under what heading would the British Government trumpet it to the world?

Could this effort to secure the right of one man to reside in Dublin be construed as a fight to achieve national independence? No, and there would have been no "Easter Week"!

Would not a similar result have ensued if his order to the Citizen Army to start an armed revolution by itself in the event that Connolly disappeared for more than a stated number of hours? And, as already mentioned, Connolly could at the end of 1915 have had no doubt about the insurrectionary aims of Clarke, Pearse, MacDiarmada, etc.!

Many writers since 1916 have sought to prove that incidents such as the foregoing prove that only for Connolly there would have been no Rising. They fail to follow up the possibilities and place them in their obvious perspective. They fail also to realise that such incidents when considered in conjunction with the now well-known background of fact, detract from rather than add to Connolly's stature as a national leader.

I admired Jim Connolly; I was proud to fight under his command; I was, I believe, the last of his men to say goodbye to him as he lay on his stretcher in the Upper Castle Yard after the surrender, Saturday, April 29th, 1916. His place in Ireland's Hall of Fame is secure; it will not be made more so by claiming credit for him solely which belongs in part, at the very least, to other men.

That Connolly found himself in comradeship eventually with the I.R.B. leaders, and that mutual confidence existed between them, is something of which all of us can be proud—as we are proud of the great contribution which Connolly made to the Rising and the national awakening of the people which followed.

P. 131. "Out of the Dublin lock-out was born the Irish Citizen Army—a Labour force *which was to co-operate with the Irish Volunteers in the 1916 Easter Rising*. The idea may have sprung from Larkin's declaration that if Carson urged arming, they would arm too."

Comment:

That the I.C.A. sprung from the Dublin lock-out is, of course, a fact. But Fox, O'Casey and White give contradictory versions as to who actually initiated it. Its *one purpose was*—rightly and understandingly so—*to defend the strikers*. The numerous efforts of Fox and O'Casey to prove that it was also "National" and "Republican" in its early stages are ridiculous.

P. 133. "Together with his enthusiasm for the freedom of Labour *grew the ardour* of *Connolly's belief* in *National* Independence."

P. 133. ". . . so his mind—*especially after the outbreak of war in 1914—turned increasingly towards Insurrection and to the shaping of the Citizen Army as a weapon which* could be used to strike a decisive blow."

Comment:

This is correct. It was not until the Autumn of 1914 that Connolly developed towards Republicanism, as the term had always been used by the I.R.B., as applied to the Irish Nation.

P. 160. "After Redmond had pledged Ireland's support to Britain in August, 1914:

"*Ulster was lost and had it not been for the Irish Volunteers, Ireland would have been lost too.*"

Comment:

For once, Mr. Fox is magnanimous!

P. 163. "'I believe the first public proposal for *Irish Volunteers* was made by me at Trinity College Gaelic Society' *said Captain White.*"

Comment:

No date given for that meeting. (I doubt that the assertion will stand under investigation).

P. 164. "*Casement's telegram* to Prof. Collingswood at Antient Concert Room meeting, urging formation of *Irish Volunteers.*"

(No date given for meeting).

P. 165. "*White's own recollection* in his book '*Misfit*' is that his own appeal was first made at Croydon Park . . . '*It was at one of these Sunday meetings I first propounded the proposal of the Citizen Army.*'"

P. 166. "Captain White complained of the leaders (of Labour) taking the men away to Political meetings or cancelling parades without his knowledge. He had one violent scene with Connolly. . . 'You're nothing but a big overgrown schoolboy,' said Connolly."

Comment:

Had a similar situation cropped up in the Irish Volunteers, Mr. Fox and his friends would doubtless have denounced the I.V. leaders as "afraid of military manoeuvres," etc.

P. 166. "Larkin . . . drew the direct moral from Carson's successful defiance of the law . . . *Connolly*, a quieter man . . . *would no doubt see the possibilities of a Citizen Army* in connection with the *Strike situation* and *the Labour Movement*. Later he was to take hold of the Citizen Army and shape it as a *National Instrument*, an important factor in the Irish Rising."

P. 170. "The Irish Volunteers, an organisation which was started about a month after the Citizen Army."

Comment:

Emphasis repeatedly laid by Fox, etc., that the I.C.A. antedated the I.V.s.

The I.C.A. at its inception and for long afterwards was a purely sectional body—without arms or ammunition.

The Irish Volunteers (initiated October 1913 and formally established 25th November, 1913) was a *National* organisation on the broadest lines—and for which the I.R.B. had secretly determined an "extreme" policy—as an instrument to bring about a "Rising."

P. 171. "The Citizen Army rose directly and naturally out of the needs of the Strike situation. *Connolly* explained this in an article in the *Worker's Republic* for 29th May, 1915. He wrote: 'Three men had been killed and one young Irish girl murdered by a "scab," and nothing was done to bring the assassins to justice. So since justice did not exist for us . . . it was resolved to *create our own Army to secure our own rights, to protect our members* and to *be a guarantee of our own free progress.*'"

Comment:

Here we have a frank and truthful statement from Connolly himself. In it he knocks over the laboriously built up case of Fox, etc., that the I.C.A. had also a National and Republican complexion when founded in 1913 and thenceforward.

P. 178. "*The Constitution* of the I.C.A. was ratified at a meeting held in Liberty Hall, 22nd March, 1914."

Comment:

See index p. 184 *Green Banners* (infra.)

Comment:

Sean O'Casey in *The Story of the Irish Citizen Army*[1] (1919) and R. M. Fox in *The History of the Irish Citizen Army* (1943) devote a lot of space to the "hostilities" between the Irish Volunteers and the I.C.A. but as they develop this theme it becomes crystal clear that this hostility was all on one side, viz. on that of the I.C.A. and that it was not alone ill-founded but censurable in the extreme.

P. 178. "The *Irish Worker* announced in its next issue . . . *Let others who may, prate about 'The Rights and Liberties common to All Irishmen.'* We are out for the right to work, to eat and to live. . ."

Comment:

The Irish Volunteers (from whose declared objects the phrase "the rights and liberties common to all Irishmen" is taken) were the alleged "praters." This is but a mild whiff of the hostility referred to above. It has an O'Caseyesque touch about it. Tom Clarke in a letter to John Devoy dated 14th May, 1914, wrote: "Larkin's people for some time past have been making war on the Irish Volunteers. I think this is largely inspired by a disgruntled fellow named O'Casey." How right Tom Clarke was in this is borne out by O'Casey's *Story of the I.C.A.* Fox in *Green Banners* (1938) avoids stressing the "hostility" mentioned, but in his *History of the I.C.A.* (1943) he caught up with O'Casey on the point. On p. 179 of *Green Banners* Fox does admit that:

"Running through all there can be seen the rivalry with, or hostility to, the Irish Volunteers, which was to be a feature of Citizen Army activities for some time yet."

(Dates indefinite).

P. 180. "Captain White and Countess Markievicz would have nothing to do with any anti-Irish-Volunteer campaign.

Comment:

I was not acquainted with White, but this broad *national* outlook was typical of "Madam's" republicanism (I.R.B. brand).

P. 180. "Captain White offered that organisation two companies of uniformed and equipped men if the Volunteer Executive would allow them to remain an *Independent* though affiliated body."

Comment:

This offer was not alone unofficial, but, in view of the condition laid down, was ridiculous. It was, of course, rejected. See also comment on p. 71 *History of the I.C.A.*

[1] (This book bears the imprint "By P. O. Cathasaic." Fox on p. 164 of *Green Banners* gives the name of the author as "Sean O'Casey").

(The "equipment" of the I.C.A. (apart from uniform) at period referred to included just *ONE RIFLE.*)

P. 180. "By June 1914 the Roll Book showed that the Citizen Army in the city and county of Dublin numbered 1,000 men."

Notes:

(Liam O'Briain on margin of his copy (which I had the loan of) notes that after the war started the membership of the I.T.G.W.U. was depleted by thousands of men who were British Reservists).

(Memo: ? Strength of I.V.s in *Dublin* after Split ?)

P. 181. "There should be closer union between the workers and the Republican Movement, *based on the recognition by the latter that the workers were the real force to be relied upon in any genuine struggle for a Republic.*"

Comment:

The term "the workers" is undefined. If "Liberty Hall" is meant, the assertion—if applied to 1913–1914—was laughable to those of us who were closely associated with "*the Republican* movement" (the I.R.B.)

The vast majority of the I.R.B. in Dublin comprised "workers" who were *not associated with* Liberty Hall: clerks, grocers' assistants, workers in the Post Office and other Government Departments, mechanics, etc., etc.

P. 181. "THE PLOUGH AND THE STARS."

(Liam O'Briain says (in margin) that he never saw it. Well, it was flown from the Imperial Hotel on Wednesday of Easter Week—where the Tricolour had already been hoisted.)

P. 184. "Dealing with the *theoretical* basis of the Citizen Army, *The Workers' Republic,* 30th October, 1914, spoke as follows:

'Its *constitution pledged* and *still pledges its* members for *an Irish Republic* and for the emancipation of labour . . . However it may be for others, for us of the Citizen Army there is but one ideal—an island ruled and owned by Irish men and women, sovereign and independent from the centre to the sea, and flying its own flag outward over all the oceans . . .

The Citizen Army will only co-operate in a forward movement. *The moment that forward movement ceases* it reserves to itself the right to step out of the alignment and advance by itself if needs be, in an effort to plant the banner of freedom one reach further towards its goal.'"

(See extracts from Fox's *History of the I.C.A.* (pp. 85–86) and my comments on Connolly's aforesaid policy.)

(O'Casey quotes it on p. 14—*The Story of the Irish Citizen Army.*)

Comment :

The Constitution of the I.C.A. (the text of which Fox does not include in *Green Banners*) does *not* pledge its members to work for an *Irish Republic.* The fact that it did not do so probably accounts for the phrase " Theoretical basis " by Fox in his introduction to extract from *The Irish Worker :* just another instance of his finesse in the effort to prove the " Republicanism " of the I.C.A. in October 1914 and prior to that date.

P. 184. " By urging unity of action, co-operation in a real forward movement, Connolly proved himself a true revolutionary and not merely a sectarian. He understood that the *advance guard* of a movement cannot, without disaster, cut itself away from other forces that will fight with it."

Liam O'Briain comments in margin : " What an assumption here : Without the I.V. and I.R.A. even Connolly would never have ' pulled off ' an Easter Week."

This last sentence of L. O'B. is subject to comment by me, but for the moment I'll confine my comment to the above extract from R. M. Fox. The term " advance guard " (applied to the I.C.A., of course) is not merely an " assumption " but a piece of presumption—as offensive as it is ridiculous.

P. 185. " Thus the whole quay is getting drilled and the Irish Citizen Army has a larger reserve of drilled men than any other force in Dublin. The great danger is that the (Labour) dispute may be over before the men are thoroughly drilled." (*The Workers' Republic,* 6th November, 1915.)

L. O'B. asks : " Where were they ? "

If the statement quoted were true in November, 1915, where were they in April 1916 ? The muster of the I.C.A. Easter Monday had not suffered as the I.V.s had from MacNeill's cancellation of orders. The I.C.A., being an independent body, was not affected by MacNeill's actions.

Certainly the strength and influence of the I.C.A. never suffered for lack of exaggeration.

P. 185. " The war situation was one which demanded, in his view, that the blow should be struck. To strike the blow required a complete mobilisation of Revolutionary Forces . . . Connolly's course was clear and, like the brave and resolute man that he was, he proceeded to take it. In every revolutionary situation the practical leader endeavours to mobilise all the possible forces of revolt. . . "

Liam O'Briain comments :

" All this could be inverted. One could argue that the I.R.B. leaders, as far-seeing and practical revolutionaries, also sought to mobilise all possible sources of revolt—including the Workers' Republicanism of Liberty Hall."

D. L. Comment :

It is hard to be patient with this " Tail wagging the Dog " stuff. I do not question the honesty of Connolly's outlook *at the end of* 1915. Even so, his attitude, even on the basis of his not-very-intimate knowledge of Clarke, Pearse and MacDiarmada, by, say, the date of Rossa's funeral, was Quixotic (to use a mild term).

But it is hard to understand how Fox could write as he does, twenty-two years after Easter Week, 1916, when all the important facts relating to the plans for the Rising have become public knowledge. The steps taken by the I.R.B. and the Clan-na-Gael through 1915 and up to January 1916, including the arrangements made with Germany to supply arms and the selection of the place where these arms were to be landed, were unknown to Connolly before 21st January, 1916, when he was co-opted a member of the Military Council. Those who comprised the Military Council prior to Connolly's membership thereof had cognisance of all these plans. While satisfied to leave the I.C.A. fighting spirit develop independently of the I.R.B. and Irish Volunteers, Clarke and his I.R.B. colleagues naturally counted on the full co-operation of the I.C.A. when the Rising started.

P. 188. " In the union some of the officials were not enthusiastic about linking their organisation with revolt. *Connolly was asked to take the Citizen Army out of Liberty Hall.*"

Comment :

Note the nice phrase : " *not enthusiastic.*" The plain fact (if other statements by Fox are correct) is that the majority of the Leaders of the Union were scared of and *opposed* to the then attitude of the I.C.A., and, I'm satisfied, that if the truth were ascertained, so was the bulk of " Labour " affiliated with Liberty Hall. " Labour," like the vast majority of the people of Ireland in 1915 and in 1916 prior to the executions, was not merely apathetic to the militant movement as a whole, but was definitely antagonistic to it. Those of us who had experience in the organisation of the I.R.B. and the Irish Volunteers had a clear idea of this situation.

P. 189. " Throughout the whole of the official inquiry (after the Rising, D.L.) the important role of the Citizen Army in preparing the way for the Rising is stressed."

Comment:

I would never minimise the actual "important role" of the Citizen Army, but the Report of the Commission (British) is a poor source to quote from, and, furthermore, the quotation taken from the Report throws very little light on the I.C.A. role. The Commission sat immediately after Easter Week and the police were then almost as ignorant of pre-Easter arrangements as they had been on the date of the Rising.

P. 191. "Connolly was determined that the Citizen Army would fight, and, if need be, he was ready they should do so alone. All his efforts were devoted to implanting the idea of armed revolt. He distrusted secret societies. When he staged the ceremony of hoisting the *National Flag* at Liberty Hall—the Sunday before Easter—it was with the definite idea of challenging all the ideas and loyalties which clung round the British connection."

Comment:

This refers to mid-April 1916. In the light of the known facts this interpretation minimises rather than increases Connolly's stature. That Connolly when co-opted a member of the Military Council in January 1916 was *sworn to secrecy*, there cannot be the least doubt. Whether he was actually sworn in as a member of the I.R.B. I am not in a position to say. Clarke, MacDiarmada, Pearse, Plunkett and Ceannt, were of course, I.R.B. men. (MacDonagh (I.R.B.) was not a member of the Military Council in *January* 1916.) There is nothing on record to show that they asked Connolly to join the I.R.B.[1] Neither is there any reason to feel that if asked at this juncture Connolly refused. But, as already stated, it is as certain as anything can be that he *was sworn or at least pledged to secrecy as a member of the ultra-secret Military Council.* Thus all Fox's repeated allusions to Connolly's "distrust of secret Societies" dissolve into thin air in the final analysis.

The "National Flag" hoisted on Liberty Hall was the *Green Flag* with the Harp. It is clearly ridiculous to attribute to this hoisting any such highfalutin meaning as that given by Fox. The old Green Flag (with harp) had been carried openly by Volunteer Corps on parade all over the country for 12 months at least previous to Palm Sunday 1916—in accordance with Pearse's order of March 1915. (See my article on "The National Flag".)

But here is the important point: Whatever Connolly's views may have been about the I.C.A. "going out alone" *prior to 21st January*, 1916,

[1] In *Labour and Easter Week* (published 1949) William O'Brien states that in January 1916, when Connolly was co-opted a member of the I.R.B. Military Council, he, (Connolly) "immediately joined the I.R.B."!

Connolly from the latter date was a party to all the secret plans and decisions of the Military Council—including the vital decision which the Council had made before he became a member of it, viz., that the Rising was scheduled to start on Easter Sunday. Any assertion that Connolly as late as Palm Sunday talked of the Citizen Army fighting alone is a reflection at least on his common sense.

And if, as asserted by Connolly's eulogists, he had, even prior to Palm Sunday, exposed to some of the I.C.A.—further than what may have been essential to his Second-in-Command—the secret of the Easter Sunday date, what conclusion are we to reach with respect to Connolly as a member of the ultra-secret Military Council?

P. 191. "The open agitation for revolt jarred on the leaders of the Irish Republican Brotherhood, who, through the Irish Volunteers, were busy preparing for a Rising in their characteristically secret fashion."

Comment:

Here we have a sneer—a ridiculous sneer in view of the historic achievement. Small wonder that the I.R.B. Military Council (it was *not* the Military Council of the *Volunteers*, as stated by Fox on p. 191 further down) were "jarred" at the attitude of Connolly and the I.C.A. which threatened to bring all their nation-wide plans to naught! Looking back over the pre-Easter period, does any sane man believe that were it not for the known strength of the Irish Volunteers the minions of the British Government in Ireland would have permitted Connolly and his fellow-leaders of the I.C.A. to remain at Liberty Hall from, say, November 1915 to Easter Sunday, 1916? Would they have waited till Holy Week when Liberty Hall became an armed stronghold? I, for one, do not believe it. Furthermore, it is my firm opinion that had James Connolly really believed during, say, November 1915 and January 1916 that in the event of a Rising started by the I.C.A. alone, the I.R.B. and the Irish Volunteers would let him fight it out alone—it is my firm opinion, I repeat, that he would have been more circumspect in his activities and talk.

Again, if the 200 men of the I.C.A. started a fight without an understanding with the Military Council (through say Clarke or Pearse—as he (Connolly) had no actual knowledge prior to 21st January or thereabouts that such a body as the Military Council was in existence), it is logical to suppose that the fight could not have assumed the status it did in Easter Week—not even if the Irish Volunteers joined in haphazardly after the I.C.A. had begun. And, what I deem of much more importance: a Rising under such auspices as those of the I.C.A. would have been heralded to the world as a purely *Labour* undertaking; the

broad National and Republican aspect would have been lost. The Irish Race throughout the world instead of looking at Connolly as a national hero would (on learning of the plans perfected by the I.R.B. Military Council) unquestionably have labelled him as an impetuous Socialist who destroyed the best chance Ireland had in hundreds of years to secure National Independence.

Another important point occurs to me: If Connolly and the I.C.A. were determined to "go it alone" prior to the date of his co-option as a member of the I.R.B. Military Council (January 1916), what was his *plan of action*—for a force of 200 *men*? If he had a definite plan, I, for one, never heard of it.

P. 191. "Connolly, on his side, feared that they (the I.R.B.) would whisper in corners and take no action at all."

Comment:

Why did he not discuss his fears with Tom Clarke?—to mention only one man. Was Tom Clarke, whose life and actions were an open book, not deemed by Connolly as a man to whom he could put a straight question, or lay down a definite proposal?

I was the last of the men who fought under Connolly to bid him farewell as he lay on his stretcher on the side walk of the Upper Castle Yard on Saturday, 29th April. I am proud to have known him and to have fought under him. He was a great man and as such I revere his memory. But the over-stressing by mis-eulogists of his part in the preparations and decisions pertaining to the Rising at Easter 1916, and their sneers at the men who comprised the Military Council prior to Connolly's membership thereof, compel me to record these present criticisms.

P. 191. "Connolly 'Disappeared' on 19th January and remained in his 'unknown destination' till 21st January."

Liam O'B's comment at foot of p. 191 reads:

("His men had orders to revolt the Saturday night following any disappearance, arrest, or kidnapping of Connolly (by police in the first place naturally). Mallin informed I.V. he was going to do so. So they had to release Connolly (Mallin to me in Richmond Barracks)".

D. L. *Comment:*

The fact, which is obvious from Connolly's subsequent membership of the Military Council, is that Connolly on being informed by representatives of the M.C. of their plans, and the stage to which these plans had advanced, agreed to drop his "go it alone" ideas and co-operate loyally with the Military Council. Had he not acquiesced, does anyone believe they would have released him? And, in the event of his continued custody, who is so naïve as to believe that Mallin would have been permitted to remain at large to lead the I.C.A. into immediate action? The men who did not hesitate to take Connolly into custody would have found a way to deal with Mallin. But, thank God, the danger of a premature, and sectional, "revolt" was removed by Connolly's agreement to fall into line with the Military Council. (I have commented elsewhere on the assertion that Mallin so informed the *Military Council*) D. L.

P. 192. "Countess Markievicz and Michael Mallin were seriously perturbed at his (Connolly's) disappearance."

Liam O'B. writes: "Arthur Griffith considered Connolly's arrest and release left him master of the situation from that on. (A.G. to me when? Easter Saturday night or later? I disremember. I don't quite agree with A.G. here)."

D. L. *Comment:*

I totally disagree with Griffith's remark. After Connolly became a member of the Military Council there was no phase in which he could become "master." He just went along on the plans already laid, but it is only natural that, in the matter of perfecting details, Connolly, as well as each individual member of the M.C., made his contribution and I am satisfied that Connolly's contribution was of great value.

P. 195. "As in Ireland where the I.R.B. worked through Wolfe Tone Clubs and Dungannon Clubs, so in America there were a variety of organisations through which the Clan-na-Gael carried on its propaganda."

Comment:

Here the author shows his ignorance of the I.R.B. organisation, and of America and the Clan-na-Gael. The latter had no subsidiary propaganda organisations. (The "Irish Volunteers" in New York was a *military* organisation composed of Clan men.) The Clan carried on its own propaganda—there was no other organisation in America to do so.

P. 197. "On his arrival Clarke was *at once* co-opted on the Supreme Council of the I.R.B."

Comment:

This error is copied (evidently) from Le Roux p. 32. Tom did not become a member of the S.C. until 1909—two years after his return to Ireland. (Letter from P. S. O'H. to D. L. 16/2/45.)

P. 199. "This paper (Irish Freedom) ran from 1910 to 1914 and was succeeded by the *Irish Volunteer*."

Comment:

Irish Freedom and *Nationality* were official *I.R.B.* organs. *The Irish Volunteer* from December 1914 onwards was run by the *I. Vol.* Executive. (It was, however, *influenced* by the I.R.B.)

P. 202. "The Volunteers . . . *more than a third* of the members of the original committee were supporters of Mr. Redmond's policy and *less than half had been connected with the* Sinn Fein movement."

Comment:

I cannot escape the conclusion that Fox's assertions (p. 202) are for the purpose of showing that the Irish Volunteers were controlled at their inception by a non-Republican element—thus laying a semblance of foundation (and justification) for the bitter hostility of the I.C.A. towards the Irish Volunteers.

I give hereunder the names of those who were members of the governing Committee of the Irish Volunteers from November 1913 to October 1914 (exclusive of Redmond's 25 nominees who functioned between mid-June and mid-September 1914).

Not all of the 30 were members of the Committee at the same time. The I.R.B. list is definite (Lonergan went to the United States).

I have not attempted to re-classify the non-I.R.B. men into Redmondites and Sinn Feiners; the list may include a few of the latter.

I.R.B.	*Non-I.R.B.*
Pearse, Padraig.	MacNeill, Eoin.
MacDonagh, Tomas.	Kettle, Tom.
Plunkett, Joseph.	Kettle, Larry.
O'Rian, Padraig.	Moore, Col.
Hobson, Bulmer.	White, Peter.
O'Connor, Seamus.	Gogan, Liam.
Mackin, Peadar.	Judge, M. J.
MacDiarmada, Sean.	Fitzgibbon, Sean.
Ceannt, Eamonn.	Gore, John.
Colbert, Con.	Lenehan, J.
Beaslai, Piaras.	O'Reilly, Peter.
Martin, Eamon.	Walsh, Geo. P.
Mellows, Liam.	The O'Rahilly.
Page, Robert.	Sir Roger Casement.
O'Loughlin, Colum.	
Lonergan.	
(16)	(14)

The above analysis, showing the I.R.B. majority on the Committee, is sufficient comment on the hostility of I.C.A. spokesmen between

November 1913 when the Irish Volunteers were established and the Summer of 1915 when Redmond's nominees were for a few months permitted to act as members of the I.V. governing Committee.

P. 216. Sean T. O'Ceallaigh in *An Poblacht* 30th April, 1926, quoted.

Comment:

In his comments on *Connolly*, Sean T. wrote: "*If it were not for the insistence of Connolly the Rising might not have taken place just exactly at that time.*"

This is merely an assumption on Sean T's part—influenced undoubtedly by the repeated claims of the I.C.A. And now (1938—when *Green Banners* was published) Mr. Fox quoted Sean T. when making all-out claims for Connolly. Sandwiched in between quotations from O'Ceallaigh, Fox states: "Connolly was not a member of the I.R.B. *or of any secret organisation.*" This view has already been commented on (pp. 9-10 hereof)—William O'Brien in 1949 asserts that Connolly *did* join the I.R.B.!

P. 218. "The well-to-do sections in Ireland had supplied men to the Indian Civil Service, to Medical, Diplomatic, and Military services elsewhere. They were inclined to look down upon Ireland as a land fit only for cattle herds to live in. This 'shoneen' spirit could not fail to irritate the intelligent men who struggled in the overcrowded *ranks of professional life* in Ireland. This was one factor of *discontent. The farmers,* too, although *the war* had brought them a measure of prosperity, thought in terms of their own land, they *did not care for British rule* and British ways of thought with their own. Add to this the labour discontent in the cities and it will be seen that there was a fertile field for Volunteer activities."

Comment:

Apparently the above applies to the period after the 1914 war started—that is after the Volunteer Split.

The fact that only 10,000 out of 150,000 Volunteers remained firm against Redmond, and that comparatively few joined the ranks of the "Irish Volunteers" thereafter, is sufficient comment on the above—except to call attention to the well-known hostility of the vast majority of the people to the Rising and those responsible for it, until the post-Easter executions turned the tide.

As against the 10,000 Volunteers who remained loyal to the original Provisional Committee, there is the fact that several hundred thousand Irishmen joined the British forces (and of the latter it would be of interest to figure the percentage which might be classed as "Labour"). And

the alleged "intelligent" men of the "professional classes" were to be found rushing for officerships in the British Army rather than to the ranks of the Irish Volunteers.

On re-reading the whole excerpt, I wonder if Mr. Fox had any personal knowledge of the Ireland of 1914-1916.

P. 218. "*Connolly* was himself the *strongest and most practical* individual force on the rebel side—sharing with Tom Clarke a determination to fight that would brook no delay—was motived by the national tradition of revolt which, in his mind, included his distinctive labour appeal."

Comment:

Here we have the oft-repeated claim that Connolly was "*the strongest and most practical*" force on the rebel side—with the subsidiary grain of appreciation to Clarke by way of contrast to Clarke's other colleagues. Also, the oft-repeated insinuation that on the side of the I.R.B. and I.V. *Clarke* was the only *man* determined to fight.

Had Clarke outlived the Rising, Fox and his fellow scribes would not have dared to write thus. Or, had they so dared, how Tom would have flayed them !—he was big enough to give credit where credit was due.

To me, as to other I.R.B. men, who knew Sean MacDiarmada, Pearse, Ceannt, etc., intimately, the treatment meted out to them by R. M. Fox is appalling. To myself, in particular, whose contacts with them in connection with many of the important items of preparation 1915-16 were perhaps closer than that of any other man outside the Military Council, Fox's attitude is irritating and deplorable.

P. 219. Occasionally, Fox throws a bouquet to the Irish Volunteers. Dealing with 1915-16, he writes:

"Yet the Irish Volunteers who marched and drilled *in these months* were the *living embodiment of that National tradition of revolt* which was to sweep the country soon enough."

P. 229. *Comment:*

I agree with Liam O'Briain that Fox in the chapter devoted to Sheehy-Skeffington over-estimates his value to Ireland in pre-Easter years.

"Over-estimates" is a mild term. Poor "Skeffy" was the proverbial "fly on the fly-wheel" so far as the *Rising* was concerned.

P. 231. (Memo) On 16th May, 1915, *Sean MacDiarmada* was *arrested.*

P. 233. "The Irish Volunteers received a great fillip. Men were coming in in hundreds. In the last few weeks of the year, 2,000 joined up in the provinces."

To the President and Congress of the United States

Dublin, June 18th 1917

Gentlemen

We, the undersigned, who have been held in English prisons, and have been dragged from dungeon to dungeon in heavy chains, cut off since Easter Week, 1916; from all intercourse with the outside world, have just had an opportunity of seeing the printed text of the message of the United States of America to the Provisional Government of Russia:

We see that the President accepts as the aim of both countries "the carrying of the present struggle for the freedom of all peoples to a successful consummation". We also see that the object of President Wilson's own Government is "the liberation of peoples everywhere from the aggressions of autocratic force"

"We are fighting" writes the President, to the Government of Russia, "for the liberty self government and undictated development of all peoples, and every feature of the settlement that concludes this war must be conceived and executed for that purpose. Wrongs must first be righted and then adequate safeguards must be created to prevent their being committed again. Remedies must be found as well as statements of principle that will have a pleasing and sonorous sound" "No people must be forced under a sovereignty under which it does not wish to live"

We trust that such remedies — in preference to any governmental professions whatsoever; will be held to include the right of each people, not merely to rely on other peoples, to support their claim to national liberty, but what the Governments and peoples of other nations will, we trust regard as even more sacred, the right of each people to defend itself against external aggression, external interference and external control, It is this particular right that we claim for the Irish people, and not content with statements of principle, though these themselves may be made a protest for our oppression, we are engaged and mean to engage ourselves in the practical means for establishing this right without awaiting the issue of the war or the settlement that may conclude the war

We ask of the governments of the United States of America, and the governments of the free peoples of the world to take immediate measures to inform themselves accurately and on the spot about the extent of liberty or attempted repression which we may encounter.

We the undersigned, are officers (just released from English prisons) of forces formed independently in Ireland to secure the complete liberation of the Irish nation

Éamon de Valéra
Eoin mac Néill
Donnchadh [illegible] lial Earcáin
Séamus [illegible]
Riobard O'Breandain
[illegible]
Fionán O'Loingsigh
Proinsias O'Fiataig
Tomás [illegible]

Sean R Etchingham
Risteard mac Conmhaoighe
Sean Mac an tSaoi
Risteard O'h-[illegible]
Seumas Doyle
Frank Galligan
Tomas Aghas
Diarmuid Ua [illegible]

Risteard O Colmáin
Seoirse O h-Eireamhóin
Conchubhar O Coileain
Laiblhin de Staic
Sean Mac Gadhra
[illegible] mac Gearailt
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

Comment :

This estimate of the number of recruits at that time is, in my opinion, grossly exaggerated.

P. 234. *Comment :*

Fox quoted Le Roux regarding the I.R.B. and MacNeill. Liam O'B. asks " Is this true ? "

Comment :

I was absent from Ireland in 1914 until November. I do not believe the statement—which Le Roux quotes from " *unpublished* correspondence." He does not quote the name of the writer, nor of the party to whom the " correspondence " was addressed.

That Clarke and/or MacDiarmada (who were the only men then in a position to do so) should send such an ultimatum to MacNeill, I do not believe.

P. 235. " He (Connolly) distrusted too much whispering in corners. Connolly was never a conspirator *for the love of conspiracy*."

Comment :

Was it but " *whispering in corners* " and *conspiring* " *for the love of conspiracy* " that the Clan-na-Gael carried on its negotiations with Germany for arms ; that Joe Plunkett went to Germany in April, 1915, for this same purpose ; that Pearse (with my humble self as his agent) selected a landing-place for those arms ; that I.R.B. Commandants of the Irish Volunteers in the South had received their secret instructions regarding their " mobilisation " areas for Easter Sunday, etc. ?

Here I revert to Sean T. O'Ceallaigh's comment (Fox p. 216) :

Those secret instructions re mobilisation areas of the Irish Volunteers in Cork, Kerry, etc., over Easter Saturday and Easter Sunday were given orally to me by Pearse *early in January*, 1916, for transmission in person to the I.R.B. Commandants of those Battalions. Some months previously I had reported to Pearse that Fenit was the most suitable landing place for a supply of arms, etc., from Germany. The purpose of the selected positions for the Cork, Kerry and Limerick Battalions was obvious : For instance, " Limerick was to hold the line of the Shannon " !

I have written of this matter elsewhere (it was " set up " but not published) and explained how it came about that the messages were not delivered by *me*.

P. 235. " In the *Irish Worker* (date ?) he asked ' are we not waiting too long.' All this was most unorthodox from the I.R.B. standpoint. Reared in an atmosphere of secrecy, the cabal habit had become second nature."

Comment :

Connolly's question in cold print was not merely "unorthodox" from the I.R.B. standpoint, it was sheer madness—expressed, it is true, in complete ignorance of I.R.B. decisions and plans conducted through the Military Council. It cannot be gainsaid that it was chiefly the mercy of Providence that blinded the British Authorities to even an approximate sensing of the situation and kept them (in the first place) from pouncing on Connolly and his I.C.A. of 200 men—who could have been nabbed outside the precincts of Liberty Hall in the early months of 1916.

Had they (the British) attacked the I.C.A., the Irish Volunteers (as already mentioned by me) were bound to become involved in some haphazard fashion.

Incidentally, the leaders of the I.R.B. as well as those of the Irish Volunteers (as such), might have been caught off their guard and arrested by the British.

One shudders to think of the probable result !

P. 235. "Even when the Supreme Council of the I.R.B. met in January at the Clontarf Town Hall, they merely passed a resolution declaring that the rising should take place 'at the earliest date possible.' From *meaning nods and winks,* members of this Supreme Council gathered that the date had been fixed by a smaller body, the Military Committee."

Comment :

The foregoing has evidently been written on the basis of my statement which appears on P. 180 of Le Roux's *Life of Tom Clarke.*

Fox, of course, was unaware of the fact that prior to that meeting I had received Pearse's secret instructions for the Commandants in Cork, Tralee and Limerick, specifying the positions which they were to occupy Easter Saturday and Easter Sunday ; and that I was cognisant of what those positions meant with relation to Fenit as a landing place for arms ; that I was also aware that Clarke and MacDiarmada, who were the two resident members of the I.R.B. Executive, were also members of the Military Council, and that Pearse was a member of both the Supreme Council and the Military Council.

The other members of the S.C. had complete confidence in these men and Clarke and MacDiarmada comprised a majority of the "Executive"—which body had complete control of the organisation when the S.C. was not in session.

So far as I personally was concerned, I preferred to leave the question of Rising date, etc., indefinite at *that* meeting of 10 or 11 representatives

(I am not certain if all 11 of the S.C. were present)—leaving that all-important item rest solely in the knowledge of the Military Council—who to my knowledge were perfecting the plans.

Remarks about "*meaning nods and winks*" and "whispering in corners" only serve to irritate ; they cannot, in the long run, hide the real facts in the situation.

P. 235. Liam O'Brian's comment on this page, "The M.C. were not to take action without sanction of S.C." is erroneous. The Supreme Council at the January meeting could have stipulated that when the definite date for the Rising would be selected it should receive the express ratification of the S.C. itself. *No such stipulation was made.* It was recognised that should "the earliest date possible" become apparent to the Military Council between that January meeting and the following Easter Sunday, the "Executive" of the S.C. was constitutionally empowered to ratify it. The Supreme Council had declared for War ; the date on which the Declaration was to be promulgated was a subsidiary matter.

Furthermore, should Clarke and MacDiarmada—with Pearse acquiescing—accept a definite date in the interim, and should their decision then be submitted to the Supreme Council, it was absolutely certain that such decision would be ratified by the Council as a whole. These three men were not alone recognised as leaders but they were cognisant of *all* the factors in the situation and were thus in the best position to pass judgment on such an important point.

When at the January 1916 meeting of the S.C. I moved that the next session of the latter be fixed for Easter Sunday, I had in mind that in the interim (a period of three months) the "Executive," and, through it, the Military Council, would have a free hand. Furthermore, at that moment I felt certain that Easter Sunday would see a "meeting" of a very different nature.

P. 235. "The date of the rising was fixed as Easter Saturday, 22nd April, but this was subsequently altered to the evening of Easter Sunday."

Comment :

It would be of interest to know on what authority Easter *Saturday* is mentioned by Fox as the date.

That the selection of Easter *Sunday* held for some considerable time before the change was made on April 23rd (Sunday) to the following day, 24th April, is beyond doubt.

But there is some foundation for the assertion that the date originally fixed for the Rising was Good Friday. William O'Brien (of Liberty Hall—and an old I.R.B. man) told me in Richmond Barracks, May,

1916, that he had been informed (by Connolly, I think) that the original date was *Good Friday*. Madge Daly, writing to me, May, 1946, stated that Tom Clarke gave her a message late in January for her uncle, John Daly, to the effect that Good Friday had been selected as the date of the Rising.

P. 237. "In *September* the I.R.B. Supreme Council appointed its *fourth Military Council*, the members being Thomas Clarke, Sean MacDiarmada, Joseph Plunkett and Padraig Pearse."

Comment:

This is *all wrong*: The Military Council, or rather the "Military Committee" as it was called at first, was appointed by the "Executive" of the I.R.B. (not by the S.C.) in or about June 1915. (Sean MacD. had been arrested in May and I substituted for him as Secretary—and thus a member of the "Executive.") On my motion, Padraig *Pearse*, Joseph *Plunkett* and Eamonn *Ceannt* were appointed as the Military Committee. When Sean MacD. was released from prison, he and Tom Clarke acted as *ex-officio* members of the Committee. At this stage the term "Military Council" may be said to be appropriate. There was no such term in use at any time as the "*Fourth*" Military Council. I think the word first appeared in Le Roux's *Life of Pearse* (which is full of errors).

Pp. 238–239. *Comment:*

Elsewhere I have written the correct details about the interviews between members of the M.C. with MacNeill and Hobson.

P. 240. *Comment:*

Same applies to the *Aud* and associated matters.

P. 242. *Comment:*

Here Mr. Fox gives all the credit to Connolly for the Sunday forenoon meeting of the Military Council at Liberty Hall.

Comment:

Elsewhere I have recorded the facts of Easter *Saturday night* as regards MacDiarmada, Pearse, Plunkett and MacDonagh (in whose discussions I participated). They endeavoured to reach Clarke, Connolly and Ceannt. For some reason or reasons they were unsuccessful. Before parting, *they decided to hold a meeting of the Military Council at Liberty Hall next morning* (*Sunday*) and to take further steps to so inform Clarke, Ceannt and Connolly.

The Sunday meeting lasted from 9 a.m. to 1 p.m. A number of I.C.A. men and Irish Volunteers (including myself) were waiting in an ante-room and in the main hall until the meeting adjourned.

(In my comments on Fox's *History of the I.C.A.*, which I wrote later than the above, I have dealt further with this point) D.L.

P. 243. "*Connolly had never believed* in these *wheels within wheels* revolving in different directions. . . . Now, at the last moment, he exerted himself to create a firm centre of revolt, *to save the plan from the wreck*."

This was the *moment* of *Connolly's triumph.*

Comment:

Well, well! No one counted but Connolly! All the others—Clarke, Pearse, MacDiarmada, Plunkett, Ceannt, MacDonagh—were mere ciphers! I know the sentiments expressed by Pearse, MacDiarmada, Plunkett and MacDonagh after midnight Saturday, 22nd April, that the Rising should go ahead notwithstanding MacNeill's cancellation of the Sunday "parades."

P. 244. *The Proclamation of the Republic.*

Fox writes: "This document bears evidence of being the work of Connolly and Pearse, possibly of others as well."

Comment:

Connolly to the fore again, Pearse taking second place, and the others —well, perhaps!

That the Proclamation covered the unanimous feelings of all seven members of the M.C. is, in my opinion, beyond question. Each of them was cognisant of the views of the others and I fail to see any point in the Proclamation on which these men could have differed. But, when we seek for internal evidence (apart from actual knowledge) as to which of them drafted the Proclamation, all discerning men are compelled to the conclusion that Pearse's style and masterful method of expression characterise it throughout.

From *The Irish Press*, 27th April, 1945:—

"Just before the Rising," says R. M. Fox in his book, *Rebel Irishmen*, "Connolly came to Mrs. Skeffington and said: 'You will be glad to know that in the Proclamation of the Irish Rebellion we are including equal citizenship for women.' 'I know who is responsible for that,' she replied. "We are practically unanimous," said Connolly. 'Only one questioned it.'"

Comment: Further on *Irish Press*, 27th April, 1946:

The excerpt from *Rebel Irishmen* is of interest, Connolly's opening remark to Mrs. Sheehy Skeffington—when speaking to her about the coming Rising—seems to me to have undergone some "editing." Anyway, Mrs. Skeffington's "bouquet" to Connolly is *not proof* that he was the individual responsible for inclusion of the clause:

and go over the details with them individually. I have a happy recollection of those special meetings with Daly, Kent, de Valera and MacDonagh. Therein also lies one of the sad notes in my memory, as it was the last time I spoke with three of them.

MacDonagh got the plans for the main telephone headquarters. James Connolly got those for the Castle, which he was to give to Sean Connolly. I have heard much comment on the failure of the Irish Republican Army to effect the demolition of the wires at the latter points. I also heard that a man who has since died was responsible for not cutting the wires at the telephone headquarters. I do not know whether the man in question received orders to carry out that work or not. I do know, however, that the prime reason was lack of men on Easter Monday, and this was due to the almost disastrous action of MacNeill, who on Easter Saturday evening again assumed command of the Volunteers and issued orders to all parts of Ireland countermanding in toto the plans which had been perfected by Pearse governing the mobilisation of the various units for Easter Sunday. MacNeill took this step because of the fact that certain important arrangements which he had the day before been informed of by MacDermott and MacDonagh had miscarried.

On that Easter Saturday night I was with Sean MacDermott. About midnight MacDonagh and Plunkett arrived at the house where he was staying with news of what MacNeill had done. Word was sent to the other members of the Military Committee, but only Pearse arrived—and he came within a very short time. I was called in to the conference and I never shall forget the occasion. Poor MacDermott, whose health had been shattered years before in his work for Ireland and who was physically worn out by the strenuous months of anxiety through which he had just passed, writhed in anguish. All were shocked at the desperate situation which had suddenly been thrust upon them. Picture it for yourselves—eighteen hours before the appointed time at which Dublin was to strike, nineteen hours before the men in the country districts were to unfurl the flag of the Irish Republic, and all the means of rapid communication in the possession of the enemy. It did seem as though Fate was against us. On some other occasion I will have more to say about that fateful night. Suffice it now to say that it was decided to call a meeting of the full Military Committee next morning. The Committee met early Sunday and at one o'clock in the afternoon despatched couriers to the country with a message that everything was off, thereby apparently confirming MacNeill's order. What caution, what calculation, what coolness underlie that decision !

Later that Sunday afternoon MacDermott lay ill at the home of a friend, but as evening approached his brave spirit overcame the physical weakness and we went to a nearby address where another set of couriers were to

assemble. Pearse arrived soon afterwards. During the afternoon he had written out his final orders for the following day, Monday, and brought them with him ready to be despatched to the Commandants of the various battalions. Some of these despatches went forward from Dublin that night, the balance early next morning. Inasmuch as the latter were directly contrary to those issued on Sunday afternoon, and considering the various orders and counter orders of the previous week, small wonder that confusion resulted. The Military Committee encountered one crisis after the other, in dealing with which the greatest tact and coolness was essential if the English enemy were to be kept in ignorance of the plans afoot. As a matter of fact the incidents of Easter Saturday were sufficient to rouse the suspicion of the English officials and there was momentary danger that they might, through one misfortune or another, come to realise what the Easter Sunday mobilisation actually meant. When at that conference at Liberty Hall on Sunday forenoon the Military Committee definitely decided to strike in Dublin at noon next day, the great problem of the moment was to throw the English off the track for another twenty-four hours—if perchance they should in the meantime correctly appraise the situation. Above and beyond all other points Dublin had to be safeguarded—everything depended on the Dublin battalions being able to take possession of their respective positions before the enemy "got wise." To make assurance doubly sure the Captains of the Dublin Companies did not receive their final mobilisation orders from Headquarters until the early hours of Monday morning, and the orders were to have their men at specific points at 10 a.m.

Pearse, Connolly, Clarke, MacDermott, Plunkett and the men who were to hold the General Post Office were assembled at Liberty Hall. A despatch was received from Commandant Kent that at 10 o'clock only eighty men had reported out of his battalion, which was to take and hold the South Dublin Union. Similar disheartening reports came in from some of the other Commandants. The cancelling of the Sunday mobilisation by MacNeill—orally and through a notice in the Sunday papers—the subsequent enforced cancellation of orders by the Military Committee, the consequent scattering of men, and the final short notice for the Monday morning mobilisation could not have resulted otherwise. The great outstanding fact, however, was that there were sufficient men to take possession of each strategic position ; the further fact that there were not nearly enough men to thoroughly carry out the work allotted to each battalion was then of secondary importance. When the meagre forces in Liberty Hall filed out into the square it was absolutely certain that nothing could stop the fight for an Irish Republic—the hour had come at last. As we swung into Abbey Street many passersby doubtless took no notice of us ; some few stopped to look at the Volunteers going as they thought on a route march. In a few

minutes more the body turned to the right in O'Connell Street; a few minutes more and we were in possession of the Post Office. Here and elsewhere in Dublin the battle had begun—for Ireland.

Throughout that day and the next, Tuesday, Volunteers who had been absent from their homes when the final order for mobilisation was delivered thereto, arrived in considerable numbers at the positions occupied by their respective battalions, and thus the forces which were on the firing line when the fight commenced were considerably augmented as it progressed.

The citizen soldiers of Ireland as they marched into their strategic positions that glorious Easter Monday without firing a shot, won another victory of far-reaching consequence—they exploded the hoary falsehood that no secret organisation in Ireland could execute its plans without being cursed by spies and informers among its own trusted men.

One of the main objects in demolishing telephone and telegraph connections in Dublin and at other points was to ensure the Commandants of the country battalions sufficient time to occupy their designated positions and conduct their preliminary operations before the enemy forces could be ordered into action against them. The initial movements of the Irish Republican units in the country districts having been frustrated by the conflicting orders already referred to, it so happened that the English enemy gained no material advantage through the failure of the I.R.A. to destroy the entire telephone and telegragh system which was in the possession of the British.

Having detailed the almost calamitous actions of MacNeill which, were it not for the determination and coolness of the Military Committee, would in all human probability have resulted in no "Rising" and no open proclamation of the Irish Republic during the period of the world war, it is but fair to remark that: (1) MacNeill's final cancellation of orders principally resulted from the capture of the shipload of arms, news of which reached Dublin on Easter Saturday. (2) Without those arms the men in the South and West were not equipped to make a fight of any considerable duration. (3) The failure of practically all of those units to get into action because of the conflicting orders had little or no bearing on the result of the "Rising." (4) Though MacNeill's actions on Easter Saturday were and may yet be severely condemned, the Easter Week survivors have not questioned the motives which prompted him in the extraordinary course which he adopted.

CHAPTER XI

DIARMUID LYNCH AS NATIONAL SECRETARY, FRIENDS OF IRISH FREEDOM

by

FLORENCE O'DONOGHUE.

PART I.

Diarmuid Lynch arrived in the United States shortly before the second Irish Race Convention, which was held in the Central Opera House, New York, on 18th and 19th May, 1918. At the Convention he was appointed National Secretary to the Friends of Irish Freedom, the organisation mainly responsible for convening this hosting of men and women of Irish blood from every part of the United States. In the years that followed he continued to serve the cause of the Irish Republic in this capacity by his devoted and untiring labours in association with the leaders of the Irish Race in America.

The aid given to the many phases of the Irish struggle for freedom by men and women of Irish birth or extraction residing in the United States has, for over one hundred years, been a significant factor influencing the ebb and flow of the movement at home. There never was a period in which that aid was so valuable, and so necessary, as in the years from 1913 to 1921. Because of the intensity of the struggle at home, very little was known, or is yet known, of the splendid work done in the United States in these years, or of its effects on the outcome of the national effort for freedom. We are apt to think of it in terms of financial aid from the millions of our race in America. That is far from being the whole story and may even be misleading.

In a country of such immense population and extent as the United States, in which the Irish are only one of numerous racial elements and that widely diffused, the problems inherent in the creation and maintenance of organisations devoted seriously to the cause of Irish independence are many and considerable. Only in exceptional circumstances can more than a fraction of the exiles' potential strength be mobilised, or their efforts consolidated in support of a specific objective. Normally the majority take no more than a nominal interest in the national struggle at home. For all of them, every-

thing that is done, or can be done, for Ireland is governed by one fundamental condition—it is work done by American citizens whose first loyalty is to the United States. On no other basis could they publicly agitate for Irish liberty, on no other basis could they create and maintain great nation-wide organisations, on no other basis could they enlist the sympathy and good will of their fellow citizens. John Boyle O'Reilly put it this way: "We can do Ireland more good by our Americanism than by our Irishism."

The most dynamic and the most valuable organisation to Ireland in the last eighty years was the Clan-na-Gael. From the considerable exodus of Irish patriots to the United States after the failure of '48 there emerged the Irish Emigrant Society in New York, and it was succeeded by the Fenian Brotherhood in 1858. The Clan-na-Gael was inaugurated in New York in June, 1867. Its object was the establishment by force of arms of an Irish Republic. It was a secret organisation, with the necessary public manifestations required by American life, and it developed a very definite relationship to and understanding with the secret organisation at home—the Irish Republican Brotherhood.

Clan-na-Gael confined itself strictly to its revolutionary plans until 1878, when, through the instrumentality of Michael Davitt, it accorded a measure of conditional support to Parnell. The Supreme Council of the I.R.B., meeting in Paris in 1879, approved the New Departure, and thereafter members of the secret organisation in Ireland interpreted the approval rather freely and became the backbone and driving force of the Land League.

The death of Parnell, the consequent disruption of the Irish Parliamentary Party, and the ten years of disunity which intervened before it coalesced again under Redmond, caused a deterioration of national morale which was intensified by the absence of strong leadership. Out of it developed an age of speechmaking, extravagantly insincere references to a more martial past, and a pathetic faith in British good intentions. An anaemic and sickly national sentiment apparently accepted the hoped for measure of Home Rule as the national destiny. There was an apparent abandonment of the Republican aim and a consolidation of national opinion behind the Parliamentary Party. A majority of I.R.B. men continued to support Redmond. Only a remnant remained steadfast in adherence to Republican principles and policy. In the first decade of the century the organisation at home had reached a low ebb.

In the United States, a cleavage in Clan-na-Gael developed along lines similar to those in Ireland, but with the relative positions reversed. Only a small percentage of Clan membership followed Redmond: the great majority remained staunchly Republican. The other nation-wide organisation—the Ancient Order of Hibernians—was mainly religious with strong Irish Ireland tendencies.

Large numbers of the Irish race in America had no contacts with these or any other Irish organisations. When it was clear that a new life was stirring in Ireland, that a new direction was being given to the struggle by the foundation of the Irish Volunteers, the leaders of Clan-na-Gael had the vision to see that if the whole potential strength of the exiles was to be mobilised, a nation-wide organisation was needed. While its main purpose must be the support and encouragement of the National effort at home, it was necessary that it be broadly based to include the greatest possible numbers, and so its objective had to be general. So, too, it was sought rather to confederate existing bodies into one great organisation rather than supplant them with another, and to enlist into that organisation in the service of Ireland the large unattached body of persons of Irish blood.

The *Friends of Irish Freedom* was inaugurated at the first Irish Race Convention held in New York on 4th and 5th March, 1916. The call for the convention was signed by 350 representatives of the Race. The Clan and the United Irish League provided the backbone of the representation. The Ancient Order of Hibernians, the Knights of Columbus and other organisations were well represented. The principal object of the new organisation was declared to be:

> "To encourage and assist any movement that will tend to bring about the National Independence of Ireland."

Victor Herbert was elected National President, Thomas Hughes Kelly, National Treasurer, and John D. Moore, National Secretary.

There were two categories of membership—regular and associate. At the peak of its strength in 1920 regular membership was over 100,000, and its 484 associate branches embraced 175,000 persons. But it was only after Diarmuid Lynch took over the duties of National Secretary in 1918 that effective nation-wide organisation was established. In that year more than 70 per cent. of its 106 branches were located in the four States, New York, Massachusetts, New Jersey and California; and of its total paid up membership New York city accounted for one half.

The *Friends of Irish Freedom* differed from Irish movements which preceded it in the United States, not in objective or policy, but "mainly in the things that opportunity made possible of achievement." It had been called into existence on the eve of the Rising, and one or its first activities was the creation of the Irish Relief Fund, started in New York on 20th May, 1916. 350,000 dollars were sent to Ireland for the relief of distress amongst the dependants of those who had been killed, wounded or taken prisoner after the Rising. A delegation from the Fund Committee, consisting of John Archdeacon Murphy and John Gill, which came to Ireland with the first contribution, was also helpful in securing unified administration of the Fund at home

through the National Aid and Volunteer Dependents' Fund, and in this way rendered a valuable service.

When America declared war against Germany on 6th April, 1917 the whole position of the Irish movement in the United States was changed Despite the noble sentiments expressed by President Wilson in his speech on war aims on 3rd April, his pro-British leanings were well known, and the politically wise doubted that he had either the courage or the sincerity to apply his lofty principles to the case of Ireland. Wilson had said :

> " But the right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight for the things we have always carried near our hearts . . . for the rights and liberty of small nations."

Ireland was a small nation demanding liberty, an old nation which had never given up the struggle to regain its lost freedom, a nation whose sons had proved time and again their willingness to die in the attempt to achieve it. But Ireland was not held in subjection by Germany, she was held by England, and Wilson was England's friend. Ireland's friends in America found that, generally speaking, the Press was closed to them, the British propaganda machine sought to misrepresent them, and every anti-Irish element in the United States tried to put them in a false position with their fellow-citizens. But they were not cowed or silenced. Two days after the American declaration of war—Sunday, 9th April—a great meeting was held in Carnegie Hall, New York, to commemorate the Rising. From it messages were sent to President Wilson, Vice-President Marshall, and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives demanding justice for Ireland, demanding that liberty for which Wilson declared America entered the war. Meetings took place in Buffalo, Philadelphia and elsewhere throughout the country, where similar appeals were made.

Despite all opposition the Irish effort was maintained. Resolutions on Ireland were brought before Congress, one by Congressman Gallivan in February, one by Congressman McCormick of Illinois on 9th April, one by Congressman Gallagher of Chicago on 13th April, one by Congressman Mason of Illinois on 14th May. By March, 1918, eight such Resolutions had been submitted to Congress, but all were denied hearings before the Foreign Affairs Committee.

The F.O.I.F. organised great meetings in many important cities ; Chicago appointed a delegation of ten which laid before Congress in Washington a plea for an Irish Republic ; a petition signed by hundreds of thousands urged upon President and Congress " the necessity and good policy of giving a great example to the world by insisting that England shall grant Ireland complete national independence." At home, when the sentenced prisoners were released in June one of the first acts of the leaders was to send a message

to the Government of the United States in which Wilson's own words were quoted :

> " No people must be forced under a sovereignty under which it does not wish to live."

Dr. Patrick McCartan brought that document to the United States and with it a memorandum similarly addressed setting out the historic background of Ireland's claim to freedom. Dr. McCartan was commissioned by the Supreme Council of the I.R.B. to proceed to Russia for the purpose of laying Ireland's claim before the Government of that country.[1] Finding it impossible to go to Russia from Ireland or Britain, he went to the United States. On 23rd July, 1917, accompanied by James K. McGuire, Chairman, Executive Committee, Friends of Irish Freedom, and John D. Moore, National Secretary, he went to the White House and handed the manifesto and the memorandum to the President's Secretary.

But all efforts on behalf of Ireland were opposed by a wall of hostility and kept under the constant fire of propagandist misrepresentation. From September 1917 to the end of the war in November 1918, those who continued to uphold Ireland's claims were pursued with even greater zeal than were enemy aliens. Penal legislation was operated against them ; their loyalty was impugned, their letters opened, their telephones tapped, their movements shadowed. Extraordinary efforts were made to try to ensure that neither inside nor outside the Halls of Congress would anything be heard of Ireland's claims during the war. A F.O.I.F. Convention, proposed for November-December, 1917, was abandoned in the face of a campaign of defamation and misrepresentation. Inevitably the organisation suffered loss of strength and effectiveness. In contrast, defection from Clan-na-Gael was slight.

Part of the dishonest propaganda utilised the now discredited but then effective technique of representing the leaders as being in contact with Germany. These contacts had of course existed in 1915 and 1916, but had ceased before America's entry into the war. Nevertheless, Secretary of State Lansing issued for publication in October, 1917, documents alleged to be copies of cables from Germany to Ambassador Bernstorff, indicating as men who could select others to do sabotage work in the United States, joseph McGarritty, John T. Keating and Jeremiah A. O'Leary. The reliability of this evidence may be judged from the fact that Keating had died on 24th June, 1915, more than six months before the dates of the alleged cables. McGarritty and O'Leary publicly challenged Secretary Lansing to produce a scrap of evidence in support of the allegations. The challenge was not accepted.

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[1] *With de Valera in America*, p. 3.

Documents seized in a raid on the German Consulate in New York in April 1916 were published in an effort to imply that John Devoy and Judge Daniel F. Cohalan were still in contact with Germany. Of that period, Very Rev. Peter E. Magennis, then Superior General of the Carmelite Order, wrote :[1]

> "To be Irish, or to be of Irish sympathies, in those days was to be alone, aye and more, it was to be despised . . . When one went to Church there was a Union Jack over the door, and one was fortunate if it did not decorate the Sanctuary."

Early in 1918 Devoy's paper, *The Gaelic American* and Ford's *Irish World* were barred from the United States mails. They could still be sold on the news stands, but, in the case of the *Gaelic American* at least, exclusion from the mails was a serious blow to circulation. On 23rd March, 1918, Joseph McGarritty founded the *Irish Press* in Philadelphia, and entrusted the editorial chair to Dr. McCartan. Many of its leading articles and other features were contributed by Dr. William J. Maloney, a medical man of Scotch origin who had served with the British Army in France in the early part of the war, been invalided out and returned to the United States where he had been in practice before enlisting.

On 24th March, 1918, the Executive Committee of the Friends of Irish Freedom decided to hold a second Irish Race Convention. This took place at the Central Opera House, New York, on 18th and 19th May, 1918. At this Convention Diarmuid Lynch was appointed National Secretary to the organisation, and took up at once, with characteristic energy and efficiency, the heavy task of rebuilding it and making it an effective force in what was now recognised to be a vital sphere. The United States, mobilising her great strength, had saved Britain from disaster in the European War, and was then attaining a dominant position in world politics. Recognition by her Government of that freedom which President Wilson had postulated as the right of all small nations would go a long way towards a happy ending to the struggle for the establishment of the Irish Republic then going on in Ireland.

Time and again Devoy had stressed the need for a nation-wide efficient organisation. "The size and capacity of the organisation," he wrote in August 1917, "must bear some proportion to the magnitude of the task undertaken, and here again the failure to build up such an organisation emphasises the necessity for such an organisation."

Headquarters of the F.O.I.F. was moved from 26 Cortland Street to 1482 Broadway in August, 1918. By then Diarmuid had reorganised the records so that he had available not only the names and addresses of all officers of all

[1] *Catholic Bulletin*, January, 1920.

Branches but also the names and addresses of every member of the organisation. Membership was being increased and associate membership developed as a source of potential strength.

Pressure on the President and on Congress continued despite all opposition. A Mother's Mission, representing only women whose sons were serving in the American forces, went to Washington and presented an appeal on behalf of Ireland to the President's Secretary on 18th July. They failed to get an interview with Wilson. On 29th September a national conference of Clan-na-Gael issued yet another call to the President and Congress which incorporated a number of Wilson's declarations in favour of the freedom of small nations. During the month of December a series of nation-wide meetings called for the application of the principle of self-determination to Ireland.

Towards the end of 1918 an immediate objective of Republican policy at home was to try and ensure that Irish representatives would have an opportunity of stating Ireland's case before the Peace Conference. Eamon de Valera, Arthur Griffith and Count Plunkett were appointed delegates. The results of the General Election in December, in which the Sinn Fein candidates secured seventy-three of 105 Parliamentary seats in the whole country, immensely strengthened their claim to a hearing, and put their authority to speak on the nation's behalf beyond question.

Speaking at a meeting in New York on 19th November, 1918, Richard F. Dalton renewed the call for action on the various resolutions relating to Ireland which had been pigeon-holed in Congress. On receiving advice soon afterwards from Congressman Thomas Gallagher of Illinois that the Committee on Foreign Affairs had fixed December 12th as the date for a public hearing, Diarmuid Lynch sent out a call to F.O.I.F. Branches throughout the country and a splendid gathering of representative men and women assembled in Washington on the appointed day.

Numerous resolutions had been submitted, and it was decided to concentrate on securing the adoption of one introduced in the House of Representatives by Congressman Gallagher :

> "Requesting the Commissioners Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the Peace Conference to present to the said Conference the right of Ireland to freedom, independence and self-determination."

The two-day hearing gave the opportunity for a most comprehensive presentation of Ireland's case, and it was fully availed of. It recorded the addresses of forty-five of the delegates—lawyers, clergymen, labour representatives and businessmen—representing more than twenty cities, as well as those of a score of Congressmen. The official report issued by

the Committee made a book of 160 pages, and it included the names of 150 associations and societies throughout the country who sent telegrams, letters and petitions in support of the proposal.

The ultimate fate of this resolution was that having been adopted by the Foreign Affairs Committee, it was held up for some time by the Committee on Rules, but finally adopted by Congress, by a vote of 216 to 41, on 4th March, 1919, in the following amended form :

> "That it is the earnest hope of the Congress of the United States of America that the Peace Conference, now sitting in Paris, in passing upon the rights of various peoples, will favourably consider the claims of Ireland to the right of self-determination."

The week, December 8th-15th, 1918, had been designated "Self-determination week," and a series of great meetings were held throughout the United States in support of the application of the principle to Ireland. Twenty-eight were held in the principal cities. That at Madison Square Garden, New York, on December 10th became historic. Hitherto the Catholic Hierarchy in the United States had refrained from active participation in the Irish movement. Though many of the Cardinals, Archbishops and Bishops were of Irish blood, they had not, individually or collectively, committed themselves publicly to support of the campaign for the recognition of the Irish Republic. In this matter the British propaganda machine had not been inactive. The Right Rev. Francis William Keating, Catholic Bishop of Northampton, had been sent on a mission to the United States, designed to prevent the American Catholic Hierarchy from declaring in favour of anything more dangerous to Imperial interests than Home Rule.

Now, for the first time, a Prince of the Church intimated his willingness to speak publicly. When the arrangements for the Madison Square Garden meeting were being made in New York, Matthew Cummings and John Curley arrived from Boston with the news that His Eminence Cardinal O'Connell would speak at the New York meeting if invited. Judge Cohalan went at once to Boston to extend the invitation personally. The Cardinal's ready acceptance was subject, in conformity with Church ethics, to the acquiescence of the head of the New York Archdiocese in the proposal that he should speak within that jurisdiction. Judge Cohalan, Judge Goff and judge Gavegan presented the request to Vicar General Mooney—Cardinal Farley having died in the previous September. Vicar General Mooney cordially acquiesced, and was himself present to invoke God's blessing on the great meeting.

Cardinal O'Connell's famous speech on that occasion raised the campaign for Irish Independence in America to a plane hitherto unattainable. It received the widest publicity in the Press, thrilled the country and was a

powerful influence in the consolidation of Irish opinion behind the demand for complete freedom. The Cardinal had honoured Judge Cohalan and John Devoy by showing them the text in advance of the meeting. It came through Richard F. Dalton who was Chairman of arrangements for the Madison Square Garden hosting.

> "In every century for seven hundred years," Cardinal O'Connell said, in part, "by protest, by appeal, by Parliament, by arms when other means seemed futile, but in any event by one means or another as she found it in her power to use them, Ireland has never failed to keep alive her own sense of distinct nationhood, and impress it as palpably as conditions would allow upon a listening world. As a profoundly Christian nation, she has clung to the law of God in all these demonstrations of her loyalty to herself. Rarely, very rarely, indeed, has she permitted even cruelty to goad her into forgetting it.
>
> "But ever and always, every method she adopted, every leader who spoke her cause, every victory won, every defeat suffered, every weapon used, every strategy designed, ever and ever and ever, the same ultimate purpose is clearly visible, and that purpose is the vindication of Ireland's right to Government only by consent of the governed. . .
>
> "This war, we are told again and again by all those responsible for the conduct of the war, was for justice to all, for the inviolable rights of small nations, for the inalienable right, inherent in every nation, of self-determination. The war can be justified only by the universal application of those principles. Let that application begin with Ireland.
>
> "Ireland is the oldest nation and the longest sufferer. If these principles are not applied in her case, no matter what else may be done, there will be no complete justice, no genuine sincerity believable, and the war not bringing justice will not bring peace.
>
> "Who was it who by the enunciation of these great principles invited the peoples of the whole suffering earth? It was our own President.
>
> "To-morrow he lands at Brest—Brest, the very port out from which Count Arthur Dillon sailed with his three thousand Irish troops to aid America to obtain from England the very principle of Self-Determination which to-day Ireland demands, and which we of America, in accordance with the principles enunciated by our President, to-day also are determined by every legitimate and lawful and Christian means to aid Ireland to obtain. For Ireland equally with America fought in this conflict for right."

On 2nd December, 1918 Dr. McCartan transmitted the following demand to President Wilson in support of the claim to have Ireland's representatives heard at the Peace Conference (it was drafted by Diarmuid Lynch, Liam

Mellows and Richard F. Dalton, and copies sent to the Governments of twenty countries) :

"TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES :

Sir :

The Provisional Government of Ireland, recognising that the object of the Peace Conference is not alone to terminate the present war, but to ensure the future peace of the World, holds that said Conference must necessarily take cognisance of Ireland's national status, and instructs me as its Envoy, and as an elected Representative of the Irish people, to transmit to your Excellency and to the Government of the United States a demand that the representatives of the said Provisional Government of Ireland be invited to participate in the Peace Conference.

I, accordingly, have the honour to transmit, and I do hereby transmit, such demand.

The Provisional Government of Ireland further instructs me to state that such demand is based upon the facts that :

(*a*) Ireland is geographically, historically, linguistically and culturally a distinct nation,

(*b*) Ireland possesses within herself all the moral and material constituents of independent nationhood :

(*c*) Ireland is one of the ancient and sovereign nations of the world, and exercised sovereign status for one thousand years ;

(*d*) Ireland has never surrendered her sovereign status by compact or by treaty or to conquest, and the exercise of such sovereignty has only been suspended by external force ;

(*e*) Ireland has asserted the conscious will of her people for the restoration of the exercise of that sovereignty in every generation since such suspension. The evidence of such conscious will has been re-asserted by force of arms during the present war, and continues to be so re-asserted by the moral attitude of the people of Ireland and by the continuance of the Provisional Government which I have the honour to represent.

To you, Sir,—the greatest exponent of international justice—the Provisional Government of Ireland wishes God-speed on your great mission to secure justice and permanent peace for all peoples.

I have the honour to be, Sir, your sincere friend in the great Cause of Human Liberty.

PATRICK MCCARTAN,
Envoy of the Provisional Government of Ireland.

Dated, Washington, D.C.,
December second, 1918."

On 15th February, 1919, after Dáil Eireann had been established and had appointed a Ministry as Government of the Irish Republic, Cathal Brugha and Michael Collins wrote a joint letter to Diarmuid Lynch, with which they enclosed part of a letter from Arthur Griffith, who, like de Valera, was then a prisoner. The letters were taken to the United States by Very Rev. Fr. Augustine, O.F.M.Cap.

The joint letter said :

" Attached is part of a letter from Griffith. We agree with the suggestion contained therein. Messrs. John Devoy, Diarmuid Lynch, Liam Mellows, Dr. McCartan and others in whom they have confidence and who (word indecipherable) to get international recognition for the Irish Republic, are authorised to take immediate steps to give effect to them. Even if our original delegates reach France, it would be essential that the substitutes from America should also be at hand ; the selection of the substitutes to be left to the persons named above. We expect Irish America to defray any expenses incurred. Moreover, if there is money available in America which could be placed at the disposal of the Executive of Dáil Eireann, it will be acceptable whenever forwarded.

Signed on behalf of the Executive of Dáil Eireann.
Cathal Brugha, Priomh Airese
Miceal O'Coileain.

The foregoing is in manuscript in Cathal Brugha's hand ; to it is added a note written by Michael Collins :

" You would like to know yourself that (word blacked out in ink in original) is safely back in town, also that the other gentleman is quite secure. If we could work it, what would you people out there think of a visit from him. If you cable refer to him (word deleted in original)."

The signature is blacked out in ink in the original. It would appear that the blackening out was done by Diarmuid as a security measure subsequent to receipt of the letter, and that Collins' note refers to the proposed visit of de Valera to America. He had escaped from Lincoln Jail on 3rd February.

The part letter enclosed from Griffith is in typescript and bears no signature. It is as follows :

" Above all concentrate on the Peace Conference. If there is no way of getting substitutes from Ireland substitutes from the U.S. should be appointed. This should be done in addition to substitutes from Ireland, provided men from America of high standing could be secured. The passport barrier will be worked very probably by Clemenceau for the French, and against Irishmen or non-naturalised Irish-Americans. There-

fore American citizens should be chosen. They should not be confined to any one Irish or American party. If Judge Goff, Cardinal O'Connell, two Senators—one a Democrat and the other a Republican—could be got together with Diarmuid Lynch and McCartan and Mellows if he is an American Citizen, it would make a delegation impossible to keep from being heard at the Conference. If two Senators, one a Democrat and one a Republican, could not be got, one Senator and one Congressman representing the different American parties, or failing a Senator, two Congressmen of different parties should be secured. Every effort should be made to get Cardinal O'Connell and a messenger sent anyhow to America about the Delegation. If arranged Dáil should formally ask them to proceed to the Congress (? Conference) in view of the fact that the appointed delegates were prevented by imprisonment and force from doing so."

There was complete agreement between Dáil Eireann and its Executive at home and the Irish organisations in America on the immediate objective of gaining a hearing at the Peace Conference. To organise public opinion in the United States in favour of that objective, bearing in mind the dominant position which President Wilson and the other American representatives would hold at the Conference, the Friends of Irish Freedom decided to hold the third Irish Race Convention at Philadelphia, "the cradle of American liberty," on 22nd and 23rd February, 1919.

Diarmuid began a new drive to "enrol into one militant, disciplined organisation the increasing but unattached supporters of the cause." Speaking at a meeting in New York on 24th January he said :

"I agree with the passing of resolutions and the holding of meetings, and showing ourselves and counting our heads in parades, but I tell you what is going to count is Organisation—an organisation that you can get working at the touch of a button, an organisation through which, by the sending of telegrams or one series of letters, you can line up inside a week or less every man and woman of the blood in this country. . . Unless we are able to do that the politicans will sneer at us, and the British propagandists who are working day and night will sneer at us also—and they will be right."

On the broad question of support for Dáil Eireann and the Irish Republic there was general agreement, and the problem of the moment was how best to win international recognition for it. The application of the principle of self-determination, to which Wilson had given world-wide publicity, was accepted as the means, and perhaps the only means, by which the desired status could be achieved. Devoy wrote at the time :

"It is not a time for wild words or reckless action, but for the disciplined courage and restraint of self-contained men who know their own minds, the strength and the weakness of their own position as well as the strength and weakness of the enemy, and who have made their plans in accordance with that knowledge."

It was decided to extend the representation at the Convention to organisations other than the Friends of Irish Freedom and to make it a hosting truly representative of Irish America. All who were prepared to subscribe to its main purpose were invited :

"The Irish people in Ireland have overwhelmingly self-determined in favour of the complete national Independence of their country. One of the most important items on the programme of the Convention will be the consideration of the means whereby Ireland's Sovereign status and the untrammelled exercise of that sovereignty shall be recognised by the International Peace Conference."

In addition to the Friends of Irish Freedom and the Clan-na-Gael Clubs, invitations were sent to A.O.H. Branches, Irish County organisations, Irish National Foresters and Irish priests. In a letter signed by Diarmuid as National Secretary, F.O.I.F., which went out with the call for the Convention, he wrote :

"Let every Branch of this Organisation and every Irish-American Society in this great Republic give the citizens in their respective localities an opportunity of congratulating the Irish people on their magnificent success in declaring to the world that they stand for the complete independence of their small nation. Let the resolutions passed at your meetings call for the recognition of the Irish Republic and secure all possible publicity for them. Send copy to the President, to the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, the Foreign Affairs Committee of House of Representatives, to Congress, to your local Congressmen and Senators, and to the Governor of your State.

"Furthermore, in addition to your resolutions urging the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House to report without further delay the Gallagher resolution now before it, it is most important that individual citizens should write to the individual members of that Committee, and to the Congressmen from your own State demanding favourable action on it in the House. Let this occasion be availed of in making up a definite list of all the prominent men and women of the Irish Race in your city—with the exact address of each. Send this list to me at once so that our National Council may be in a position to issue invitations to such individuals for the Convention, in addition to duly appointed delegates from organisations."

14,500 copies of the call were issued on 16th January. With it went an appeal for the creation of an Irish Victory Fund, signed by M. B. McGreal, National Treasurer, F.O.I.F. The appeal stated that funds were urgently needed to carry on the work of the organisation and to meet other phases of the situation. It went on to say :

> "The National Council requests all regular and associate Branches, and the Irish-American organisations generally, to co-operate in the raising of an Irish Victory Fund in their respective localities. A local Finance Committee should appoint and authorise Collectors and apportion a definite territory to each so that the work may be done effectively and promptly."

This fund amounted to just over one million dollars before it was closed less than seven months after the Convention, to make way for the Bond Certificate drive.

The most difficult problem confronting the organisers of the Convention was that of so guiding its decisions as, on the one hand, to secure unanimity in a large body representing a variety of organisations and opinions, and on the other hand, of formulating and obtaining approval for the policy most likely to succeed in getting international recognition for the Irish Republic. That policy had to be related particularly to the position in the United States, and, in view of Wilson's pronouncements, the most hopeful prospect seemed to lie in holding him to his own words. If the principle of self-determination could be applied to Ireland, no one doubted what the result would be. The emphasis with which the idea was reiterated, both in Ireland and in the United States, was no more than a tactical move for the achievement of the ultimate object. It was in no way an abandonment of that object.

The position at home had been completely clarified and immensely strengthened morally before the Convention assembled. The Constituent Assembly of Ireland—Dáil Eireann—had assembled in Dublin on 21st January, ratified the establishment of the Irish Republic proclaimed in 1916, adopted a Declaration of Independence and called upon the free nations of the world to uphold her national claim and recognise her national status. It had appointed three delegates to the Peace Conference.

The main task of the Convention was to secure such action at the Peace Conference as would result in international recognition of the Irish Republic. The co-operation of His Eminence Cardinal Gibbons of Baltimore in this effort was a matter of the utmost importance. By virtue of his high and sacred office he was an outstanding figure in American life, well known for his conservatism particularly in matters outside the religious sphere. The invitation to speak at the Philadelphia Convention was conveyed to

him by a distinguished committee consisting of Judge Cohalan, Judge Goff, Judge Gavegan, Monsignor Gerald P. Coughlan and former Congressman Michael Donohoe. They secured his decision to endorse publicly at the Convention the claim for the application of the principle of self-determination to Ireland. Cardinal O'Connell was detained on ecclesiastical matters in Washington, but sent a splendid letter, which was read at the Convention.

At the date of the Convention membership of the F.O.I.F. was three times what it had been six months earlier. Regular membership numbered over 50,000, and its 200 associate Branches had approximately 30,000 members on their rolls.

Five thousand, one hundred and thirty-two delegates assembled in the Second Regiment Armoury, Philadelphia, on Saturday, 22nd February, 1919, and on the following day their united, unanimous voice acclaimed the resolution proposed by Cardinal Gibbons, seconded by the Presbyterian Minister, Rev. Norman Thomas, and supported by Archbishop Messmer, Rabbi Aranskop, Rev. James Grattan Mythen and Henry Goddard Leach.

The Convention appointed a Committee to proceed to Washington and present the resolutions on Ireland to President Wilson. Judge John W. Goff was Chairman of the Committee, which included the following :

Right Rev. Thomas J. Shahan, Washington D.C.
Edward F. Dunne, Illinois.
Judge Daniel F. Cohalan, New York.
John J. Splain, Connecticut,
Right Rev. H. J. Henry, Pennsylvania.
Thomas McNamara, Ohio.
Rev. James Grattan Mythen, Virginia.
Frank P. Walsh, Missouri.
Richard W. Wolfe, Illinois.
James E. Murray, Montana.
Rev. Patrick J. Healy, Washington D.C.
E. F. Kinkead, New Jersey.
John P. Grace, South Carolina.
James K. McGuire, New York.
Michael J. Ryan, Pennsylvania.
Thomas F. Cooney, Rhode Island.
Michael Francis Doyle, Pennsylvania.
Thomas J. Breslin, New Jersey.
Rev. John F. Fenlon, Washington D.C.

Three previous delegations had been refused an audience with the President, that from the first Irish Race Convention, headed by Victor Herbert, that from the Second Irish Race Convention, headed by Rev. Fr. Magennis,

and the Mother's Mission led by Mrs. McWhorter. The Committee from the Third Irish Race Convention, the most representative group of Irish-Americans which had ever approached him, encountered a similar refusal in Washington, but after much pressure received an assurance that the President would see them at the Metropolitan Opera House, New York, on 5th March, on the eve of his departure for the Peace Conference in Paris. To New York the Committee went, only to be met with a new difficulty—Wilson refused to meet them so long as Judge Cohalan was a member of the delegation. Despite the protests of the other members, Cohalan insisted on withdrawing, and the Committee presented the Convention resolutions to the President. He was non-committal and made no promises.

The Committee asked the President to "present to the Peace Conference at Paris the right of Ireland to determine the form of government under which she shall live." He was further requested to use his powerful influence to see that the delegates selected by the people of Ireland were given every opportunity to present Ireland's case, and that a group from the interviewing Committee should have the right to appear before the Peace Conference to assist the delegates from Ireland in presenting this case. When the President said "you do not expect me to give an answer to this request now?" he was not pressed any further, and thus escaped disclosing what became known later—that he had no intention whatever of allowing Ireland's case to be heard at the Paris conference.

The request was reinforced by a Senate resolution on 6th June, 1919, passed with only one dissentient:

> "That the Senate of the United States earnestly request the American Plenipotentiary Commissioners at Versailles to endeavour to secure for Eamon de Valera, Arthur Griffith and Count George Noble Plunkett a hearing before said Peace Conference in order that they may present the cause of Ireland: and resolved further, that the United States express its sympathy with the aspirations of the Irish people for a Government of its own choice."

Although much labour and money was afterwards devoted to this effort, and although the three distinguished American citizens who were appointed for the purpose—Frank P. Walsh, New York, Edward F. Dunne, Chicago, and Michael J. Ryan, Philadelphia—went to Paris and left nothing undone to carry out their mission, nevertheless the project failed. It failed because Wilson did not have the courage to insist, in defiance of the implacable opposition of Britain, on the application to Ireland of the principles he had so eloquently expressed and the rights he had claimed for all small nations. Ireland had another bitter lesson. Denied justice by the great Powers she turned to other methods of achieving it at home.

CHAPTER XII

DIARMUID LYNCH AS NATIONAL SECRETARY, FRIENDS OF IRISH FREEDOM

by

FLORENCE O'DONOGHUE.

PART II.

For some time before President de Valera's arrival in America in June, 1919, there had been differences of opinion amongst the Irish American leaders. They were confined to a few men and did not affect the rank and file of the F.O.I.F. They were differences of opinion on tactics rather than upon the main objective, but unfortunately they were intensified by personal likes and dislikes and in time grew, or were nursed, to such proportions as to finally disrupt the splendid organisation which had been built up.

The principal protagonists were Devoy and Cohalan on the one hand, and McGarrity, McCartan and Dr. Maloney on the other. The first slight and apparently temporary rift in the friendship between McGarrity and Cohalan—a friendship which had developed out of long years of co-operation in Ireland's service—arose out of a trivial incident. When the self-determination meetings were being arranged in December, 1918, it happened that suitable places of meeting were available in New York and Philadelphia only on the same day. Senator Phelan of California was to attend the Philadelphia meeting and McGarrity wanted Cohalan to meet him there. Cohalan explained the importance of his being present in New York because of Cardinal O'Connell's intention to speak at Madison Square Garden and McGarrity accepted the wisdom of this. Judge Goff then agreed to preside at McGarrity's meeting in Philadelphia, but when he induced State Governor Whitman to attend the New York meeting, he decided on his own initiative that he should be present at Madison Square Garden to escort the Republican Governor to the platform. McGarrity blamed Cohalan, unjustly in fact, for Goff's desertion of the Philadelphia meeting.

In connection with this meeting there was another incident in which Dr.

Maloney played a curious part. Diarmuid Lynch writes, referring to Dr. McCartan's book *With de Valera in America*:

> "Dr. McCartan states that he, too, received from another source intimation of the Cardinal's willingness to speak in New York, and that he passed on the word—on what date or to whom he does not say. Whether or not it was from him Dr. Maloney heard it does not matter, but this much is certain: Maloney called in connection therewith at the home of Judge Cohalan, with whom at the time John Devoy, Richard F. Dalton and Diarmuid Lynch happened to be in conference respecting the Madison Square meeting and other affairs. This was a few days prior to December 1st. Dr. Maloney, with great vehemence, argued and pleaded against the coming of the Cardinal to speak. It would, he urged, be a political blunder of far-reaching importance, it would make the Clan-na-Gael the tail of the kite of the Catholic Church, it would give undue prominence to the Catholic Church in the Irish movement, the effect on the American people would be disastrous, and so on.
>
> Though Dr. McCartan's book is replete with references to the acts, words and even thoughts of Dr. Maloney, there is no mention of his momentous effort to keep this prince of the church away from the New York meeting . . . one wonders if Dr. McCartan was aware of the foregoing when he so studiously endeavoured—with erroneous dates as part of his premises—to prove that Maloney's articles in *America* were the prime factor which resulted in the petitions signed by the Hierarchy and clergy of California and elsewhere. . . Maloney's endeavour to suppress the clarion call of His Eminence of Boston failed as flatly as did the mission of Bishop Keating and Shane Leslie in broader phase."

Other conflicting opinions were held in connection with the Resolutions to be proposed at the Irish Race Convention in Philadelphia. Devoy and Cohalan were convinced that the self-determination policy enunciated by Wilson was the most fruitful one to emphasise at that particular time. It was in fact being reiterated by all the leaders at home, and no one at home doubted that an unfettered application of it to Ireland would result in a vote for sovereign independence, for an Irish Republic. But McCartan and McGarrity advised or counselled by Dr. Maloney, feared that too much insistence on it indicated a desertion of the Republican policy, and they wished to so word the Resolutions that they would voice a demand for the recognition of the Irish Republic by the United States Government and by the other nations assembled at the Peace Conference.

Diarmuid Lynch has occasion to refer to many inaccuracies in Dr.

McCartan's book, and one in connection with these resolutions is illuminating. Dr. McCartan wrote, p. 82:

> "On the evening of the Convention, in Maloney's room at the Bellevue-Stratford Hotel, in Philadelphia, McGarrity brought to Maloney and I (sic) a copy of the resolution to be proposed by the Cardinal. . . In effect, the resolutions spread over many foolscap pages, denounced all entangling alliances with foreign nations, repudiated any League of Nations, and . . ."

Diarmuid Lynch comments:

> "Now, the resolution as approved by Cardinal Gibbons—and as proposed by him on Sunday, February 23, without any change whatsoever—contained no reference direct or indirect to 'entangling alliances with foreign nations' nor to 'any League of nations.'
>
> "A comparison between (it) and the declaration that emanated from the Committee on Resolutions shows that Dr. McCartan confused one with the other. Such a glaring error on the part of one who at the time not alone held the position of 'Envoy of the Irish Republic' but was in contact with the proceedings of this Convention of the Irish Race in America—except in so far as he voluntarily divorced himself from them—is in itself a striking commentary on his fitness as an 'Envoy' and on his criticisms of men and events."

The resolution proposed by Cardinal Gibbons called on President Wilson to "place before the Peace Conference, and support with all his powerful influence, Ireland's right to self-determination, and secure for the elected delegates from the Constituent Assembly to the Peace Conference the same status and recognition which had been accorded to those of other small nations."

As a further example of Dr. McCartan's unreliable recording of events, Diarmuid Lynch refers to the following extracts from *With de Valera in America*. p. 92:

> "At this time, Cathal Brugha, the Minister for Defence in the Cabinet of the Dáil, wrote to Diarmuid Lynch urging that Cohalan should demand nothing but recognition of the Irish Republic from the United States. Here was at least one member of the Cabinet who was not with de Valera in seeking self-determination from England."

This is the letter quoted on p. 18 supra., signed by Collins as well as Brugha, and a reference to it will show how erroneous and irresponsible Dr. McCartan's assertions are.

On p. 90 of his book Dr. McCartan writes :

> " At the first meeting of the Friends of Irish Freedom after the Convention, it was discovered that without the knowledge of McGarrity, who was Chairman of the Organisation Committee of the Convention, Cohalan had named a National Executive of 15. The supreme control of the organisation was vested in this body. . . In the interval between Race Conventions all power resided in it. Of the 15 the majority came from New York and its neighbourhood and were aides of Cohalan. The Friends of Irish Freedom had become his personal machine under his complete control."

Diarmuid Lynch comments :

> " Passages in these excerpts show, perhaps more clearly than other mis-statements referred to . . . the extent to which Dr. McCartan permitted himself to be carried in his uncontrollable desire to distort facts to the detriment of Judge Cohalan. It is untrue to say that the National Executive was elected without the knowledge of Mr. McGarrity ; the election took place openly and formally at the National Council meeting held on 12th March, 1919, at which McGarrity was present, and at which Dr. McCartan himself was also present. . . The National Executive did not have control of the organisation in the interval between Race Conventions ; it exercised such control only when the National Convention or National Council is not in session, in other words, between the monthly meetings of the Council."

These are some of the questions upon which conflict of opinion arose between the leaders. Each of the principal Irish or Irish American protagonists had given ample proof of loyalty to the cause of Irish freedom, and they differed, not in their adherence to the ideal of an Irish Republic, but in their conceptions of steering a policy for its recognition by the United States through the perilous seas of American politics.

John Devoy, then an old but still vigorous man, had given a long life of dedicated service to the cause. In the wisdom gained from his experience both in Ireland and in the United States, he had reached the unshakable conviction that the function of Irish leaders at home was to decide policy (the objective being agreed) and the function of Irish organisations in America was to support the home policy loyally by every means in their power. With equal vehemence he held that the American organisations should be entirely free to determine the methods and activities to be adopted in their own field in support of whatever effort was being made in Ireland. Interference by Irish leaders in the internal affairs of American organisations he resented and constantly opposed.

Judge Daniel F. Cohalan, an American by birth, had been sworn into the Clan-na-Gael in his eighteenth year by Captain James Murphy, the man under whose direction the Clerkenwell Prison explosion was carried out in 1867. He became a successful lawyer in New York city, and in 1910 was elected a Justice of the Supreme Court of the State. Long before then he was an outstanding figure in Clan circles. He was District officer of the New York area for many years, and Chairman of the Clan's biennial Conventions from 1902 to 1910. But his main service to the Clan was in the role of adviser and spokesman ; a role for which his ability, expert legal knowledge, tact and prestige eminently fitted him. In contrast to many others of his status, his active participation in the work of the Clan never flagged. He took a leading part in formulating the policy on which the F.O.I.F. directed its efforts from its inception. He was " a masterful man " of judicial habit, an eloquent public speaker and forceful writer. If by 1919 he had acquired something of the mentality that he had a mission to advise everybody connected with the movement, it was one of the factors which created antagonism between him and Dr. McCartan, and later and more disastrously, between him and de Valera.

Joseph McGarrity had also given life long service to the cause of Irish freedom. For many years he was one of the three-man Executive of Clan-na-Gael—the other two being John Devoy and John T. Keating of Chicago. He found it difficult to accept all the implications of a change over to the more open type of organisation represented by the F.O.I.F., with its large National Council and Executive, its wider organisation and greater freedom for the expression of opinion in contrast to the more compact Clan where decisions of the Executive were absolute.

From the time of his arrival in America Dr. McCartan's contacts with McGarrity were closer than those with Devoy or Cohalan. From March 1918, when McCartan took the post of editor of McGarrity's newly founded *Irish Press* in Philadelphia, much of his time was spent in that city. After both the *Irish Press* and Devoy's *Gaelic American* were barred from the U.S. mails the *Irish Press* was brought to New York and put on sale on the streets in competition with the *Gaelic American*. Dr. Maloney's closest association had always been with McCartan. Devoy distrusted Maloney and even went to the point of publicly calling him a British agent.

The disposal of the Irish Victory Fund created further differences of opinion. The original resolution pledging the Fund, passed at the Philadelphia Convention, did not specify when, where or how the money was to be expended. The following were the objects of the Fund as set out in the F.O.I.F. headquarters circular letter on 1st May, 1919, over the signatures of Very Rev. Peter E. Magennis, National President, and Diarmuid Lynch, National Secretary ;

"To educate public opinion.

(*a*) To urge that the objects for which America entered the war may be fully attained.

(*b*) To urge and insist upon the recognition of the Republican form of Government established in Ireland.

(*c*) To urge that America does not enter into any League of Nations which does not safeguard all American rights.

(*d*) To maintain and preserve American ideals of Government and to oppose and offset the British propaganda which is falsifying and misrepresenting the facts of American history.

(*e*) To maintain for the foregoing purposes a widespread and professional publicity campaign.

(*f*) To defray the expenses of the Irish American delegation to the Peace Conference.

(*a*), (*b*), (*c*) and (*d*) were drafted by Richard F. Dalton, (*e*) and (*f*) by Diarmuid Lynch.

Six days after the issue of this letter, at a meeting of the National Executive on 7th May, McGarrity proposed that 50,000 dollars be sent to Ireland. This was opposed for the reasons that only 5,000 dollars had been collected at the time, there were only 12,000 in F.O.I.F. funds, of which 2,000 were due on unpaid bills, and that it would be a mistake to deplete their treasury completely when there was important work to be done in the United States. The proposal was defeated.

Diarmuid Lynch's work in the raising of the Irish Victory Fund was of the greatest importance. Headquarters was moved to the Sun Building, 280 Broadway and his staff was much enlarged. By the end of May he had issued nearly half a million pamphlets, including copies of official documents, to Branches, libraries, newspapers and public men. A press campaign, first entrusted to a firm of publicity agents, had not proved satisfactory, and after three months was taken over by Diarmuid and Miss I. T. Martin of Detroit. When the fund was closed on 31st August, 1919, to make way for the first external loan of the Irish Republic, just over one million dollars had been collected.

Some of the principal items from the subsequent disposal of this fund may be mentioned. It was proposed by Devoy on 11th June, 1919 that 25 per cent. of the fund be sent to Ireland and this was agreed. Ten thousand dollars had already been sent at that date and a further 50,000 were sent immediately afterwards. Ten thousand were sent to the Chairman of the American Commission then in Paris, and 10,000 were sent to Sean T. O'Kelly

in Paris on 25th July. Ten thousand were given to James O'Meara for similar transmission on 8th November 1919, on 2nd September, 40,000 to Sean Nunan, on 2nd January, 1920, 10,000 to Harry Boland with a further 15,000 on 26th February. The whole of President de Valera's campaign expenses in America, amounting to 26,200 dollars, were paid out of the Fund. In December, 1919, 100,000 dollars were advanced to defray the initial expenses of the Bond Certificate drive.

About 11th May, 1919 Harry Boland arrived in New York. His mission was in part an I.R.B. one, but he brought from the Dáil Ministry credentials authorising Dr. McCartan to act as Envoy of the Irish Republic. McCartan had hitherto acted on credentials from the I.R.B. Supreme Council, which apparently relinquished its governmental authority on the setting up of a popularly elected parliament with a ministry responsible to it. Boland had also the mission of preparing the ground for President de Valera's visit.

On arrival in New York, he went straight to Diarmuid Lynch. They were old friends. In a long discussion Diarmuid gave him an account of the position in America, including the differences of opinion which had arisen between a few of the leaders on some matters of policy. On the self-determination issue Boland characterised the fuss which had been raised as "a tempest in a teapot" which, he said, had better cease. Diarmuid proposed to him that he should call a conference of Devoy, McCartan, Cohalan, Dalton and five or six other men prominent in the movement, and repeat to them what he had just then said to Diarmuid. Boland agreed, but went to Philadelphia, and the conference was not held. But from that time the attacks which had been made on the self-determination policy ceased.

The League of Nations issue was another matter on which the leaders did not reach unanimity of opinion. Cohalan and others took the view that the proposals as originally drafted would preclude America from recognising the Irish Republic if the United States Government adhered to the League. President Wilson and the Democrats were sponsoring the League, and Wilson toured the country in support of it. The national Executive F.O.I.F. on 16th June appointed an Advertising Committee, consisting of Judge Cohalan, Richard F. Dalton and Diarmuid Lynch, to conduct an anti-League publicity campaign, and put 50,000 dollars at its disposal. On 3rd October the Committee was given a further 25,000 dollars. It would appear that joseph McGarrity was in favour of this campaign, as it was he who proposed the expenditure of the second contribution. The anti-League fight was conducted with great vigour and thoroughness. The opposition which it had to combat may be judged from the fact that Lord Northcliffe had stated, after his return from the United States in 1917, that he had left there a fund of 150 million dollars and 10,000 agents.

When President de Valera arrived in America in June, 1919 these differ-

ences existed, and although he made several efforts to reconcile the conflicting opinions in the ensuing six months, he did not succeed. His mission was to try and obtain American recognition of the Irish Republic and to raise a loan of five million dollars for his Government. The manner in which the loan would be raised created further difficulties. President de Valera favoured the issue of Bonds. The lawyers, led by Cohalan, held that it would be illegal, under the United States Blue Sky laws, to sell Bonds on behalf of a Government not internationally recognised. A Committee consisting of Thomas Hughes Kelly, W. Bourke Cochran, Daniel F. Cohalan, Richard F. Dalton and John D. Moore was appointed. They recommended the issue of Bond Certificates, and this was agreed.

Although the American Commission on Irish Independence officially sponsored the Bond Certificate drive, the F.O.I.F. organisation was extensively used, and all the facilities which Diarmuid Lynch and the other Executive officers commanded were freely put at the disposal of the organisers. After a National Council meeting on 10th December, 1919, at which President de Valera was present, Diarmuid supplied to James O'Meara, who had come out from Ireland to direct activities in connection with raising the loan, a complete list of F.O.I.F. Branches together with the names and addresses of their secretaries. Soon afterwards he mailed 70,000 sets of Bond Certificate literature to individual members of the organisation.

Pressure was exerted on him repeatedly to resign his post as National Secretary and join the Bond Certificate Staff. He declined, strongly believing the F.O.I.F. to be necessary and convinced that he could more effectively help the loan raising effort through the organisation than in any other way. Since he returned to America in 1917 he had been in constant touch with Devoy, and not much less intimately, through his work on the national Council, with McGarrity. He deplored the differences which were accumulating between these and others of the leaders, but he never allowed them to influence his work for the Republic, nor did he ever contribute to the inflammation of partisan sentiments. Later, when Devoy set no bounds to his irascible wrath in denouncing de Valera, Diarmuid resigned his position as Director on the Board of the *Gaelic American* as a protest. In Diarmuid's own view, an opinion he held consistently and which was well known to the leaders, "President de Valera had not departed, and would not depart, from the position of fighting for the recognition of the established Irish Republic."

In his absence from Ireland, Diarmuid had been elected Dáil representative for South East Cork at the General Election of December, 1918. The differences of opinion in which he was now involved made him feel that he owed it to his constituents to resign from his position as T.D. He addressed the following letter to them in July, 1920:

2366 Grand Concourse,
New York,
July 19, 1920.

To the People of South East Cork:

A Chairde:—

The honour which you conferred on me in my absence from Ireland by electing me, unopposed, as your Representative to Dáil Eireann at the General Election, December, 1918, is one which I shall ever gratefully remember. In being thus honoured by the citizens of my native district, without solicitation or desire for office on my part, I have reason to feel a pardonable pride.

While fully appreciating the confidence which you have reposed in me, I realised at the time of my election that, the English Government having deported me from Ireland through the exercise of its naval and military power, it would prevent my return thereto until such time as the Irish Republic secured its due recognition.

In full knowledge of how important it was that the Representative for South East Cork should be on the spot in Ireland to attend to the affairs of the Constituency and of the Nation, I seriously considered resigning at that time the position of Teactaire but concluded that my resignation then would have been an embarrassment inasmuch as the Dáil had not yet perfected laws, governing such elections.

Differences have arisen since July, 1919, between President de Valera and members of Dáil Eireann now in the United States on the one hand and the recognised leaders of the movement here on the other, as to the proper conduct of the campaign in America for the recognition of the Irish Republic. My judgment in this matter, based as it has been upon an intimate knowledge of conditions in America, was generally in agreement with the American leaders. This circumstance has governed my actions as National Secretary of the Friends of Irish Freedom, and has furthered my determination to immediately tender my resignation as a member of Dáil Eireann. The only consideration which deterred me from giving effect to that determination was that my action might have been misconstrued by the enemies of the Irish Republic, and heralded as a break in that splendid unity which has marked the progress of the Republican Government in Ireland.

Now, however, it has become evident from letters apparently written by officials of the Irish Republican Government at present in America, captured by the English Government on the person of a man named Barry and published in the Boston, Philadelphia and Chicago papers, that my resignation may at this time be properly offered without adding to the risk of such misconstruction.

I decline to permit my actions here or the actions of those men who have

consistently worked for a generation in America for the establishment in Ireland of a form of government similar to that which prevails in these United States, from being made the subject of controversy and possible dissension in my Constituency. Without acquaintance with conditions in America, you, my friends, cannot possibly understand the American attitude, nor, in particular, the position of those who through the years have borne the brunt of the fight here. It would not be fair to ask you to express an opinion on the merits of the controversy which now diverts the attention of the supporters of the Irish Republic in this country, and it would be unwise to inject it into South East Cork.

The foregoing reasons impel me to hereby resign my position as Teactaire Dáil Eireann representing the Constituency of South East Cork. I am forwarding a duplicate of this resignation to the Speaker of An Dáil Eireann.

In thus definitely severing my official connection with you I desire once more to tender to all my old constituents my sincere thanks for the very great honour conferred on me in my election as your Representative to the first Congress of the Irish Republic, and I beg to assure you of my continued interest in your welfare and in the Cause of the entire Irish Nation.

No matter what vicissitudes the future may have in store for me, I shall always cherish with pride the part which I had the honour to fulfil in the councils of those who made "Easter Week" possible and solidified the foundations of the Irish Republic. It is permissible for me now to speak with a certain amount of freedom in these matters, and it may interest you to learn that during those eventful years prior to "Easter Week" I was one of the selected few in whose hands lay the destiny of the Irish Republic; that my unalterable belief in the necessity of rebaptising the ideals of Emmet, Tone and Mitchel in the blood of men strong in the faith of Irish Republicanism in order to preserve the National Soul of Ireland, guided me to the right course of action; that my voice and influence were invariably in favour of the Irish Nation reasserting itself in arms before the existing favourable opportunity had passed. Results have justified my judgment and I am happy in this knowledge.

I now feel more free to continue my efforts here for the recognition of the Irish Republic on lines which long and practical experience in America has shown me to be for the best interests of the Irish Cause.

I pray God to preserve the unity and magnificent courage of those who in Ireland are battling against the brutal militarism of England; may He give light to those citizens of the Irish Republic who are as yet irresponsive to the Proclamation of "Easter Week" that "The Republic guarantees religious and civil liberty, equal rights, and equal opportunities to all its citizens, and declares its resolve to pursue the happiness and prosperity of the whole nation and of all its parts, cherishing all the children of the

nation equally and oblivious of the differences carefully fostered by an alien government which have divided a minority from a majority in the past."

With renewed assurance of my esteem and my interest in your welfare, and a special word of grateful remembrance to those splendid comrades in South East Cork who in less enlightened days stood unflinchingly for the principle of Irish Republicanism.

Is mise, le meas mor,
Diarmuid Lynch.

The rift between the leaders widened despite efforts at reconciliation. Perhaps the most disastrous element in the situation was that a deep hostility developed between the Irish President and Cohalan. During January 1920, Sunday night conferences were held at President de Valera's headquarters in the Waldorf Astoria Hotel, New York. These were attended by McGarrity, Cohalan, Devoy, Lynch and O'Meara, but they did not curb the growing hostility between Cohalan and the President. Although there was a dramatic public reconciliation between them at a conference in the Park Avenue Hotel on 19th March, the tension did not relax. Devoy's fiery criticism of some of President de Valera's actions continued in the *Gaelic American*, particularly after the President had given the *Westminster Gazette* interview of 6th February on what came to be known as the Cuban policy.

Despite these differences the many phases of the fight for recognition of the Republic were being actively pursued. In March, 1920, the Senate in ratifying the Peace Treaty included a reference to Ireland:

> "The United States adheres to the principle of self-determination and to the resolution of sympathy with the aspiration of the Irish people for a government of their own choice adopted by the Senate, 6th June 1919, and declares that when such government is attained by Ireland—a consummation it is hoped is at hand—it should promptly be admitted as a member of the League of Nations."

Throughout the summer and autumn of 1920, while the struggle in Ireland grew in intensity and violence, President de Valera undertook immensely successful tours of the United States, designed to expound and clarify the national claim for American recognition of the Irish Republic and to encourage subscriptions for the loan. States and cities extended invitations to him, and welcomed him with the ceremony accorded to representative statesmen. He addressed State Legislatures, Universities and official gatherings of many kinds, as well as many public meetings. Everywhere he was accorded every mark of honour and respect and his tours raised the status of the campaign to a new level. Members of the F.O.I.F. were foremost in the work of organisation and in ensuring that the five million dollar target set for the loan was attained.

At the end of October the crisis came. Harry Boland, acting as he said, "with full authority in the name of the Supreme Council of the Irish Republican Brotherhood," cut off the Clan-na-Gael from any further contact with the secret organisation at home. That was a disastrous blow to the F.O.I.F. The Clan was its backbone. On November 16th President de Valera launched at Washington the American Association for the Recognition of the Irish Republic. With sorrow and regret Diarmuid Lynch saw, wrecked and broken, the magnificent organisation he had done so much to create. Its regular membership was then 100,749 ; it had 484 associate Branches, and its total membership approximated 275,000. Of these, 20,000 remained after the split.

Diarmuid Lynch continued as National Secretary, F.O.I.F. A year later, on 11th and 12th December, 1921 a National Convention of the organisation was held at the Hotel Astor, New York, where it had been founded. Strength had again increased to 26,350 regular members and 157 associate Branches, but with two nation wide organisations now claiming the allegiance of Irish America, the effectiveness of both was sadly diminished.

Meanwhile, the Truce had come in Ireland, the negotiations in London had followed, the Treaty had been signed, and Dáil Eireann by a small majority had approved it.

The statement issued by the F.O.I.F. in regard to the Treaty reflects the traditional I.R.B. attitude, and may be said to express Diarmuid's own views at the time :

> "Well meaning men have suggested that the Friends of Irish Freedom should endorse the Free State. They are wrong. This organisation will never endorse the Free State, and individual members should not do so. We were not consulted regarding any measure of compromise ; we were not consulted regarding the agreement made at London, nor regarding the conversations leading up to that agreement. If we had been consulted we would not have approved. Not having been consulted we are under no obligation to approve or endorse. On the contrary we can best serve the Race by refusing to endorse because we can always show historically by the conclusive testimony of men who took part in the conversations at London that the Agreement or Treaty was entered into under duress—so far as Ireland was concerned—under such duress that the compromise made can never be held morally binding, upon this or future generations of the Race—unless that compromise is now ratified and approved by the free will of the Race at home and abroad. While the indications are that at the proposed general election the people of Ireland may, by a majority, vote for the Free State Government, we assert that, in view of their repeated declarations for an independent Republic in recent years, such coming vote will not represent the free will of the Irish people, but will be given merely to escape the ever present English threat of a renewal of the war of devastation and extermination.
>
> "One of the main purposes for which the Friends of Irish Freedom exists is to aid in securing the absolute independence of Ireland—which is her God given right. We have not deviated and will not deviate from that policy. We are opposed to external as well as internal association of Ireland with the British Empire. We reaffirm our belief that Ireland can never achieve liberty nor reach a place of equality with independent nations while any connection with England remains, and that a free and independent Republic, separated from the Empire and controlling the destinies of the Irish people, is the only solution of the Irish national problem."

Coming to the close of 1922, when Civil War raged in Ireland, Diarmuid Lynch wrote in a letter sent to all members of the F.O.I.F. :

> "Heartrending as are the conditions in Ireland at the moment, our fellow workers in the cause here must not feel discouraged. It is more than ever incumbent on us to draw together those friends of Ireland who are capable of viewing the deplorable circumstances intelligently and without passion, so that our influence may be exercised towards securing for Ireland the greatest need of the moment—Peace ; and then forge ahead towards the ultimate goal of the Race—an independent Irish Republic."

Looking at his activities in the ten following years during which he remained in America, and continued as National Secretary, F.O.I.F., his steady, consistent purpose is evident. His Republican principles remained unchanged from the day Sean T. O'Kelly swore him into the I.R.B. until the day of his death. There was no time in that long span of over half a century when he was not thinking and working in one way or another for the realisation of the ideal for which he took up arms in Easter Week, 1916. Wherever he was, in the United States or in Ireland, he found the means to continue what was for him a labour of love.

His sterling honesty and fearless expression of his views remained uninfluenced by the stormy political passions in which he was unavoidably involved. In all his writing on current events there is an absence of that extravagant denunciation of opponents which was such an unfortunate aspect of the very human difference of opinion on policy which arose both in Ireland and America. In the historical recording of the events with which he was associated, truth was for him the first and paramount consideration.

In the years when Irish political life was embittered by the Treaty dissensions and their aftermath, he was, always with the ultimate purpose in view, an advocate of policies which were later adopted but then unpopular. As well as having the Fenian faith, he had faith in the Irish people. He never doubted their ultimate attainment of the national goal of complete independence, and he was, in the old tradition, prepared to use every weapon which came to his hands for the achievement of freedom.

At the Easter week commemoration in New York in 1924, he said :

> "The oath and other obnoxious parts of the Treaty, and the objectionable features of the Constitution drawn in conformity therewith, were accepted under duress ; and I hold that if the Irish people elect a majority of representatives for the express purpose of eliminating said features, the Deputies so elected would be justified in taking that oath with a mental reservation and with the definite intention to break it at the first opportunity.
>
> "Republican Deputies . . . with a clear conscience, and as a matter of determined policy could take their seats in the Dáil, could elect their Cabinet and place their nonimees in control of all the principal departments of State, and could at the earliest moment they saw fit proceed to nullify the oath and take the consequences."

Nearly four years later that policy was adopted by Fianna Fáil. The oath was removed and a Republican Constitution made law.

In 1923 Diarmuid was anxious to relinquish his post as National Secretary, F.O.I.F. He was however persuaded to continue, and in 1928 there was a proposal to wind up the affairs of the Organisation, but lawsuits which were in progress or impending caused a decision to be deferred. Diarmuid has written an account of these lawsuits, from which the following excerpts are quoted :

> "Subscriptions to the First and Second external loans of the Republic of Ireland raised in the United States through the issue of Bond Certificates in 1919-1921 amounted to 5,236, 955.46 and 622,720 dollars respectively, making a total of 5,859,675.46 dollars. The trustees of these proceeds were Eamon de Valera, Most Rev. Michael Fogarty and James O'Meara. The latter resigned in 1921 ; his brother, Stephen O'Meara, replaced him as Trustee."

During the period ending 1st July, 1922, portion of said moneys was transmitted to Ireland ; portion had been expended in raising the loans, in the financing of the American Association for the recognition of the Irish Republic, in defraying the expenses of the Dáil Eireann representatives to the United States, etc. Including accrued interest, the balance remaining

on deposit in U.S. Banks amounted to approximately 2,500,000 dollars by 1927.

The Irish Free State Government under President Cosgrave claimed ownership of the said balance and brought suit in New York against Trustees de Valera and O'Meara and the banks to secure possession. Two other parties intervened as defendants, viz. the Hearn Committee and the Noonan Committee. The case was tried before Justice Peters in the New York Supreme Court in 1927. In this the F.O.I.F. did not participate. Judge Peters gave judgment in accordance with the main contention of the Hearn Committee, viz. that the balance on deposit should be distributed pro-rata amongst the subscribers to the said loans. . .

The F.O.I.F. duly deposited with the Receivers the certificates in its possession, and applied for its appropriate share of the distribution. One of its claims made on the basis of the 100,000, dollar subscription . . . was objected to by the Hearn Committee. The Referee . . . disallowed said claim.

The F.O.I.F. appealed. This necessitated the printing of the testimony, together with some 136 exhibits and certain other documents, making an exhaustive volume of 860 pages. The five sitting judges of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, New York, unanimously reversed every finding of the Referee which was adverse to the F.O.I.F. claim.

The Hearn Committee then took the case to the Court of Appeals at Albany ; the seven judges thereof unanimously affirmed the decision of the Appellate Division. Thereupon, the Receivers, in 1931, paid to the F.O.I.F. the sum of 63,180.55 dollars, the full amount to which it was entitled.

While the investigation of the objections to the F.O.I.F. bond-certificate claim was in progress, the prime movers organised another Committee and in February, 1929, began suit against the F.O.I.F. for an accounting of the Irish Victory Fund. The personnel of this plaintiff committee included Joseph McGarrity, Hugh Montague, Rev. John H. Dooley, and Thomas Rock,—who as previously stated had been members of the National Council, F.O.I.F., up to the time of the Split in November, 1920, and as such had participated in the deliberations and decisions of that body. Their " attorney of record " was Mr. Jeremiah A. O'Leary, with Mr. John T. Ryan as counsel.

In the trial of the action, three years later, in addition to plaintiffs' exhibits, 46 were introduced by the F.O.I.F. (including the anti-League of Nations advertisements). The testimony of the witnesses (Joseph McGarrity, Father Dooley, Thomas D. O'Connor and William P. Manahan, for plaintiffs ; Diarmuid Lynch, Richard F. Dalton, Thomas J. Breslin, John P. Grace and John J. Kirby, for the F.O.I.F.) occupied 703 typed pages.

In dismissing the complaint, Supreme Court Justice Albert Cohn after setting forth Findings of Fact, stated in his Conclusions of Law :

"'The plaintiffs have failed to establish the cause of action alleged in the complaint, or any cause of action against the defendants or any of them.'"

It is the unanimous opinion of those who have first hand personal knowledge of Diarmuid's work as National Secretary of the Friends of Irish Freedom that this favourable result would not have been achieved were it not for the extraordinary day-to-day attention he had given to the organisation over the previous years, the excellence, integrity and completeness of his records, and the clarity and honesty of his testimony before the various courts, even under the strain of severe and prolonged cross-examination. He had rendered a last signal service to the organisation he had done so much to build up, and contributed notably to the courts' complete vindication of the manner in which its affairs had been conducted.

With the successful issue of this last suit he was at last in a position to effect his resignation as National Secretary, F.O.I.F.

In May, 1923 headquarters was changed from 280 Broadway, where it had been located for fourteen eventful years, to the American Irish Historical Society's Building at East Sixteenth Street, New York.

Closing his association with one of the finest efforts of Irish America, Diarmuid Lynch left behind him an honoured name and an unsurpassed record of service.

CHAPTER XIII

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

Note on Pearse's Valedictory Letter.

Statements have been published, including one by Mr. Bouch of the National Library, ascribing to P. H. Pearse the *penmanship* as shown on this photostat.

There can be no question as to the *authorship* of the valedictory, but in my opinion the penmanship of the photostat is definitely *not* that of Padraig Pearse,—and it is wrong to ascribe the letter to him. As a result of conversations I had with Mr. Bouch in 1937 he was inclined to agree with me.

Mr. Bouch took steps to ascertain from the British War Office if the *original* document was in its archives; he received a reply in the negative.

In 1937-8 I made numerous enquiries in Dublin along these lines:

(*a*) How Pearse's original MS. escaped at (or immediately before) the surrender,—as apparently it did.

(*b*) Who it was that made the print-script copy of which the enclosed is a photostat.

(*c*) What became of Pearse's original MS., and of the first print-script copy (as per photostat)—which copy is evidently the work of an expert draftsman.

but failed to elicit any information on these points.

Furthermore, I submitted the photostat to several individuals for their opinion as to whether the penmanship thereon is that of P. H. Pearse. All were in agreement with myself on the matter.

I also submitted the question of the penmanship to Col. J. J. O'Connell: his re-submission of it to the Chief-of-Staff resulted in the following statement by Capt. P. O'Duinnin:

"I have submitted attached documents to various people here.

"All are agreed that it is difficult if not impossible to find a basis of comparison between the script used in the valedictory letter (the photostat D.L.) and the actual manuscript of Pearse's draft of the Manifesto to the Citizens of Dublin.

"Major Joyce who was a pupil of Pearse's says he was not aware of Pearse's

ability to use or practise this type of script. He showed me a school certificate from St. Enda's which was compiled and signed by Pearse himself. It was done in manuscript and if Pearse was addicted to the use of the illuminating script he would most likely have employed it in issuing Certificates.

"Commandant S. O'Sullivan—himself a good exponent of this type of script writing—is of opinion that it was not executed by Pearse for the following reasons :—

(*a*) The consistency of form, neatness of execution, as well as its compression into such a small compass, and its general lay out proclaim it the work of an experienced draughtsman.

(*b*) It would take an expert penman at least an hour to produce it and the circumstances, chaos and turmoil that must have existed in the G.P.O. on the morning of 28th April, 1916 were not conducive to issuing of orders or proclamations in this manner

(*c*) If the document was written by Pearse it is likely he would have signed it in manuscript. That the signature is printed and prefixed by the word 'Signed' in brackets denotes that it is not the original."

D. L.

APPENDIX II

Tracton, Ballyfeard,
Dec. 30, 1947.

Major F. O'Donoghue,

Pearse's remarks, 6.2.16.

Dear Florrie,

You asked me to comment on Pearse's talk to "G" Co., 2nd Battalion, I.V., Dublin, on February 6, 1916, as published in the *Irish Volunteer,* Vol. 2, No. 63.

His purpose was, of course, self-evident, viz. ; to focus attention of the rank and file on a definite objective which was neither specified nor suggested in the I. Volunteer Declaration of Principles ; to attune their minds to participation in an *insurrection* for the achievement of Irish independence (secret preparations for which were then far advanced).

This outspoken advocacy of "Separation" as the goal of the Irish Volunteers, coupled with his statement about being "called into action" was fraught with possible dangers :

First, it might have impelled the "moderate element" on the I.V. Executive Committee to challenge openly his right—as an individual member of that Committee—to advocate any policy other than that laid down in the Declaration of Principles.

Second, his remarks might have excited the suspicion of the British Government with relation to the Irish Volunteer organisation, which in turn might have led to moves by the British calculated to wreck any plans the Volunteers might have had of "going into actions."

Fortunately, neither of these untoward results eventuated from that talk :

(1) Eoin MacNeill and his colleagues who desired the Volunteers to adhere to the Declaration of Principles did not realise *until Holy Week* that Pearse and his associates actually contemplated an *insurrection* and the participation therein of the Irish Volunteers.

(2) What with the attitude of the Parliamentary Party and that of the vast majority of the Irish people at that time, the idea of an armed insurrection seems to have been entirely beyond the conception of the British Government. That Pearse's remarks on the 6th of February were noted by the British officials in Ireland may be taken as axiomatic, but whatever danger the latter may have sensed around that period it evidently did not appear to them to be immediate. Pearse's intimate contact with Clarke, MacDiarmada, etc., was unknown to them. Furthermore, I'm inclined to the opinion that they deemed Padraig Pearse more or less a literary visionary,

and discounted his remarks accordingly. They did not know Pearse as we knew him.

Pearse's role was a difficult one: to exhort the Volunteers to a "separatist" conception of their existence, and at the same time to allay the fears of those whose opposition would have been serious. He was careful to preface the words "IF EVER" in the phrase: "IF EVER the Irish Volunteers went into action," and to add another qualification: "It would be wrong for me to say they might SOON be called into action."

The subject of this talk was in all probability discussed in advance by the Military Council, at the *instigation of Pearse* who was a *deeply* conscientious man. The Irish Volunteers were not founded nor was the organisation promoted—not in so far as *some* of the founders, nor the vast majority of the Volunteers themselves, nor the general public understood, as a "separatist" body. Yet, we know that in pursuance of the purpose which the I.R.B. had in mind for them from the beginning, the Military Council aimed at throwing the Volunteers en masse into the proposed Rising, and that *this was to be accomplished through the instrumentality of Padraig Pearse* in his capacity of Director of Organisation on the Irish Volunteer Staff.

This situation demanded some adjustment—in so far as it could be accomplished with reasonable degree of safety—before the Irish Volunteers were actually "called into action for the achievement of Irish freedom." It was a delicate undertaking, and Pearse himself was, par excellence, the man for it. He succeeded in not alone conveying the desired idea to those who were ready to be impressed by it, but at same time in minimising the full and immediate purport of his remarks from others. Had the effort not been essential under the circumstances he would certainly be open to censure for "Sailing too close to the wind."

DIARMUID LYNCH.

APPENDIX III

DÁIL EIREANN

Scoltar litreaca Runaide Dáil Eireann, f/c Tig an Ard-Maoir, At-Cliat.

Correspondence may be addressed to the Secretary, Dáil Eireann, Mansion House, Dublin.

Dublin.
6/3/19.

Diarmuid Lynch,

A Chara Dhil, Since we wrote you in Feby the situation has developed a good deal, and the necessity for immediate funds has greatly increased.

The expenditure with regard to foreign Propaganda is simply enormous —the cost of the present modest establishment in Paris running into some £100 per week up to the present. Arrangements have had to be made to extend the scope and the additional amount required will be of large proportions. To give you an idea of money values there one small sitting room in Sean t's Hotel costs 90 frs per day.

In addition there are constructive schemes we want to go in for here. To make any decent start and to secure credit we must first accumulate a considerable reserve.

There are a number of statements being made here by the Press that you in America have collected 1,250,000 dollars for Dáil Eireann. We would like to have some sort of a general idea as to the actual amount. It would very materially affect our calculations.

With regard to a suggestion as to the appointment of Trustees—any funds which will be sent to the Dáil will of course be placed in the hands of the Minister of Finance. Receipts will be furnished you by the Chairman and the Minister jointly. It is suggested for your consideration though, that you appoint Trustees for the Dáil Fund in the U.S.A. These names would be the guarantee to the subscribers out there while the Dáil would in turn be responsible to them.

This letter was to deal with finance only but two points may be mentioned

(*a*) We are now getting in touch with Breathnach.

(*b*) If you think well of it you might send that man Malyet to France at once. The person whom he recommended we should send had already applied for passport.

We suggest that in sending money—and we want £5,000 at once—(it would interest you to know that at the moment, we are working on a loan)

—you cable it to London County Westminster Bank, Chancery Lane, Holborn Branch, to the order Erskine Childers, Thirteen Embankment Gardens, Chelsea, London, S.W. Arrangements have been made with him and he is an American citizen who frequently receives large sums for various activities from America. It would be quite safe to cable £5,000 to him.

We are making provision to send you a fortnightly bulletin on matters this end.

Slan agus beannact leat,
Sinne
Cathal Brugha, Priomh Aireac,
Micheál O Coileann, Finance

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